As we bid adieu to 2024, Balochistan finds itself at a critical juncture — grappling with a year shaped by political turmoil, devastating floods, spiralling violence, and the rise of grassroots rights movements.

The year began ominously enough — with a direct confrontation in Islamabad between the state and protesters demanding to know the whereabouts of missing persons as well as escalating tensions between Pakistan and Iran, culminating in an exchange of missiles in January. This was followed by a series of terror incidents, including suicide bombings, ambushes targeting security forces, and coordinated attacks across the province.

According to a report by Balochistan’s provincial home department, 296 people, including civilians and military personnel, were killed, and over 500 injured in 563 reported attacks between January 1 and December 20, 2024. February, coinciding with general elections, and August, marking the country’s Independence Day, were the deadliest months, with 187 attacks, including suicide bombings, claiming 119 lives.

Amid the chaos, a silver lining that shone through was that young, educated women emerged as powerful agents of change, leading peaceful rights movements such as the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) and the Baloch Women Forum (BWF). But even as these young women took to the streets, the already fragile security situation in the restive province further deteriorated.

The rising insurgency, coupled with the year’s major political upheavals, has left observers concerned about what 2025 might hold for Balochistan. This article is an attempt to explore the factors fuelling unrest and how the situation may unfold in the coming year.

Tensions between Iran and Pakistan

The start of 2024 saw an alarming escalation between Iran and Pakistan, as both countries engaged in a rare exchange of missile strikes. On January 16, Iran targeted Pakistan’s Panjgur district, claiming to have struck two strongholds of the anti-Iran militant group, Jaish al-Adl. This Sunni Baloch militant group has long been accused by Tehran of orchestrating unrest and ambushes in Iran’s Sistan-Baluchestan province — a region with a restive Sunni Baloch population that alleges discrimination in Shia-majority Iran.

Pakistan responded the next day with retaliatory strikes, reportedly targeting hideouts of the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), a separatist group responsible for unrest mostly in the Makran coastal region. While both countries moved quickly to de-escalate, the exchange drew fresh attention to the activities of both Jaish al-Adl and Baloch separatist insurgents operating on either side of the border.

The aftermath of the missile exchange was far from contained. On January 27 and 28, nine Pakistani workers were killed by unidentified attackers in Iran’s Sistan-Baluchestan province, highlighting the fragile security dynamics in the border regions.

Days later, between January 29 and 30, the banned Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) launched one of its most sophisticated and deadly offensives in Balochistan’s Mach town. The coordinated attack targeted security installations in the city of Mach, firing at least 15 rockets from nearby mountains, before attacking a security forces’ camp near the central jail and also entering the Mach railway station.

This was a turning point for the BLA, showcasing its evolution from a small guerrilla force into a highly lethal terror outfit, capable of executing complex operations. The Mach attack not only highlighted the growing operational capacity of Baloch insurgents but also showed the deepening instability in a region plagued by overlapping militant movements and cross-border tensions.

As the year progressed, these events showed the fragile and combustible nature of relations between Iran and Pakistan, with militant groups exploiting the vacuum of security on both sides of the border. The year ahead may see both nations struggling to manage these volatile dynamics while addressing their domestic insurgencies.

The march to Islamabad

In late January, a month-long protest by Baloch activists, led by Dr Mahrang Baloch, ended outside Islamabad’s National Press Club (NPC), with activists expressing “disappointment with the state”.

The sit-in, which began in December 2023 amid freezing weather, ended with the protesters facing harassment, police cases and a sustained media campaign against them. Caretaker Prime Minister Anwarul Haq Kakar repeatedly accused these families of missing persons of being “terrorist sympathisers”, further deepening tensions and aggravating the long-standing distrust between Islamabad and Balochistan.

For decades, Balochistan has accused Islamabad of neglecting its grievances, with the treatment of the protesters in Islamabad underlining what many see as heavy-handed tactics. Reports of harassment of Dr Mahrang and her fellow activists drew sharp criticism and anger in Balochistan. Although the NPC briefly requested police to remove the protest camp — a decision reversed following public backlash — the damage had already been done. Dr Mahrang’s decision to call off the protest disheartened many young people in Balochistan, who perceived it as yet another instance of systemic disregard for their concerns.

Dr Mahrang’s return to Quetta told a different story. Thousands gathered to greet her, with supporters honouring her with pearls and the Balochi turban, a traditional emblem of immense respect. Musicians and poets dedicated songs to her, and some dubbed her “The Sardar of the Baloch” — a title traditionally reserved for male tribal leaders.

Ironically, the state’s heavy-handed approach in Islamabad had elevated her standing, turning her into a fiery young leader who people believed was not afraid of challenging the powerful.

Elections amid rising violence and controversy

February saw Balochistan go to polls under the shadow of escalating violence and tensions. The home department described February as one of the most volatile months in Balochistan, second only to August. On the eve of the general elections, twin bomb blasts in Pishin and Qila Saifullah claimed the lives of more than 30 people and injured dozens. Meanwhile, the Baloch Raaji Ajoi Sangar (BRAS), an umbrella organisation of Baloch separatist insurgents, issued a post-election statement claiming responsibility for 161 terror attacks on polling stations across the province.

Overall, the elections were widely regarded as controversial, with Baloch and Pashtun nationalist parties labelling the process as flawed. Following the results, the Balochistan National Party (BNP Mengal), National Party (NP), Pashtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PkMAP), and Hazara Democratic Party (HDP) formed a four-party alliance to protest the alleged rigging. Against the backdrop of violence, frustration among the youth, and growing alienation, the elections were a critical opportunity to defuse tensions between Islamabad and Balochistan.

However, accusations of rigging and the alleged imposition of what nationalist parties described as “artificial leadership” deepened mistrust and further alienated the province. A credible and impartial government could have helped ease tensions, particularly by engaging with the BYC, which emerged as a vital political force in 2024, comprising activists from various political parties and civil society. Instead, the government’s decision to sideline the BYC and frame its leadership in police cases disillusioned Baloch youth, intensifying feelings of hopelessness and anger in a province already plagued by violence and disillusion from the centre.

A year of natural disasters

With the province already reeling from political instability and escalating violence, it was also severely affected by natural disasters that compounded its existing challenges. In late February and early March, heavy rains devastated the Gwadar, Makran, and northern and central regions of the province, causing widespread disruption to daily life and halting traffic across affected areas.

The 30-hour downpour triggered flash floods that submerged large swaths of land, overwhelming the already fragile infrastructure. The district administration in Gwadar was forced to declare a state of emergency as the rains inundated homes, roads, and agricultural fields, further deepening the province’s crisis. The situation was exacerbated by poor infrastructure, insufficient urban planning, and the blocking of natural water pathways due to unregulated construction on traditional riverbeds.

These factors worsened the already dire conditions, making it clear that Balochistan’s lack of preparedness for such calamities had been a long-standing issue.

A strategic shift in Baloch insurgency

The year 2024 also witnessed a dramatic escalation in both the intensity and strategy of terror outfits operating in the province, particularly the BLA. Once known for its hit-and-run tactics, the BLA has, since 2018, employed suicide bombings on and off as part of its operational repertoire. However, where the group previously managed only one or two such attacks annually, 2024 saw a dramatic surge with six claimed suicide attacks.

This shift speaks of a broader evolution of the terror outfit from rural guerrilla warfare to urban-targeted militancy. The group’s focus has shifted toward striking strategically significant urban centres, which highlights a growing operational sophistication. A notable example came in March, when the BLA targeted the Gwadar Port Authority, a linchpin of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and a symbol of economic and strategic importance. The attack, carried out in one of the province’s most heavily secured zones, was a reminder of the grim trajectory of violence in Balochistan and the increasing capabilities of insurgent groups and terror outfits.

Despite the lingering fallout from the March attack on the Gwadar Port, the BLA struck again, attempting to target PNS Siddique in Turbat just days later. The Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) said the attack was thwarted due to a “swift and effective response by the troops, ensuring the safety and security of personnel and assets”.

However, the attempted strike highlights several key issues: the insurgents’ growing ability to exploit security loopholes and the increasing manpower at their disposal. The frequency and scale of such attacks also raise concerns about the rising number of Baloch youth joining armed groups.

August 26 — a turning point in the Baloch insurgency

The flashpoint of this violence came on August 26, when the BLA launched a series of coordinated attacks across 11 districts which shocked the authorities and marked one of the deadliest days in the two-decade-long insurgency. The assaults included blocking highways, a suicide bombing by a young woman at a military camp in Lasbela, sabotage of gas pipelines and railway tracks, and the killing of 23 passengers, mostly Punjabis. In total, 72 people were killed in these attacks.

The timing was symbolic, commemorating the anniversary of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti’s 2006 death, an event seen as the catalyst for the current wave of insurgency. The scale and sophistication of the attacks in areas such as Lasbela and Musakhail on the border with Punjab — which had previously been unaffected by the insurgency — along with the involvement of a young female law student, highlight the BLA’s alarmingly growing operational capabilities.

BLA’s increasing use of suicide bombings

The BLA’s increasing reliance on suicide bombings is a scary shift in its tactics, as seen in Quetta, where a suicide bomber targeted the Quetta railway station, killing over two dozen people, including 16 security personnel, and injuring more than 100 in November. Similarly, in October, a suicide bombing near Karachi’s international airport killed two Chinese nationals and injured 11 others.

Traditionally, Baloch armed groups have avoided attacks in densely populated public areas such as railway stations and highways. However, this restraint appears to have diminished, reflecting a troubling evolution in their strategy. The attacks also point to the BLA’s ability to recruit and mobilise manpower, even as the state intensifies its crackdown on insurgent outfits in the province.

Punjabis the soft target

According to official reports, 44 per cent of the total attacks in the province targeted armed forces, while a staggering 56pc were directed at civilians. Among the most vulnerable groups were settlers from Punjab, who have become a frequent target of insurgent groups. In the second week of April, the BLA carried out an attack in Nushki District, where the terrorists offloaded nine passengers from a bus, checked their identity cards, and executed them on a deserted roadside. The victims were all from central Punjab.

On May 9, seven barbershop workers were killed in Surbandar in Gwadar. These targeted attacks underline the persistent insecurity faced by non-local civilians, particularly those from Punjab, who are increasingly viewed as symbols of the state’s presence and economic interests in Balochistan.

These attacks in Balochistan are part of a broader surge in violence that has spilled over into neighbouring Iran. On April 4, gunmen launched simultaneous attacks on multiple security and military compounds in the southeastern Iranian towns of Rask and Chabahar, killing 11 Iranian security personnel. This cross-border violence signals the growing regional ramifications of the Baloch insurgency and highlights the increasing volatility across the Goldsmith Line.

Given this scenario, it is imperative that the state makes every effort to stem this ethnic violence. Allowing it to simmer will only result in further escalation, as seen in other areas of the country.

Increasing attacks on freedom of speech

As violence escalated and the law enforcement agencies struggled to contain the insurgency in Balochistan, one of the most concerning developments has been the growing clampdown on freedom of speech and the press.

For the first time in decades, police and local authorities locked the gates of the Quetta Press Club to prevent members of the BYC from holding a seminar on the situation in Gwadar. This unprecedented move sent a chilling message about the extent to which the authorities are willing to go to stifle free expression.

At the same time, however, rights activists gained international recognition for their advocacy against enforced disappearances and alleged human rights abuses.

In May 2024, Sammi Deen Baloch became the first Pakistani recipient of the Front-Line Defenders Human Rights Award, an honour given to her by the Ireland-based human rights organisation. Later in October, TIME magazine named Dr Mahrang Baloch among its 100 next emerging leaders, acknowledging her as a rising voice for change.

The recognition, however, came at great personal cost for Dr Mahrang. In June, she was named in a police case for disrupting government officials from performing their duty, rioting, condemnation of the creation of the state, advocacy for the abolition of its sovereignty, and sedition during an event at the Quetta Press Club in May. The authorities also placed her on a no-fly list in October, preventing her from traveling to New York to attend TIME’s gala to accept her award. In December, she was named by the BBC as one of the 100 most inspiring and influential women of 2024.

In July 2024, the BYC organised the ‘Baloch Raaji Muchi’ (Baloch National Gathering) in the coastal city of Gwadar to raise awareness about what they termed as the exploitation of Balochistan’s resources and to highlight alleged human rights abuses in the region.

The protest, which aimed to draw attention to these pressing issues, was met with a violent crackdown by provincial authorities, leading to clashes between protesters and security forces in Gwadar and Mastung.

The unrest led to the deaths of at least three people, with several others injured. Despite roadblocks set up by authorities to prevent the protests, hundreds of protesters from across the province successfully made their way to Gwadar’s Marine Drive for the gathering. Earlier, on their way to Mastung, 14 protesters were shot and wounded by security forces. For more than a week, the city of Gwadar was effectively shut down.

The crackdown on peaceful protesters sent a chilling message to the people of Balochistan. It reinforced the growing belief among the youth that their calls for change, even through peaceful means, would be met with hostility by the state. This violent response to a nonviolent protest only fuelled the narrative among Baloch nationalists that the authorities reject dialogue and peaceful struggle, which further alienated the province’s already disgruntled youth.

The rise of young women leaders

But even as the state has attempted to clamp down on dissent, more and more young men and women took to social media, leveraging modern communication technologies to amplify their voices. The vast majority of these activists, especially women, hail from middle-class backgrounds and expressed growing disillusionment with traditional nationalist leaders, accusing them of failing to address their community’s pressing concerns.

One example of this shift is Dr Shaale Baloch, an emerging new voice in Balochistan’s activism. With an MBBS degree, Dr Shaale has been mobilising women under the banner of the Baloch Women Forum, focusing on some of the most neglected areas such as Awaran and Mand, often overshadowed by Balochistan’s urban politics. Having grown up in a small neglected remote village in Kech district during a period of heightened militancy, Dr Shaale’s activism is deeply personal, driven by her experiences of repression and neglect.

She has a large number of young followers, especially women from the peripheries. “Baloch politics and activism have long been centred in urban areas,” says Dr Shaale. “My mission is to bring the peripheries into focus.” Activists like Dr Shaale, Dr Mahrang and Sammi now have the power to rally thousands to protests and sit-ins within hours, which shows their influence and the public’s growing trust in women-led movements.

“There has been a huge political vacuum, and masses have been disappointed by traditional nationalist parties, who have only benefited from Balochistan’s conflict,” says Sadia Baloch, a young activist from Quetta. “Movements like the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) and the Baloch Women Forum, led by young women, are filling that gap. They are trusted because they are women, they are young, and majority of them are victims themselves. This places an immense responsibility on their shoulders.”

The rise of women leaders like Dr Shaale Baloch and Dr Mahrang is a transformative moment in Balochistan’s political landscape, as a new generation of educated and middle-class women activists from the peripheries attempts to reshape the narrative and give a voice to the region’s most marginalised communities.

Challenges and opportunities in 2025

Thus, the year 2025 in Balochistan hinges on Islamabad’s engagement with the province’s young, educated activists. The challenge for the state is that even as it cracks down on insurgents and focuses on counter-terrorism measures, it must do so without further alienating the youth. Providing space for discussions with groups like the BYC and the Baloch Women Forum, while addressing deep-rooted grievances, could turn these grassroots movements into agents of peace.

Regional dynamics will also shape the province’s trajectory. With its porous borders, Balochistan’s stability is somehow also tied to Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan and Iran, both of which can influence cross-border militancy and insurgent networks.

Furthermore, the economic ambitions tied to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) hang in the balance as violence against Chinese nationals continues to rise. The toll — 20 Chinese nationals killed and 34 injured since 2021 — suggests the fragility of these investments amid unrelenting unrest.

For the Baloch youth, the state’s apparent indifference to their activism, coupled with Pakistan’s internal political distractions, presents both challenges and opportunities. Moreover, Islamabad’s preoccupation with political crises in Punjab and power struggles between the PTI and the establishment has left Balochistan on the margins of national priorities.

Thus, the interplay between local activism, state policies, and regional geopolitics will ultimately determine whether Balochistan moves toward greater stability or deeper conflict in 2025.

Header image created with generative AI