2024 was an eventful year for Pakistan. We have seen a few successes — including an IMF deal and the return of macroeconomic stability, for now — and perhaps a greater number of setbacks, including continued political instability, democratic backsliding, and a worsening security situation.

The country faces formidable challenges in 2025. Here are five major issues that it will need to confront head on in the new year:

A growing, multi-front security threat

As many as 579 civilians were killed in 784 terror attacks in Pakistan in 2024, according to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, both numbers higher than any year since 2015. Moreover, 383 security forces personnel were killed in these attacks as well as other operations, according to the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) director general Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry.

December 16 marked 10 years since the 2014 Army Public School attack in Peshawar, which claimed the lives of 147 people, including over 130 schoolchildren. It became a turning point in Pakistan’s fight against terrorism.

In the years that followed, the terrorist threat against Pakistan receded in the face of military action, including the Zarb-i-Azb operation against the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). But terrorism in Pakistan has resurged since the TTP found logistical space in Afghanistan after the Afghan Taliban took over in 2021, with attacks and fatalities rising each year. Pakistan has struggled to find a strategy to counter the TTP in recent years and has had no success in pressuring the Taliban to contain the group either.

The terrorist threat facing Pakistan evolved further in 2024 with the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) operating on a larger scale, and shifting its tactics: in Musakhel on August 26, the BLA executed at least 23 workers from Punjab after offloading them from buses and checking their identity cards. In November, the BLA claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing that killed at least 26 people at the Quetta railway station. Moreover, the insurgent group was also responsible for an October attack outside the Karachi airport that killed two Chinese workers.

The government has announced the launch of kinetic action against the BLA. But the people of Balochistan say there is little in the state’s response to address their grievances, including over decades-long heavy handedness from the state and the distribution of Balochistan’s natural resources. Any coherent, comprehensive strategy for Balochistan will have to address the grievances of citizens while taking decisive action against those who take up arms.

Both the BLA and TTP require the state’s focus and attention. The two outfits are different — in their goals, where they draw support, where they recruit — compounding the challenge to the state. BLA and TTP attacks in Pakistan have also contributed to tensions with China and Afghanistan, respectively (discussed next). In 2025, a key challenge will be dealing with two fronts of insecurity — and additional ones, including ballooning sectarian violence — simultaneously.

On top of it all, the state’s narrative on terrorism remains full of stiff, awkwardly worded condemnation and platitudes; Pakistan’s leaders have still not learned to talk candidly and clearly about the terrorist threat the country faces.

Foreign policy strains

Pakistan’s security issues, and in particular, attacks by the BLA on Chinese targets, pose a direct threat to Pakistan’s relationship with China and the future of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). China recently told Pakistan in no uncertain terms that security threats are “unacceptable” and pose a “constraint” to CPEC.

Attacks by the TTP have in turn caused escalating tensions with Pakistan’s western neighbour Afghanistan, which has refused to rein in the group. Pakistan has few good options when it comes to dealing with the TTP. On December 24, it directly struck TTP targets in Afghanistan, reportedly killing 46 people. The Afghan Taliban countered with retaliatory strikes across the border in Pakistan a few days later.

Pakistan faces a tough situation on the American front as well. The US-Pakistan relationship struggled to find a basis during the Biden years and has been at a low point following the American withdrawal from Afghanistan. One of the final decisions of the Biden administration for Pakistan was to impose sanctions on four Pakistani enterprises — state and private — that supply Pakistan’s ballistic missile programme. The second Trump administration brings uncertainty into the mix — but not much hope for improved bilateral relations.

Pakistan is in a tight spot in its relationships with both the US and China. Ultimately, the security problem that bedevils its bilateral relationship with China may be an easier one to tackle than the larger one that confronts its relationship with the US — the lack of a solid basis for a partnership.

Zero-sum politics

Pakistan’s zero-sum political crisis that began nearly three years ago with the ouster of Imran Khan continues, to deleterious effect. Protests, arrests, military trials, repression, and a marred election later, it is no closer to resolution.

The government (and the military) sees and treats the political opposition as an existential threat. This kind of politics has resulted in democratic backsliding, a deeply polarised society, a state that is consumed with thwarting the political challenge to it rather than the task of governance, and negative consequences for the economy. Besides, the argument that the political opposition is engaging in “digital terrorism” online has driven away focus from the very real terrorism nightmare faced by the country.

The resolution to this political challenge ultimately will have to be political. The PTI’s protests have not succeeded beyond showcasing popular support for the party. The government will have to acknowledge that it has a political opposition that remains incredibly popular. It seems a dialogue between the two sides has begun; reaching some sort of conclusion should be a key goal for 2025.

It is crucial for the incumbent ruling dispensation to recognise that healthy political contestation and accountability will in the long run help all of Pakistan’s political players — and are necessary to help the country progress.

Throttling the internet

The state has resorted to an array of blunt moves to curb online dissent and political mobilisation of the opposition — from banning social media platforms, most notably X (formerly Twitter), to throttling the internet and putting up a purported “firewall”. These steps clearly threaten Pakistan’s growing technology industry, and in turn, its economy.

The state has denied some of these moves, including the firewall and throttling internet speeds, but its statements betray a deep suspicion and paranoia of the online space (which the opposition has proven particularly effective at using, including for the 2024 election).

The state’s actions are resulting in accumulating losses for Pakistan’s tech industry. Technology exports amounted to $3.2 billion for the year ending in June. An estimated 300,000 freelancers in the country work in the technology sector, and hundreds of thousands more rely on internet-based companies like ride-sharing apps to earn their incomes. One estimate suggests that Pakistan’s internet firewall could cost the economy at least $300 million.

It is ironic that the same government that argues that political stability is necessary for economic growth is, through online repression, hurting a powerful engine of that growth. And in a global economy where an edge in the technology sector is crucial to say the least, it is a deeply regressive approach.

Democratic decline

The state’s response to Pakistan’s political crisis has accelerated the country’s democratic decline. By the end of PDM’s first stint in power in 2023, the Economist Intelligence Unit had already downgraded Pakistan to an “authoritarian regime”.

The backsliding continued in 2024 in the wake of the February general elections, which in itself were marred by allegations of rigging. Ironically, the polls had become controversial even before election day — with months of unconstitutional delay, the leader of arguably the country’s most popular party, the PTI, in jail, and the party forced to contest the elections without its electoral symbol.

Months later, the judiciary, which had served as an important (albeit inconsistent) check on the state’s excesses, was defanged via the 26th amendment, which gave Parliament power to select the chief justice.

Meanwhile, the civilian government appeared to cede further space to the military, by extending the term of the army chief to five years (with a second term also a possibility). The manner in which these changes were rushed through Parliament was as significant as the substance of these changes.

A key challenge for 2025 and beyond — and perhaps the most elusive one — will be for Pakistan’s political parties to work together to avert further democratic decline. The current civilian dispensation may neither have the will nor see the incentive for that right now, but the long-term health of Pakistan’s democracy is necessary for its survival as well.

Priorities, priorities

To sum up, the challenges Pakistan faces are formidable — some are of its own making; most difficult to address. The two it can address head on in the coming year are its political crisis and security challenges.

Tackling the political crisis will be no small feat, but it is crucial because its ripple effects will ease the other challenges described above, including curbs on the internet and the broader democratic decline. This would give the government space to address the country’s security challenges as well.

In terms of security, the state must be prepared to combat terror with force on multiple frontiers, while making every attempt not to further alienate the population that is likely to be affected by these measures.