LIKE other data sciences, assessing and analysing security trends is a rigorous process, requiring specialised skills and methodologies to derive accurate projections. Evident trends provide valuable insights into violent actors’ capabilities and the effectiveness of countermeasures, but a deeper analysis can uncover future strategies, political designs, and shifts in the operational tactics of both non-state and state actors.

The security landscape in Pakistan is undergoing rapid change. According to data compiled by the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (Pips), the country experienced a 70 per cent increase in incidents of terrorist violence in 2024 compared to the previous year, with a total of 521 terrorist attacks reported. The sharp rise highlights the growing strength of two major groups: the Tehr­eek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). These groups have escalated religiously motivated militancy and nationalist insurgency to a level that demands a comprehensive response. The state will need to employ full-scale force and reassess its threat perception. Furthermore, it must review its political and diplomatic strategies to effectively address the critical threats to its sovereignty.

The TTP and BLA are also not the only groups operating within their ideological and political domains. Other factions also contribute to the unrest, albeit with diminishing influence. It has been seen that, gradually, smaller groups are becoming subservient to the two major organisations. This trend is particularly evident among Baloch separatist groups, where consolidation is occurring at a faster pace compared to religiously motivated groups. For instance, after the formation of an alliance of insurgent groups under the Baloch Raji Ajoi Sangar (BRAS) banner, discussions about merging additional factions into the BLA have remained ongoing. In the realm of religiously motivated groups, the other significant actors include the Hafiz Gul Bahadur group, Lashkar-i-Islam, and Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K). These groups continue to fuel violence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. However, despite internal disputes and disagreements, no major new factions have emerged in this domain over the past four years.

While the sources of strength for these groups vary, common factors include access to Nato’s leftover weapons in Afghanistan and support from the Afghan Taliban. The BLA’s strength lies in the growing identity crisis among Baloch youth, fuelled by the missing persons issue and a pervasive sense of deprivation. In contrast, the TTP derives support and inspiration from the Taliban and their ideology surrounding the “Azad Qabail” (independent tribes; a reference to former Fata).

A failure to implement effective political and tactical strategies has allowed militant groups to strengthen.

A failure to implement effective political and tactical strategies has allowed these groups to strengthen. The TTP has also been actively attempting to persuade the BLA to collaborate against the state. If their operational partnership strengthens, the threat dynamics to internal security could change drastically. The combined operational reach of these groups would extend to critical regions, enabling them to launch more sophisticated attacks using a combination of guerrilla warfare and terrorist techniques.

When such actors gain strength, they can ignite other latent conflicts. This phenomenon was observed in Kurram tribal district, where local violent actors affiliated with their counterparts from their respective sectarian faiths. A similar dynamic can be observed with the Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA) in Sindh. Drawing inspiration from the Baloch insurgency, the SRA is now seeking to incite violence in the region.

As terrorist violence intensifies, it exacerbates sectarian and political divides among vulnerable communities, further eroding social cohesion. The TTP threat is primarily concentrated in the southern districts of KP. Meanwhile, the BLA has expanded its reach, with increasing activity in Karachi, neighbouring districts of South Punjab, and across the province. In 2024, the BLA carried out several high-profile terrorist attacks targeting security forces, non-Baloch workers, miners, and Chinese nationals.

While the TTP remains a significant threat due to its sheer numbers, the BLA poses a more substantial challenge. Its enhanced capabilities allow it to execute coordinated attacks at multiple locations simultaneously and even block major highways for extended periods. The BLA’s increased operational capabilities, including the use of suicide bombers and coordinated gun-and-bomb attacks, indicate access to steady financial resources, advanced training facilities, and effective recruitment mechanisms.

Over 59pc of all attacks recorded in 2024 targeted personnel, vehicles, convoys, and facilities belonging to security and law enforcement agencies. Due to widespread anger over the mounting casualties among security forces, Pakistan conducted a cross-border airstrike in Afghanistan last year. The incident reflects a policy shift towards more kinetic measures, suggesting that similar operations may follow. But though terrorist casualties have also risen, recruitment and resource supply lines remain intact, posing a persistent challenge for state institutions hoping to disrupt their human and financial support. On the diplomatic front, too, engagement with the Taliban interim government has yielded little success despite multiple efforts.

The internal security situation is becoming increasingly complex. However, there is now unprecedented public and institutional support for coercive measures against terrorism, particularly against groups like the TTP and IS-K. This is a marked departure from the pre-2014 era, when public opinion on military operations against terrorists was deeply divided, necessitating parliamentary backing for such actions. The challenge now lies with the security leadership in devising effective strategies and demonstrating vision and capability to counter these threats.

The writer is a security analyst.

Published in Dawn, January 5th, 2025