If you can’t change people’s minds, change the people. Mass exodus, ethnic cleansing or genocide can all be devastating ways to change the demographic of an area overnight. However, gradual demographic engineering is done as part of state policy.

That is what is unfolding in India-Occupied Jammu & Kashmir (IOJK), where Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government is systematically dissolving any hopes the people of the region might have for autonomy.

India’s administrative structure has a total of 28 states and eight union territories. IOJK, while previously a state, became a union territory under August 2019’s sweeping legislative “reforms”. To understand the systematic dismantling of Kashmir’s identity and the BJP’s roadmap for the total annexation of the disputed region, it is necessary to understand the legislative chokehold on IOJK’s autonomy.

LEGAL LASSO

India functions through a bi-cameral legislature, with the Lok Sabha (lower house of parliament) and the Rajya Sabha (upper house of parliament) working on distinct mandates. Both houses have equal powers in passing constitutional amendments and bills require approval from both chambers before the president can sign them into law.

In August 2019, BJP’s home affairs minister, Amit Shah, introduced key legislative “reforms” in the Rajya Sabha to consolidate India’s hold of IOJK, which was swiftly passed by both legislatures and signed off by the president.

In 2019, the Modi government revoked India-Occupied Jammu & Kashmir’s special status, setting in motion a strategic plan to alter its demographics and consolidate power. What does this mean for the future of the disputed land and its people?

These politically motivated legislative changes helped the BJP government in its mission to alter the social fabric of the land. Important changes included the abrogation of Article 370, which revoked IOJK’s special autonomous status and rendered its constitution and flag obsolete.

As a union territory, IOJK now operates directly under the Indian constitution and central government, which holds legal supremacy over local legislative bodies. No major decision about IOJK’s governance can be taken by the locally elected government, with the lieutenant governor — a central government appointee — controlling bureaucratic appointments and holding a veto power over local legislation.

Article 35A of the Indian constitution was also abrogated, thereby revoking the special property rights and residency protections previously granted to the permanent residents of IOJK. Under the provision, individuals who had resided in or had legally acquired property in the region before 1954 were recognised as permanent residents, ensuring their exclusive rights to government employment, property ownership and state welfare benefits.

With its removal, restrictions on land acquisition were lifted, enabling non-locals to purchase property in the region. This change also opened government employment and state benefits to non-residents, increasing competition for resources traditionally reserved for the local population. Additionally, new domicile regulations and security measures further undermined the locals’ residency rights and restricted their ability to voice dissent.

A CONVENIENT POWER VACUUM

These sweeping changes took place at a time when no local legislative assembly was functioning in IOJK, local political leaders were detained, internet and communications were restricted, and security personnel were heavily deployed in the streets.

With presidential rule imposed and no elected state government in place, these “reforms” had the central parliament acting on behalf of the state legislature. The circumstances provided the BJP with a strategic window to fulfil a nationalist promise without meaningful opposition. The timing ensured that this was done in a rapid fashion.

Citing security concerns, liberal market theories and governance efficiency, the BJP managed to consolidate power over a strategic location, weaken regional political parties and initiate the process of changing electoral demographics.

The legislative changes were only the first phase of BJP’s broader strategy for IOJK. Since the changes, the government has announced multiple development projects, including roads, tunnels and railways, aimed at boosting connectivity. This, again, comes at the expense of locals, whose agricultural lands are being acquired with uncertain promises of compensation.

With new settlements constructed for outsiders and ambitions to integrate the territory more closely with the rest of India, there is a growing fear that the Modi government’s plan is to engineer demographic shifts through an influx of new settlers.

DEVELOPMENT OR DISPLACEMENT?

While the BJP government maintains its stance on the effectiveness of these measures, their implementation tells a different story. Economic incentives opening up IOJK to outside investment, which were supposed to benefit the locals, are lining the pockets of foreign investors.

Citing national security concerns for these “reforms” is also a claim that can be well disputed. Through unilateral legislation, there has been increased militarisation and growing local resentment, conditions that historically breed regional instability and extremism.

Modi has effectively reframed the discourse on IOJK by painting a picture of Article 370 and Article 35A as being discriminatory and a threat to India’s unity. This narrative stands in stark contrast to India’s raison d’etre — its “unity in diversity.” IOJK has had decades of constitutional protection and safeguards in place to preserve regional stability and protect the vulnerability of the local population. The Modi government’s approach to Kashmir disregards historical precedents and reneges on promises made during the accession process.

The National Archives of India still houses the “Instrument of Accession” signed by Maharaja Hari Singh, the last sovereign ruler of Jammu and Kashmir, which explicitly outlined the conditions under which Kashmir would accede. The stipulations limited Kashmir’s accession to the subjects of defence, foreign affairs and communications, while ensuring local autonomy over all other affairs.

From 1947 onwards, Indian prime ministers and government officials have given public commitments to the conditions surrounding Kashmir’s accession and the right to its autonomy. These historical commitments have now been abandoned, while the residents of the disputed region themselves have been marginalised, serving the BJP’s dual goals of power consolidation and nationalist appeal.

The Modi government argues that Article 370 was designated as a “temporary provision” from the outset, and their actions merely concluded what was an inevitable transition. However, the resolution of this “temporary provision” was never meant to be dictated unilaterally, but rather determined through multilateral discussions, with IOJK’s unique relationship with the Indian Union forming the basis of any decision.

With new rules and regulations, the locals have to fear for something more than their livelihoods, safety or cultural identity — they now fear losing their rightful place in their homeland. Kashmiris are no longer fighting for liberation or for autonomy; they are now fighting for their own place in the land they have always known as home.

The writer is a journalist and Pulitzer Centre fellow. He can be reached at wasaymir10@gmail.com

Published in Dawn, EOS, March 16th, 2025