THE growing intensity of the Baloch insurgency has led to a debate on how to tackle it. Security institutions vow to address it with force, and want to see Pakistan as a “hard state”. On the other hand, sections of the intelligentsia and the political class insist that political problems should be resolved through political means. These contrasting approaches reflect old and new evidence to bolster the respective arguments. This diversity of opinion is a healthy sign, and can lead to effective, consensus-based strategies — provided that the establishment is not averse to engaging with viewpoints that challenge its own.

In controlled polities, the power dynamics favour those voices that align with its own interests. In Pakistan, it is common for segments of the intelligentsia, academia, media, and politicians across ideological lines to distort or manipulate the facts in order to appease those in power and seek personal or institutional rewards. This needs to be acknowledged before assessing global best practices for counterinsurgency (COIN).

Too often, in their efforts to justify state policies, so-called intellectuals misrepresent research findings. One unfortunate example is the frequent misinterpretation of a RAND Corporation report titled Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies, authored by Christopher Paul, Beth Grill, Colin P. Clarke, and Molly Dunigan. Anyone familiar with internal security discussions in Pakistan would know that this study is often cited to argue that crushing insurgencies is the key to victory.

Actually, the study deconstructs this argument by analysing 71 insurgencies resolved between World War II and 2010. It acknowledges that every insurgency is unique, and rigorously tests 17 out of 24 counterinsurgency strategies that emphasise brute force. The findings provide strong evidence against the ‘crush them’ approach. Instead, the 286-page report offers a multidimensional analysis of COIN, demonstrating that effective COIN strategies do not rely on a single method but rather a mix of several best practices.

Identifying common elements in successful COIN campaigns is not difficult. Three key factors emerge. The first is the reduction of tangible support — in every successful COIN campaign, governments effectively cut off material support to insurgents. The second is commitment and motivation — victorious COIN forces exhibit a genuine commitment to defeating the insurgency rather than prioritising personal wealth, prolonging the conflict for external aid, or avoiding combat. The third factor comprises flexibility and adaptability. For COIN operations to be successful, they must adjust to the evolving strategies and tactics of the insurgents.

It is necessary to go beyond simplistic narratives and recognise the complex nature of COIN.

For Pakistan to address the ongoing insurgency in Balochistan effectively, it is necessary to go beyond simplistic narratives and recognise the complex nature of COIN. Sole reliance on force is hardly effective, and contradicts the lessons of history and empirical evidence.

The study closely examines effective and ineffective COIN practices. In our context, there is greater focus on maintaining national unity, which comes from ensuring that at least one factor legitimises the government’s authority and reduces corruption. The focus of successful COIN efforts is on engaging the local people, building trust, ensuring the provision of essential services, and fostering a sense of security in controlled areas.

At the other end, ineffective COIN strategies include collective punishment, escalating repression, and corrupt, arbitrary governance. Conflicts persist when ruling elites have incentives to prolong them or insurgents receive external military support. Economic dependence on foreign backers, failure to adapt to tactics, excessive coercion, and a lack of alignment between the government and COIN forces weaken counterinsurgency efforts. Additionally, when insurgents are more skilled or motivated than COIN forces or state forces resort to looting for survival, the chances of failure increase.

A key lesson for countering operations is that counterinsurgency forces often compel insurgents to adopt guerrilla warfare on reaching the decisive phase of the conflict. While insurgents typically rely on terrorist tactics, sabotage, and the exploitation of political narratives, their strategy evolves in response to state actions.

The study also exposes the wide variation in the duration of insurgencies. The median length of the 71 cases examined was around 118 months. The shortest insurgency lasted for about nine months (Bangladesh, 1971); the longest over 35 years (Guatemala, 1960–1996). On average, insurgencies lasted around 128 months, though the median figure — less influenced by extreme cases — provides a more balanced perspective on typical conflict duration.

The study also examined the 1971 insurgency in East Pakistan, identifying two significant factors behind Pakistan’s loss: the denial of a political mandate and the excessive use of force. But despite these lessons, Pakistan applied a similar approach in Balochistan during the 1972-78 insurgency. The Baloch People’s Liberation Front (later the Baloch Liberation Front) had widespread local support and used standard guerrilla tactics, ie, targeting major supply lines and transportation routes between Balochistan and its neighbouring provinces. However, the insurgents couldn’t overcome the more extensive and better equipped COIN force, which consisted of the Pakistan Army and special forces units. By resorting to overwhelming force, Pakistan managed to suppress the insurgency.

However, the ‘crush them’ strategy did not go according to plan. After the decisive phase of the conflict, insurgents established bases in Afghanistan and continued to wage a low-level insurgency across the border. But, their cross-border presence prolonged the conflict instead of leading to a decisive victory for them. The report misses a critical factor: Iran’s military and political support for Pakistan during this period, which played a significant role in countering the insurgency. In contrast, today’s insurgents have found safe havens across the border in Iran, and Tehran’s support for Pakistan is no longer available.

Had Pakistan prioritised development and governance reforms after the counterinsurgency, ma­­t­­ters in Balochistan might have been different. The study found that in 36 cases, COIN forces fai­led because they did not establish legitimacy and address grievances after military success. Addi­t­ionally, democracy was a decisive factor in long-term stability: COIN forces that did not adopt de­­mocratic governance lost in 26 out of 30 cases. The study emphasises that democracy enhances legitimacy by gaining public support through good governance, which comes from fair processes. Without such measures, even militarily successful COIN campaigns risk long-term failure.

The writer is a security analyst.

Published in Dawn, March 23rd, 2025