Was the Lahore Resolution a mistake? We need only to look at the ongoing genocide in Gaza for an answer. The borders of Israel expanded in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973, even though the Jews were a tiny minority in that region. It is statehood that made all the difference. Israel was created as a small state, but it was a state, and a state could receive external support. Critics of the Two-Nation Theory need to see how elusive the two-state solution is now in Palestine.

The Lahore Resolution was no sudden decision. Its story began in Karachi. On October 10, 1938, Shaikh Abdul Majid moved Resolution No.5 at the Sindh Muslim League Conference. The resolution was seconded by Khan Bahadur Gurmani and supported by Sir Abdullah Haroon, Sayed Abdul Rauf Shah and Maulana Abdul Hamid Badayuni. It was on this occasion that G.M. Sayed articulated that the Hindus and Muslims were two separate nations.

“This Conference considers it absolutely essential, in the interests of unhampered cultural development, the economic and social betterment and political self-determination of the two nations, known as Hindus and Muslims, to recommend to the All-India Muslim League to review and revise the entire conception of what should be the suitable constitution for India which will secure honourable and legitimate status to them.”

There were two other steps before the Lahore Session. On March 25, 1939, speaking at Meerut, Liaquat Ali Khan said: “If Hindus and Muslims cannot live together, then they should divide the country on the basis of religion and culture.” The next development was at Muhammad Ali Park, Calcutta. On April 17, 1939, presiding over a meeting to observe the first death anniversary of Allama Iqbal, the Raja of Mahmudabad, referring to the Allama’s Allahabad address in 1930, said:

The Lahore Resolution was not a sudden decision; nor was it some British ploy to divide the subcontinent.

“The main purpose of this proposal was a single autonomous, independent Muslim Government, or, if you want to phrase it in constitutional terms, then understand that a separate federation of autonomous Muslim provinces is brought into being.” (Shaiq Ahmad Usmani (ed.), Asr-i-Jadeed, Calcutta, April 18, 1939)

Thus, the road to Lahore was opened, but before we come to its text, let us deal with the accusation that the Lahore Resolution was inspired by the British and drafted by Sir Zafarullah Khan. We have two writers who cite the actual views of Sir Zafarullah Khan on the matter. Hasan Ja’far Zaidi cites the actual opinion of Sir Zafarullah Khan:

“There is, for instance, the Pakistan scheme which broadly speaking seeks to divide India into Muslim and non-Muslim parts, the Muslim part being described as Pakistan … one has only to contemplate the expense, misery, suffering and horror involved in any such attempt … the scheme is utterly impractical.” (Dawn, July 16, 2017)

Khan Abdul Wali Khan cites the Viceroy Lord Linlithgow’s letter dated March 12, 1940, to Lord Zetland, the Secretary of State, as below:

“Under my instruction, Zafarullah wrote a memorandum on the subject: Two Dominion States: I have already sent it to your attention. I have also asked him for further clarification, which he says is forthcoming. He is anxious, however, that no one should find out that he had prepared the plan. He has, however, given me the right to do with it what I like, including sending a copy to you. Copies have been passed on to Jinnah and, I think, to Sir Akbar Hydari. While he, Zafarullah, cannot admit its authorship, his document has been prepared for adoption by the Muslim League with a view to giving it the fullest publicity.” (Facts are Facts, New Delhi, Vikas, 1987, p29)

Note that the last part is open to two interpretations. The first is that the idea of demanding two dominions should be formulated and popularized. This interpretation would have been valid had All-India Muslim League leaders like Shaikh Abdul Majid, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan and the Raja of Mahmudabad had not, as detailed above, already been demanding two federations since 1938.

The second interpretation is that it was a document drawn up to dissuade the Muslim League from demanding Partition; otherwise, why would Sir Zafarullah Khan be anxious that he should not be known as the author of a solution repeatedly and publicly demanded by the leaders of the Muslim League? Sir Zafarullah’s anxiety, that he should not be known as the author, could be that he was going counter to the Muslim League. This ties in with Zafarullah Khan’s note, as cited by Hasan Ja’far Zaidi.

Ashique Husain Batalvi, who was present when the Lahore Resolution was being drafted, cited the correspondence between the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, and the Secretary of State, Lord Zetland. The Viceroy wrote on March 25, 1940:

“I do not attach too much importance to Jinnah’s demand for the carving out of India into an indefinite number of so-called ‘Dominions’, and I would judge myself his attitude at the present moment is that, as Congress are putting forward a preposterous claim which they know is incapable of acceptance, he equally will put forward just as extreme a claim the impracticality of which he is just as well aware.”

Wali Khan cites the above letter on pages 30 and 31 of his book; he, however, omits the reply that the secretary of state gave on April 5, 1940, which was:

“I think that in the course of the forthcoming debate, I shall be bound to express my dissent from the proposals which have recently been put forward by the All-India Muslim League in the course of their recent Conference at Lahore. I would very much doubt whether they have been properly thought out.” (Jang, August 25, 1987)

Since the secretary of state for India thought that the Lahore Resolution had not been “properly thought out,” this disposes of the notion that the British had thought it out. The operative portion of the Resolution reads:

“No constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz, that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions with such territorial adjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the north-western and eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute ‘Independent states’ in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.”

Ashique Husain Batalvi made the criticism that the Resolution was imprecisely expressed. The areas which were demanded should have been named. This criticism was valid, as it allowed the partition of Punjab and Bengal. The more intriguing ambiguity was the use of two discordant terms, “autonomous” and “sovereign”. What is autonomous cannot be sovereign; what is sovereign does not need to be autonomous. B.R. Ambedkar lost no time in pointing out this discrepancy. The question of why these phrases were used was to provide a cover for the separation of Bengal from Pakistan.

Awami League leaders, from 1948 to 1966, demanded autonomy for the eastern wing on the basis of the Lahore Resolution. In 1947, Mr. Jinnah and the All-India Muslim League were quite willing to let a united and independent Bengal emerge on August 15, 1947, but then, Jawaharlal Nehru and Vallabhbhai Patel blocked the move, censuring Mahatma Gandhi and insulting Sarat Chandra Bose in the process. All this has been attested to by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in his Unfinished Memoirs. Could the Congress have been acting under the guidance of Sir Zafarullah Khan?

Even the British could not have been behind the denial of independence to Bengal, as PM Clement Atlee’s letter to President Harry Truman shows. Atlee alerted Truman of the possibility that three independent nations would emerge on the map of South Asia. Dawn carried this correspondence on December 28, 2018. This denial of independence, that is, the ‘third option’, had its repercussions in the referendum in the North-West Frontier Province, when the two options given were joining either India or Pakistan, but the third option of independence was omitted because it had been denied to Bengal. On this point, Wali Khan, in his book, unjustly chastises the British:

“The British were clever manipulators! They were able to utilize different and opposing forces to their advantage. The Viceroy approached Hindu Mahasabha for the unity of India. They approached the Muslim League and Jinnah for partitioning the country. This was an excellent method to set these two forces on a collision course.” (p45)

The fact was that when the Independent Bengal proposal was put to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, he invoked the Two-Nation Theory to turn it down: “There was no chance of Hindus there agreeing to live under permanent Muslim domination” (Transfer of Power Papers, Vol X, 1013). Why Nehru blocked the independence of Bengal, he did not hide. “East Bengal is going to be a source of embarrassment for Pakistan.” (Transfer of Power Papers, Vol XI, 03). Thus, to blame the British is not fair. Khan Abdul Wali Khan seems to have realized this. He was to admit that the, “Withdrawal of the British from South Asia was a mistake.” (The News, April 15, 1995).

This was a mere 18 years after the Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan.

The writer is the editor, Quarterly Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society and author of A Concise History of Pakistan, Oxford University Press, 2009, Second Edition 2024.