TWO recent developments have reinforced the fraught relationship between Pakistan and India, which makes the prospect bleak for any thaw in their ties. The first concerns the terrorist attack and hijacking of the Jaffar Express train in Balochistan and statements that followed from Pakistani officials. The second development involves Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s allegations in a podcast that Pakistan is waging a proxy war against his country. This war of words is, of course, nothing new but its re-eruption makes it even harder to overcome the protracted diplomatic impasse between the two countries.

Following the terrorist incident in Balochistan, Pakistan’s military spokesman accused India of complicity, saying the country’s eastern neighbour has long been involved in fomenting such violence and supporting militant groups. These accusations echo what Islamabad has consistently said about Indian interference; the arrest of RAW operative Kulbhushan Jadhav in 2016 being incontrovertible evidence of this. The Indian naval officer who was convicted of espionage had confessed to his role in subversive activities in Pakistan and assisting Baloch militant groups. India predictably rejected the latest allegations by Pakistani officials as “baseless” saying Pakistan should instead “look inwards”.

In a podcast with Lex Fridman, broadcast on March 16, Prime Minister Modi’s lengthy remarks about the tense relationship with Pakistan added to the toxic environment between the two countries. He attributed the troubled bilateral relationship to Pakistan’s pursuit of “state-sponsored terrorism” and insincere peace efforts over decades. Claiming India had made peace moves but they were met by “betrayal” by Pakistan, which had not chosen the path of peaceful coexistence, he described Pakistan as the “epicentre of turmoil.” This was familiar rhetoric but its strident reiteration at this juncture injected more strains into the relationship.

The outlook for any India-Pakistan normalisation remains bleak.

Modi’s comments, in fact, reinforce the narrative India has increasingly built against Islamabad. This places the blame entirely on Pakistan for the slide in relations as well as shifts the onus on it for any resumption of ‘normal’ diplomatic relations. It is also part of a strategy to mount pressure on Pakistan in what is seen by many in India as a moment of vulnerability. This is also indicated by the way the Indian media went into overdrive after the Balochistan terror attack in what seemed an orchestrated and hyper coverage of the incident.

All this leaves relations between the two neighbours in an uncertain and unstable place. In the absence of formal dialogue, suspended now for well over five years, and given the nature of issues driving present tensions, a backchannel may be useful to manage tensions and avert the risk of miscalculation by either side.

Islamabad seems interested in putting such a mechanism in place and has conveyed this informally through the track two process, which involves exchanges between former officials and other participants from the two countries. In a track two interaction held in London in late February, the Indian side did not respond to Pakistan’s backchannel suggestion. Instead, it said this could be discussed at the leadership level either on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in July or UNGA in September. That, of course, is if the two prime ministers meet.

At the official level, the Indian view is that existing arrangements are adequate to manage or prevent any crisis and a formal backchannel is not required for now. The reference seems to be to communication that has taken place on an ad hoc basis between Rawalpindi and India’s national security adviser when tensions escalated in the past. The last time this happened was during the Brahmos incident in March 2022, when India accidentally fired a missile from Ambala that landed in Mian Channu in Pakistan. The dangerous situation was quickly defused and a crisis averted.

There are several obstacles to the resumption of formal talks between the nuclear neighbours. The biggest hurdle is the seemingly unbridgeable gap in the two countries’ positions on occupied Jammu and Kashmir. Relations, in fact, broke down when India illegally annexed, bifurcated and absorbed the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir into the Indian union on Aug 5, 2019 — in violation and defiance of UN Security Council resolutions. Delhi’s action, accompanied by a sweeping set of repressive measures, prompted Pakistan to suspend trade and downgrade diplomatic ties by recalling its high commissioner. The Modi government’s post-2019 actions in J&K further intensified tensions with Pakistan.

India wants Pakistan’s acceptance of Aug 5, 2019, to be the starting point for any re-engagement and is not willing to show any flexibility much less offer any concessions. Its officials have repeatedly said the Kashmir ‘problem’ has been ‘resolved’ and there is nothing to negotiate with Pakistan. In August 2024, Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar declared the “era of uninterrupted dialogue with Pakistan is over … So far as J&K is concerned, [abrogation of] Article 370 is done”. This take-it-or-leave-it approach puts Pakistan in a dilemma. However much the current Pakistani leadership may want to move towards a modus vivendi with India, it cannot abandon its principled position on Kashmir. Relegating Kashmir to the backburner to resume other aspects of the relationship such as trade will enable Delhi to construe that as Pakistan’s de facto acceptance of its August 2019 action. How to square this circle remains a vexing policy challenge.

Nevertheless, working level engagement on practical issues continues through diplomatic missions in both capitals. This led in October 2024 to renewal of the agreement on Kartarpur Corridor for another five years to enable Indian Sikh pilgrims to visit the holy site. This was done at New Delhi’s request. Issuance of visas by both sides for visits to religious sites has been another area of cooperation as has release of fishermen who stray into each other’s territorial waters.

This low-level diplomatic channel obviously can’t produce a thaw. The relationship can only be extricated from its frozen state by the leadership on both sides who show the will and accommodation needed to bring this about. But for now, the Indian leadership seems to have concluded that disengagement with Pakistan better serves its interests. The BJP government also sees a political advantage in constantly demonising Pakistan as this reinforces its Hindutva agenda.

The writer is a former ambassador to the US, UK and UN.

Published in Dawn, March 24th, 2025