THE former Fata districts of Pakistan have some of the worst economic indicators and highest unemployment rates of any region in the country. Historically, these areas have never been very wealthy, relying on subsistence farming, forest produce or remittances from family members working in cities across Pakistan or in the Middle East to sustain their livelihood. Some also engaged in trade, both cross-border and local, and were heavily involved in the transport sector.

However, in the 1980s, the economic landscape of then Fata drastically started changing. These changes were a direct, and in some cases a deliberate, consequence of the Afghan war that by then was fully underway in the neighbouring nation.

An entire arms and ammunition industry took birth, both in terms of trade and manufacturing of weapons. The trade and then plantation and manufacturing of illicit drugs and narcotics started around this time as well.

Over the next couple of decades, as globalisation took effect and world trade astronomically expanded from less than $2 trillion in the mid-1980s to over $16tr by the mid-2000s, smuggling and related work started becoming a key source of livelihood for the residents of then Fata. The porous border with Afghanistan and tribal affinities and kinship was key in fostering this. Then, there were a lot of donations coming into the area — in the beginning, in the form of donations for establishing and supporting madressahs to promote the jihadist cause in Afghanistan but then later, after the advent of the ‘war on terror’ in the aftermath of 9/11, in the form of aid primarily from Western countries.

Fast forward to the mid-2010s. The US had increasingly started to grow weary with its presence in Afghanistan and was pushing for an exit both physically and resource-wise. Even for Pakistan, Fata had served its purpose as a buffer zone between Afghanistan and mainstream Pakistan, and it was now felt that it was important to take steps to secure this border in preparation for whatever government in Afghanistan took shape once the Americans left. In 2017, Pakistan took on the ambitious task of fencing the 2,400-kilometre-long border with Afghanistan. This, coupled with the enforcement of a stricter visa regime with Afghanistan, greatly reduced cross-border trade and commerce between the populace living on either side of the border.

While a few big players in cahoots with officials may have remained active in smuggling, many of the smaller players for whom this was a means of supporting daily expenses, lost their jobs.

The wait for the promised funds and development in the former Fata region is still ongoing.

With the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, grants and international aid to the merged areas has all but stopped. Simultaneously, two key developments in the Middle East have also had a significant impact on the economic condition of these districts.

First, the liberalisation of countries in the Middle East and a rebranding effort by these countries to dissociate themselves from their past image as supporters of extremism, led to a crackdown on funding for support of madressahs in the area from these Middle Eastern states.

Second, Gulf countries have developed enough to have moved beyond the need for unskilled workers as they once did. With little educational or skills development programmes, workers from merged districts find it difficult to compete for higher skilled jobs that are now available in these Middle Eastern countries. Many families’ livelihoods were dependent on these funds and remittances.

The military operations by Pakistan around this time and a change in the policy towards jihadists, destroyed the arms and ammunition industry in ex-Fata and with it the livelihood of all those associated with this industry. The illicit drugs and narcotics trade and plantation also took a major hit in these military operations. While a few years ago Pakistan finally did develop a hemp and medicinal cannabis policy in 2021, realistically the details of this legislation make it clear that it was done with new growers in mainstream Pakistan in mind, rather than helping to legalise produce of existing farmers in the merged areas. As a result, there is now increasing pressure from the government to dismantle hemp production in these districts.

Following Fata’s merger with KP, there is now also increasing pressure to finish ex-Fata’s special status as a tax-free zone. This policy seems to be getting a lot of traction, in spite of the fact that such regulations were subject to being extended once the merged areas had received their funds for a period of five years and developed enough to be at par with the rest of the country. The wait for these funds and promised development is still ongoing. This and the extension of electricity bills has largely shut down the pocket of industrial activity that was happening pre-merger in the region.

This article is not meant as critique on the merits or necessity of these actions taken by the government but rather an effort to recognise that while the state may believe these policies to be necessary for Pakistan’s national security, the brunt of its consequences is being faced by people of the merged areas.

They never asked for their territory to be transformed in the manner that it did in this game of Great Power politics. Each of these interventions could have been achieved in a more inclusive and productive manner by securing people’s livelihoods through transformational changes to the region’s economy by legalising and aligning it with Pakistan’s formal sector, rather than destroying that economy as a whole.

To now take away these peoples’ livelihoods without providing any viable alternative or support, and to believe that locals won’t be lured by militants providing them a financial lifeline for them to feed their families, is a grave fallacy. Patriotism is a luxury not affordable by starving families.

The writer is a development practitioner and a former parliamentarian.

X: @GhaziGJ

Published in Dawn, March 26th, 2025