THE Jaffar Express tragedy has once again exposed Pakistan’s lack of security and planning for tackling terrorism, especially by banned outfits in Balochistan. The incident was not an isolated one: it was a symptom of a deeper, unresolved malaise that has plagued the region for decades.

The persistence of insurgencies in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) underscores a fundamental reality. Pakistan’s internal security crisis is not merely a question of law-enforcement; it is as much a question of governance failures and a flawed approach to counterinsurgency.

The Global Terrorism Index 2025 ranks Pakistan as the second-most terrorism-affected country, behind Burkina Faso, with attacks nearly doubling from 517 in 2023 to 1,099 in 2024. The Afghan Taliban’s return to power in 2021 emboldened Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) mili-tants, who have escalated cross-border attacks, particularly in KP.

Meanwhile, in Balochistan, the insur-gency, apparently rooted in political disenfranchisement and resource inequity, has continued to fester, with armed groups targeting security forces and state infrastructure. These conflicts reveal not just the weaknesses of Pakistan’s security apparatus, but also the long-term consequences of failing to address structural inequities in the country’s governance model, being exploited by foreign elements.

Pakistan’s response has remained largely reactive, with successive military operations yielding only temporary stability rather than long-term peace. Despite multiple counterinsurgency campaigns, the TTP carried out 482 attacks in 2024, resulting in 558 deaths — a staggering 91 per cent increase from the preceding year.

This alarming escalation underscores the limitations of a force-centric approach, raising critical questions about the efficacy of Pakistan’s security policies, which have historically suppressed insurgencies rather than dismantling their ideological and structural foundations.

As American researcher Christine Fair argues in Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War, the military’s strategic culture prioritises external threats over internal stability, fostering a perpetual state of controlled instability where insurgencies are contained rather than eradicated at their roots.

This cycle of suppression and resur-gence highlights the need for a funda-mental rethinking of counterterrorism strategies, moving beyond tactical crackdowns to address the political, economic, and ideological dimensions of insurgency.

A major flaw in Pakistan’s counter-terrorism framework is its reactive approach, often devoid of long-term planning. Scholars argue that Pakistan’s reliance on short-term security crackdowns, without addressing socioeconomic inequalities, political disenfranchisement and ideological extremism, creates a cycle where militant groups re-emerge stronger after temporary setbacks.

This is evident in the state’s handling of banned organisations, which frequently rebrand and resume operations under different names.

The economic dimension of Pakistan’s insurgency problem is equally critical. With inflation exceeding 30pc and a mounting fiscal deficit, the government’s ability to implement sustainable counter-insurgency measures has been severely constrained.

The World Bank’s Pakistan Development Update 2024 underscores how governance failures, coupled with economic instability, exacerbate security threats by creating conditions conducive to radicalisation and insurgency recruitment.

Balochistan, where poverty rates exceed the national average, remains a focal point of economic marginalisation, further fuelling unrest.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) was initially presented as a transformative economic initiative, but people have often contended that its benefits have largely bypassed local communities, reinforcing perceptions of resource exploitation and deepening resentment.

Addressing this multidimensional crisis requires a paradigm shift in Pakistan’s counterterrorism strategy. A successful official response must integrate intelligence-based operations, political solutions, and economic revitalisation.

Zakir Ullah
Mardan

Published in Dawn, April 5th, 2025