One more crisis
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AN economic, security, and political polycrisis had ravaged us after 2021. Luckily, our most risky crisis — war with India — didn’t occur at that time. But just as some of its axes had eased, conflict erupted, which may worsen the crisis. The April 22 terrorist act in Pahalgam was shameful. But a series of errors undid India’s valid quest to find the killers. Some of these errors by India are noted below.
Political: Failing to pacify the Kashmiris despite India’s global claims to the contrary.
Intelligence: Failing to anticipate the attack or substantiating its allegations against Pakistan.
Strategic: Misreading the situation and assuming that talks were the best option and that the US would not want war among nuclear foes, as India is neither a blue-eyed boy like Israel nor are Pakistanis orphans like the Gazans.
Military: Starting a war without any proof and failing to land a knockout punch.
Direct talks are the best way to end the threats.
Informational: Unleashing war hysteria and blatant lies via the Modi media, hurting India’s own image.
Pakistan aptly used only robust self-defence tactics and avoided escalatory, pre-emptive, or punitive acts that are illegal under UN law like India’s attack. Hawks egged us on to deliver a knockout punch to deter future Indian attacks. That would have been unfeasible, risking a nuclear war. Both sides can achieve pre-emptive aims only through talks. A draw is a sane aim, as even that against a stronger foe, despite all our other problems, was a big political win.
No one gained a strategic edge from a futile war. But the heroic downing of Rafales may be its abiding memory, like the 2019 MiG-21 episode. So, our professionally focused and low-profile air force was again our best defence asset and saviour, and deserves a significant share of our defence outlays. But as triumphalism grips a long-glum nation, it’s wise to grasp a harsh reality. Wars continue in covert ways even after ending overtly, and their later impact is often greater for a more vulnerable state. Despite a political win, even a mini-war may worsen all axes of our polycrisis.
Politically, wars can impose a security-first and autocratic mindset. For us, it may amplify such existing tendencies by much. A political win over a major external foe may embolden a similar approach against local peaceful opponents. Action against them, sadly, continues despite the need for unity.
Economically, uncertainty may deter foreign flows and induce outflows. Defence outlays may out-prioritise welfare ones. Potentially useful economic ties with India are now unlikely in the near future. India may up efforts to harm us economically through its global influence and water disputes. Strategically, the West may increase scrutiny over whether militants still find space in Pakistan, even though it has not accused us regarding this attack, and even if this attack’s simple scope does not suggest a foreign hand — unlike Mumbai in 2008 and Jaffar Express in 2025
Lastly, security risks may rise. India’s huge war machine embarrassingly failed to secure strategic gains in 2019, 2020-21 and 2025 against us and China, even under a gung-ho Modi. These quick triple blows may prompt it to invest militarily to match its global economic heft and aspirations, in order to perform better in a future attack on us. More sinisterly, it may see the high all-round cost of overt war against us, and its limited gains, as pressure from the West to avoid nuclear risks. Thus, it may increase its covert aid to the BLA and TTP for terrorist attacks inside Pakistan, and escalate such support if an attack occurs on its own soil, to seek domestic face-saving.
Direct talks between the conjoined twins are the best way to end these threats. US ceasefire messages aptly mention wide-ranging talks at a neutral venue. Direct talks pushed strongly by both the US and China are the best option. But given the gulf of mistrust that exists, a host-facilitator role for a nearby neutral state can help build initial trust and prevent minor incidents from derailing talks. Qatar has demonstrated such skills effectively during the Taliban-US and Israel-Hamas talks.
Water issues must be a top priority. Talks must also find a neutral way to investigate the Pahalgam attack, as Pakistan has offered. Even an ongoing mechanism to check if militants still find space may help, as it would address global concerns and counter Indian aims to levy baseless charges to attack us. Militants still attack Pakistan. Eradicating them may aid both sides. Success on these issues may push both sides to later tackle the knotty Kashmir issue.
The writer has a PhD from the University of California, Berkeley, in political economy and 25 years of grassroots to senior-level experiences across 50 countries.
Published in Dawn, May 13th, 2025
