BAGHDAD: While the unloved Iraqi provisional governing council is still haggling over ministerial positions, the country’s tribal sheikhs are once again in the background pulling the strings.

Up until 1958, Iraq’s royal house knew to never to underestimate tribal leaders. When Saddam Hussein became president, he humbled the sheikhs only to later throw money at them to win their loyalty.

The US military too has learned how useful sheikhs can be in keeping law and order. They could fill a power vacuum created by the situation in which the Iraqi army has been disbanded but where there are not enough US troops or new Iraqi security forces.

There is a catch in all this however: The type of government the sheikhs seem to have in mind is a wee bit different from western- style democracy.

The top sheikh in Iraq is Ali al-Burhan al-Ali Latif al-Assawi, head of the Assa tribe which is settled north of Baghdad. He counts around 860,000 men as followers, and he sees the value in being the democratically elected chairman of the Council of Sheikhs in Iraq.

“By the help of God and the sheikhs, we can get the security situation in Iraq under control,” says the 56-year-old leader.

“We are in continual talks with the other tribes so that the coalition forces are not attacked. We want to solve problems and not create them,” says al-Assawi diplomatically.

He reminds the Americans “that the tribes did not fight (against the US invasion), because they wanted to get rid of Saddam”.

Remedial instruction in democracy from the US civil administration is nothing al-Assawi is interested in.

“What the sheikhs are doing is pure democracy. They take into consideration the opinions of the families,” he says.

And he already has in mind how future elections should be handled: “We will suggest to the voters, whom they should vote for. For the candidates will be selected beforehand by the families.”

According to al-Assawi, 90 per cent of tribal members are absolutely loyal to their sheikh. They have their power base in particular among the uneducated rural population.

The other 10 per cent — and above all the intellectuals — consider the sheikhs opportunists that use every change of power for their own benefit.

“Sheikhs 2003” is what the intelligentsia call them. During Saddam’s time, they were “the 90s Sheikhs”. In 1992, the most important tribal leaders pledged allegiance to the president at a reception at Saddam’s palace.

Right next to Saddam’s presidential office was the Bureau of Tribal Affairs, where posts were doled out, discord was smoothed over and money flowed into pockets.

A “Volvo”, the automobile of choice for handing out as a gift to a clan head during the Saddam years, is now the common pejorative for “sheikh”.

After the humiliating defeat of the 1991 Gulf War and the start of UN sanctions, Saddam needed the sheikhs to fill the power vacuum; with his army and Baath party reduced by half, the long arm of the state did not reach quite far enough without them.

And there was not enough state aid for the needy. Familial networks were reactivated as a safety net, security guarantee, and income source, wrote Iraqi sociologist Faleh Jabar from the University of London.

The necessity for familial networks grew stronger, the weaker state social services became under the influence of war and sanctions.

“For 35 years, Saddam destroyed the political infrastructure in order to stay in power,” says Sheikh Issa Ali al-Adai of the Nasalha clan in Fallujah.

The 46-year-old sheikh is critical of the current overtures between the sheikhs and the US civil administration. He feels the United States is seamlessly taking up the policies of Saddam Hussein.

“The parties and the intellectuals are the supreme power in Iraq. They will be sidelined by the sheikh system,” al-Adai says.

“The Americans don’t want national parties,” he adds. “What we’re seeing is the tribes becoming stronger. But the sheikhs are not qualified for political leadership. The sheikh has a social duties. Politics must be placed in the hands of politicians.”—dpa