Wapda, it seems, has initiated the nine flood canals in Sindh and Balochistan simply to counterbalance the construction of the Greater Thal flood canal in Punjab that by itself is a compensation for Kalabagh dam.

Otherwise the future of flood canals without storage is obscure, especially in view of the fact that even the perennial canals are not getting water. Therefore, there is an urgent need for flood water storage dams to make these canals perennial and really useful.

Moreover, the flood canals with their barrages at Mithankot (now shifted to Taunsa) and Sehwan require further shifting and changes in their planning concepts to achieve optimum benefits as these are haphazardly planned. No consideration is given to a better command and also to avoid the huge river bed losses from Chashma to Taunsa, Taunsa to Guddu, Guddu to Sukkur and Sukkur to Kotri reach.

The rerouting of huge discharge for these canals in a course other than on the Indus River bed would save huge losses and serve as a measure of water management.

The flood canals under discussion are:

1. The Kachi flood canal from the proposed Mithankot, now Taunsa barrage, to irrigate a small portion of the lowest part of Kachi plain in Balochistan.

2. The Ranee flood canal in Sindh.

3. The Thar flood canal in Sindh.

4. The Sehwan barrage complex with its six canals in Sindh.

5. The Greater Thal flood canal with a discharge of 8,500 cusecs in Punjab.

The collective water requirements of these canals on the basis of their designed discharge is nearly 17000 cusecs that requires 12 maf of live storage or 15 maf of gross storage. The losses in the Indus river bed are in addition to that. To cover losses one more storage of the size of Basha dam will be required. It means that it will require four mega storage of the size of Basha dam otherwise these flood canals running for less than a quarter year will be useless.

The building of flood canals is like building a first class passenger train and run it empty. Moreover, the planning of flood canals at this stage, before storage dams,is like putting a cart before the horse. Therefore, flood water storage under pare 4 of the Water Accord must precede the flood canals. The Greater Thal canal with a discharge of 8500 cusecs is already under severe dispute between Sindh and Punjab. Moreover, Balochistan bitterly complaints against Sindh alleging that it steals its share of water.

Keeping these traditional disputes as precedence, the farmers would insist on running these flood canals either perennially or for longer time otherwise these canals would become a headache. Wapda is, therefore, creating an awkward situation for Irsa to regulate such canals.

Besides the above drawbacks of flood canals, the Water Accord has not indicated the quantity of balance river supplies in para 4 over and above the allocated quantity of 117.35 maf in para 2. Therefore, the distribution of balance river supplies under para 4 of the Water Accord without flood water storage with known capacity would rather be difficult to assess by Irsa and to correctly estimate the quantity of water that changes each year.

Therefore, Irsa may not be able to exactly foresee the balance supplies and ascertain the share of each province and may not easily be in a position to substantiate the water account of each canal under section 8 (1) (g) of the Isra Act for the approval of Ecnec as the flood flow varies each year.

Under the circumstances, Irsa would be required to regulate two types of canals. The one canal system with perennial flow with water allocation of 117.35 maf under pare 2 and the other canal system with flood flow from flood supplies for 2 1/2 months a year under para 4 of the Water Accord. The twin regulation from the same common source would create confusion and create disputes especially at the beginning and at the end of flood season due to low discharges.

However, first priority should have been given to Water Accord para 2, to build storage dams to make available the allocated quantity of 117.35 maf of water. This means to build storage for (117.35-103)=14.35 maf or equivalent to another three Basha dams. It is only then to store the balance river water, including flood water under para 4 of the Water Accord, to run flood canals.

It appears Wapda has not consulted Irsa while preparing the Vision-2025 projects. This is against the spirit of lrsa Act and the Water Accord. The ministry of water and power just appears to be a helpless spectator, as it has no intention to implement the Water Accord as the past ten years show.

“Shifting of Mithankot barrage, Kachi canal and Sehwan barrage:In the Vision 2025 programme Wapda has planned Kachi flood canal to offtake from the proposed barrage at Mithankot in Punjab, now shifted to Taunsa,to irrigate the lower part of the Kachi plain in Balochistan.

The canal command from Mithankot is very limited and only a small fringe area of the Kachi plain would be irrigated after providing huge ‘bunds’ and heading-up water upstream and inundating large areas to which Punjab has raised objection. Moreover, 90 per cent of the area of the Kachi plain will remain out of the command from the Mithankot barrage and about 80 per cent from Taunsa barrage.

This huge plain will therefore stay barren for all times if it once loses the chance of irrigation from a much higher elevation by locating a new barrage further upstream in Dera Ismail Khan of NWFP.

The command of the Kachi plain from Taunsa barrage would slightly be better than Mithankot barrage but still most of it would be out of command and will not achieve optimum benefit. It therefore needs further shifting upstream.

From this newly proposed barrage site in Dera Ismail Khan almost the whole of the Kachi plain below Sibi will be irrigated by gravity flow by the proposed canal offtaking from it. Even higher areas of the Kachi plain can be irrigated by a small lift from the newly proposed lined canal which may now be renamed as the All-Pakistan Grand Canal, Balochistan will, for the first time, have a dispute-free and independent source of water supply directly from the river Indus.

This great potential should never be missed by the government of Balochistan, as it is the only chance of irrigation from the Indus River.

The Member, Balochistan,Irsa may demand this change in the interest of his province. The blunder of building Mithankot barrage or shifting it to Taunsa barrage should be avoided. Balochistan is the largest province area-wise and therefore it should not be deprived of great irrigation facilities due to wrong planning and political expediency.

The All=Pakistan Grand Canal (APGC) passing below the town of Sibi besides irrigating almost the whole of the Kachi plain would further be extended to irrigate upper Sindh, and the Thar Desert through the Thar canal. It can also provide water to Cholistan desert in Punjab.

Moreover, the best feature of the All-Pakistan Grand Canal is that it can also replace the Sehwan barrage complex and its six offtaking canals in Sindh. It will, therefore, serve both Baluchistan and Sindh besides Punjab.

By this new proposal, the two barrages at Mithankot or Taunsa and Sehwan can be replaced by a single high command barrage to be located some where below Chashma barrage or even from the Chashma Barrage itself.

However, the new barrage downstream of Chashma can create storage of about 0.8 maf and serve as a balancing reservoir to help regulate Indus River water.

The remarkable advantage of this new proposal would be that the entire discharge of the nine flood canals for Balochistan and Sindh would be routed through the lined All-Pakistan Grand Canal avoiding the Indus River bed where losses are colossal. This alternative routing of huge discharge through the lined canal would avoid substantial part of the estimated water losses of about 14 maf about 3 times Basha storage in the Indus River bed in the various reaches between Chashma to Taunsa and Taunsa to Guddu, Guddu to Sukkur and Sukkur to Kotri.

This new routing can be part of the water management for the Indus basin in avoiding huge losses and wastage via the Indus River bed. The losses in a single reach of the river bed between Taunsa and Guddu are estimated to be 40 per cent of the flow.

This needs urgent investigations and control as part of water management under para 14 (e) of the Water Accord by Irsa. The 14-mile wide Indus River bed can be channelized, the huge river bed losses can drastically be reduced if Katzarah storage is built to control and regulate the flow of the Indus.

Another great advantage of shifting of Sehwan barrage complex to the upstream will be that Sindh which is already suffering from severe salinity, waterlogging and sodicity mainly due to the construction of the three barrages will get relief. These barrages have raised the bed level of river Indus. Lands are lying at a lower level. Sindh has therefore become the drainage bowl of Indus basin.

Under such adverse circumstances, the building of the fourth barrage in Sindh at Sehwan will further aggravate salinity and waterlogging. Sehwan barrage too will raise the Indus bed and will need heavy bunds. Therefore, the shifting of Sehwan barrage to the upstream and below Chashma barrage would save Sindh from many serious problems.

At the same time it will have better command for all the six flood canals and the Ranee canal and also avoid huge riverbed losses.

It would ultimately be essential to make these ten flood canals perennial so that they become really useful in public interest. They would therefore need a live storage of about 12 maf without river bed losses. Similarly, to meet para 2 water deficiency of the Water Accord, another about 14 maf of live storage is needed.

After 15 years till a new dam is built, the storage lost due to silting at Tarbela and Mangla would reach up to 9 maf. The drainage requirement for leaching salt under para 12 is estimated to be about 5 maf of water.

Under such circumstances, the construction of Basha dam with a live storage of only 5.7 maf will be of no value to meet the essential requirements of (12+14+9+5)=40 maf of water. It is therefore absolutely inevitable to build the world’s largest storage dam at Katzarah on the Indus about 18 km below Skardu.

The three gorges Katzarah dam can store water in three valleys i.e. the lndus River valley, the Shiok river valley and the Shigar river valley, up to 35 maf equivalent to 6 times the Kalabagh storage, with power generation of about 15000 MW and a life span of 1000 years due to very low siltation and excellent capacity inflow ratio due to its huge reservoir.

Later on, for huge hydro-power generation and storage of water and complete river control and its regulation required by the preamble of Irsa Act, it is suggested to build a number of dams-cum-barrages with unrestricted silt sluices in a stretch of 300 miles upstream of Tarbela at suitable intervals. The dam-cum barrage will be a structure consisting of a combination of two components. The base component will be a concrete overflow type dam with a suitable height to hold dead storage.

Over the top of the concrete dam, there would be a conventional barrage about 60 feet high to hold live storage. The barrage component will have unrestricted silt sluices to freely pass on silt and hold residual flood water.

This will, on average, create a live storage of between 1.5 to 2 maf of water and generate about 1000MW of hydropower. The series of such structures on the Indus would nearly generate 30,000 MW of power to use about 7000 feet fall on run-of- river. Even the concrete dam can be provided with low-level silt sluices.

As a general principle of river valley development, many countries have built storage many times the average annual flow of the river for river regulation, flood water storage, power generation and to serve as inter-seasonal storage, development storage and carryover storage.

However, the minimum storage to be created on a river is upto 1.6 times the average inflow at a site. We must follow this on the Indus to get optimum benefit of storage and power.

Kalabagh dam: The above concept for storage can apply to Kalabagh dam also. Therefore, keeping the dead storage level at RL 830, for holding the dead storage, Kalabagh dam may be build as a solid overflow concrete dam. Above this concrete dam a 60 feet conventional barrage with unrestricted silt sluices to have open waterway to freely pass silt may be built. This will create a live storage of about 4 maf upto RL 890 in Soan River Valley and Indus River Valley. It will also serve as a balancing reservoir and generate about 1200MW of power

This type of dam-cum-barrage structure is more suited to silty rivers. Therefore the present wrong design of Kalabagh dam, that is artificially supported by a 1 000MW of thermal power as its component,may be changed and its maximum height may be limited to RL 890 so that in no case it creates heading up of water upstream of Attock in NWFP.

During floods the flow must pass unrestricted without backwater flow or unnecessary heading up at Attock. It was wrong on the part of Wapda for fixing and restricting the dam site at Kalabagh with a height up to of RL 925 under the TOR as that created controversy due to wrong design inundating vast areas in NWFP besides rendering the project infeasible.

The ego behind controversy, obstinacy and water politics can end by the proposed new design. This proposal will correct the wrong concept and wrong design of storage dam at Kalabagh, already rejected by Irsa on 22-10-1996. The new design if considered will assure silt free reservoir of about 4 maf perpetually instead of the rapidly silting and dying storage of 6.1 maf.

The new design will avoid submergence of the Peshawar Valley. Moreover the building of Katzarah dam on the upstream will further improve hydraulic conditions at Attock for storage and power generation at Kalabagh, as floods will almost be eliminated and the Indus flow regulated according to the need.

The government is again and again advised in national interest to build Katzarah dam rapidly to end water and power woes. The para 6 of the Water Accord only allows to build dams wherever feasible.

High rates of Thermal power generation have destroyed industries, trade and is a terrible economic burden on common man.

Katzarah storage is also 6 times larger than the storage of Basha dam. The cost of Kalabagh, Basha and Katzarah dam are almost the same. Katzarah dam will regulate most of the flow of Indus River and also help implement paras 2,4,6,12 and 14 (e) of the Water Accord.

It will also serve as a carryover dam, inter-seasonal dam and development dam.Katzarah dam can irrigate about 10 million acres of barren land including the area of 10 flood canals on perennial basis.

Even 10 mega dams on the Indus would not be able to irrigate this much area. Wapda should be above provincial politics and should not mar water and power development by appeasement tactics of providing flood canals or waiting and insisting for the execution of wrong projects.

One more mistake of the Vision 2025 programme is that Satpara mini dam is being constructed on one of the tributary of the Indus River upstream of Skardu.

This dam will be overlapped if Katzarah mega dam is built or conversely, Katzarah dam will be ignored for the sake of Satpara mini dam.

The legal as well as the correct way for the government to develop resources including storage dams and to remove its problems is by implementing the Water Accord. It will form the base of water development policy.

It is strange on the part of Wapda to ignore Water Accord and instead preferred to build the lowest priority projects of flood canals of no use that will create controversies.

At present there are two professional agencies, the one is Irsa which on paper is supposed to implement the Water Accord,but it has no powers to execute projects and nobody listens to its directions.

The other agency is the autonomous Wapda that has the powers to plan, investigate and execute projects. But Wapda has no mandate from the ministry of water and power and the provinces to implement Water Accord and to set right water-related problems as is clear from the Vision 2025 programme.

It is, therefore, suggested that Wapda be bifurcated and its water wing be affiliated with Irsa as its implementation wing. This is necessary in view of para 13 of the Water Accord.

For better performance and mutual coordination, the merger of water wing with Irsa is necessary. Such coordination with Wapda is seen in section 8 of the Irsa Act and its preamble.

The union of experienced professionals of the two organizations will expedite implementation of the Water Accord, regulate the flow of river Indus by building storage dams and carry out remedial measures for all “connected and ancillary matters” to water development.

For this very reason, the section 4 (9) of the Irsa Act provides that Chairman Wapda should be a part of Irsa as its ex-officio member with no power to vote. At present both organizations are poles apart.

There should, therefore, be a determined effort for optimum water development for which a national water development policy is a prerequisite for guidance.

In the absence of such a policy and since the creation of Wapda, irrigation and drainage problems have many times increased. Experience shows Wapda should not be free to choose any project of its liking at random like the 10 flood canals, the SCARPs, the NDP and the storage facilities.

Moreover, Wapda’s wrong planning of SCARPS against the advice of this writer who suggested surface and sub-surface tile drainage in early 60s has proved a miserable failure. This is followed by NDP,again a failure.

Similarly, Wapda also made storage controversial for more than half of the life span of Pakistan. It also failed to initiate an alternative and even now is wasting time making problems more complicated in an effort to execute a wrong project.

Wapda never conceived to plan water management for the Indus basin where 60 per cent water is wasted. Under such circumstances, administrative restructuring is needed, The water wing of Wapda should therefore be merged with Isra, a representative body, to execute basic projects of irrigation and drainage in the context of the Water Accord.

The writer is the former Chairman of Irsa