GEN Musharraf is back on the political scene. The announcement that he is setting up a political party and that he plans to return to Pakistan has triggered a fresh political debate. Commentators have wasted no time in analysing whether he will be able to gain traction as a civilian politician and deliver to the people of Pakistan.

Let me first point to Nawaz Sharif's role.

To have any chance, Musharraf will have to reunite the parties that supported his presidency. All Muslim League factions (except the PML-N) and the MQM would need to be in his camp if he is to have a realistic chance of altering the political landscape. The MQM, given its dissatisfaction with the current set-up and less than cordial ties with the PML-N, will be the easier challenge. But on the PML factions, the PML-N leadership holds the key.

Thus far, Sharif has been quite principled in his refusal to accept his former party members who sided with Musharraf post-2002 back into the fold. This is despite the fact that a number of PML-Q members (and those who have broken away and formed new entities) wish to return; they do not see much of a future for the PML-Q under the Chaudhries. They are still hoping that pre-election dynamics will force the PML-N to seek candidates who can provide assured victories and thus make them attractive picks. To date, however, the PML-N has been in no rush to reach out; its strategy has been to keep these 'in-waiting' cadres hanging.

Musharraf's announcement changes the calculus. Now these individuals can signal to the PML-N that they will proceed to support Musharraf's bid unless they are assured a return to the N-League. Sharif would know that with Musharraf as a potential unifying force, the PML-Q's fortunes may well be revived; this would force him to consider the threat from the 'in waiting' members as credible. The recent coming together of the PML-Q and PML-F would not have escaped Sharif's attention.

Sharif's role is central as returning to his party still remains the preference for many of the dissidents. This is natural; they would much rather return to a secure party than throw in their lot with a Musharraf-led entity whose future is highly uncertain. In essence then, if Sharif is willing to show flexibility towards his ex-lieutenants, he would automatically undermine the potential for a formidable Musharraf-led alliance to emerge.

Sharif's only other option is to force mid-term elections before Musharraf has time to make inroads. This is dangerous, not only because he will have to go to the streets and create massive agitation — this will not be looked upon favourably by the army or the international community — but also because the PML-N itself is not guaranteed an outright victory even if an election were to take place in the near term. With the latter party's present vote bank, the PPP will have to be further discredited — thereby the need to let them continue in office — before the N-League can have an assured run in the next elections.

The army — read Gen Kayani — is the other actor who could cut short Musharraf's bid. This could be as simple as him signalling to his former boss that the army is not in a position to guarantee his personal security and/or that he cannot ensure that the political parties and judiciary will refrain from taking him to task. Without some conciliatory signalling from the army, it is inconceivable for Musharraf to jump into the fray. He requires a guarantee that he will not be charged, say for treason, upon return and that even if he were to be put behind bars, the army would ensure that it is a temporary phase.

In short then, Musharraf only becomes a serious political consideration if he is provided the initial opening courtesy of Sharif's stubbornness or Kayani's willingness.

How likely is this?

Sharif's moves depend on the mood within his party. There has been an ongoing debate within the ranks and the view has always been split on what to do with those wishing to find their way back into the party as well as on forcing mid-term elections. Musharraf's announcement will certainly give more room to voices that have supported reconciliation with the dissidents. This is not to say the Sharifs will necessarily give in, but they will surely be under greater pressure to do so.

Gen Kayani's calculus is even trickier. One the one hand, the army remains dismayed at the performance of the incumbent government. The view of the PML-N among the top brass is not much better. The institution is still not sure whether Nawaz Sharif's vendetta is limited to Musharraf or if it extends to the institution as a whole. Regardless, there is not much faith in his governance capability. Add to this the fact that the army top brass is adamant not to cross the line itself. The overriding preference is to continue operating from behind the scenes. All this is to say that the army may find charming the idea of an alternative leader who can deliver on governance without challenging the military's institutional interests.

Is Musharraf an attractive proposition? Yes and no. Yes, since he will never undermine the army institutionally and since he understands their institutional preferences. Also, he genuinely believes in 'bringing the army in to keep the army out'. No, because a sitting army chief would never be comfortable having his former boss as a civilian head. And specifically in Musharraf's case, many in the rank and file may be bitter about the deterioration of the army's image under him. Finally, the army will be cognisant that backing Musharraf would imply taking the judiciary and the PML-N head on. n

On balance, the odds seem to be against Musharraf. It will not be entirely surprising to see him backtrack on his promise to return to Pakistan soon and let his enthusiasm cool. The PML-N and Gen Kayani's actions and signals in the coming weeks will provide obvious clues.

By Moeed Yusuf