WHILE in the US this summer, I heard enough whispers circulating in Washington of deep factionalism and differences plaguing the Obama administration vis-à-vis strategy in Afghanistan to encourage me to refer to this “confusion in strategy”, in some of my articles. Obama's Wars

While its contents need not be accepted as gospel truth, Woodward's track record of being able to penetrate the inner sanctums of power and reveal intimate secrets, including sordid tales of personality clashes, is such that few would venture to question the veracity of his claims.

More importantly, the basic premise has not been questioned by any of the principals, including the president.

One is left with the impression of an administration torn by deep differences with the principal actors engaged in ferocious infighting over both the tactics and strategy of the war in Afghanistan. The Promise

While some of this could be ascribed to the president wanting his team to think 'out of the box', nasty exchanges and orchestrated leaks too are revealed. These are far worse than the ones in Jonathan Alter's book , which reviewed the first year of the Obama administration.

Obama's frustration in getting his generals to be on board regarding policy is evident and reinforces the view that the Pentagon has never been an easy customer for any US president. Such accounts also provide us with an insight into Washington's decision-making process.

Obama's primary interest had always been domestic policy, while foreign adventures, even the defeat and destruction of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, were distant priorities.

Having opposed Bush's invasion of Iraq, he could not afford to denounce the Afghan war too, as it would have left him exposed to the charge that he was weak on national security matters. But Obama remained in conflict over the Afghanistan war with many of his close aides preferring an early closure to the war there in order to redirect US energies and resources to the economy.

Not surprisingly, these differing priorities, pushed by powerful and ambitious individuals, came to a head when the president was asked to approve a massive troop increase — the 'surge' strategy.

While Vice President Joe Biden feared that such a decision would amount to a “slow creep”, reminiscent of the Vietnam War, the generals were equally adamant that without substantial troop increase, the war in Afghanistan would be lost. A massive clash of personalities and policies was therefore inevitable.

Advocating less troops and more technology (e.g. drones), Biden used his access to the president to influence the decision-making process, while the generals used bluster and doomsday scenarios to cajole the president to give in to their demands.

In fact, the contempt for Obama shown not only by Gen McChrystal but by other generals is surprising and deeply disappointing. Their language is peppered with expletives.

In the book, an angry Obama is shown trying to reason with a smug group of generals, convinced that they alone understood strategy. Even when pressed for a viable third option, inclusive of an exit plan, they kept “steering the mission towards one option and thwarting his search for an existing plan”. This so upset Obama that he himself wrote out a six-page “terms sheet” that spelled out the conditions for the surge, so as not to be sucked into the slippery slope of more demands.

Nevertheless, he opted for a middle course which while acceding to much of what the Pentagon wanted, included a firm time frame that envisaged withdrawal of US combat troops beginning July 2011. He believed that in devising this option, he was giving something to those who accused him of not being committed enough to the war on terror, while not disappointing those who wished he would walk away from Afghanistan.

Not surprisingly, Pakistan figures prominently in Woodward's book. In his very first briefing to the newly elected President, the national intelligence chief characterised Pakistan as: “A dishonest partner of the US in the Afghan war. They are living a lie”, thus confirming the extent of the trust deficit between the two countries.

It goes to Obama's credit that, notwithstanding this impediment, he has sought to build a strategic relationship with Pakistan, which seeks to take ties beyond the single-item agenda that they have historically been. The challenge, however, is for the Pakistani leadership to carve out a policy that protects our core national interests, while engaging in a genuinely cooperative relationship with the US.

In the meanwhile, the increased frequency of US drone attacks inside Pakistan and incidents of cross-border violations as we saw last month have given rise to deep misgivings and added to tensions between the allies. This is highly detrimental to the interests of both.

The US must not subject Pakistan to public humiliations which reinforce anti-American sentiments and call into question the credibility of an elected government. Though it has recognised that without Pakistan's help and cooperation there can be no genuine peace and stability in Afghanistan, the US continues to engage in threats and intimidation rather than showing some sensitivity to Pakistan's other major concerns and economic needs.

At the same time, Pakistan's decision to suspend Nato land supplies may not be the most appropriate way to react — the threat of the use, rather than the actual use of this 'trump card', may have been more effective.