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CAIRO: BOGEYMAN or genuine radical Islamist agenda? Poised to ride a wave of popular support to power or a just one of the options in Egyptian society?
The debate over the motives and aims of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is intrinsically tied to the future of this country of over 80 million people.
President Hosni Mubarak and his National Democratic Party regime have long argued the ‘us or the Islamists’ defence, one readily imbibed by the US and its most important ally in the region, Israel.
But in Cairo itself, two weeks since the protests against the Mubarak regime began and a day after the momentous meeting between the Muslim Brotherhood and Vice President Omar Suleiman, there is little certainty about the Brotherhood’s popularity or its intentions if it were to eventually capture power.
In Tahrir Square, the epicentre of the anti-Mubarak protests, the Brotherhood is far from dominant. Secular youths and a plethora of Egyptian flags suggest the main driver of the protest is nationalist grievances rooted in the temporal: empowerment, jobs, etc.
But the presence of the Brotherhood in the crowds is also clear. A camp office is set up in one corner of the square, shielded by a white sheet, where Brotherhood members meet the press. Across Tahrir Square, Islamic slogans ring out frequently and the call to prayer echoes from many sides.
The Brotherhood, though, is quick to claim it neither has the means to capture power nor does it want to implement a radical Islamist agenda.
Speaking through a translator, a man identifying himself as a former spokesperson of the Brotherhood said, “(The Brotherhood) doesn’t have the infrastructure to take over the country. At most, there is 30 per cent support.”
The man added, “We want something very similar to Turkey, the Iran model will not work here. We are an open society, we depend on tourism.”
The problem with estimating support for the Muslim Brotherhood and discerning its true agenda is that it has been officially banned in Egypt since 1954 and periodically persecuted, driving it underground and rendering its members wary of public discussion.
In the 2005 parliamentary elections, however, Brotherhood candidates contesting as independents captured 20 per cent of the seats. The success led the Mubarak regime to hit back with a series of repressive measures and legal and constitutional changes designed to further limit the political space for the Brotherhood.
The result? Candidates allied to the Brotherhood failed to win a single seat in the parliamentary elections held last November, an election widely denounced as fraudulent and sparking protests that were the precursor of the Jan 25 movement two months later.
Still, few independent analysts suggest the Brotherhood has anything even approaching the support of a majority of Egyptians.
“Just because someone is praying doesn’t automatically mean he is a supporter” of the Brotherhood, according to Dr Said Shehata, a broadcast journalist in Cairo. “At most, there is 20 per cent support.”
Gamila Ismail, a democracy activist and former wife of the leader of the opposition Al Ghad party, described the presence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Tahrir Square thus: “They defend against the stones (thrown by pro-Mubarak supporters) and they man the checkpoints, but not much else. They also lead the prayers, but after that khalaas (over).”
Analysts also suggest the agenda of the Brotherhood is not radical in a violent sense.
“For sure, their frame of reference is Islam,” said Dr Shehata, “But they are only ‘radical’ to the extent that they want to impose certain things on others. It isn’t about violence.”
Possibly tempering more radical elements inside the group is the reality that the Brotherhood is not a monolith. According to Mohamed Sabreen, deputy editor-in-chief of the Egyptian daily Al Ahram: “When they elected the last (General Leader) in 2010, they tore into each other like any other party with accusations of fraud, of cheating, of lying. There are many different camps. No one is dominant.”
The vacillation of the Muslim Brotherhood between joining the talks with Vice President Omar Suleiman and staying was also typical of the group, according to analysts. “They never seem to know what they want. There is no vision,” Dr Shehata claimed.
Yet, unease remains.
Mr Sabreen appeared wary of the Brotherhood’s ultimate aim said: “Let me put it this way. It won’t look like Turkey. And I hope — hope — it won’t end up like Iran.”
