The Labour Policy, 2002 envisages revamping the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC). The reason or the need to do so is best known to the government.

It is understood that the idea must have emanated from the criticism of this institution by certain stakeholders. The government in view of the requirements and objectives would,of course, decide parameters according to which revamping or restructuring of the NIRC will be carried.

However, there remains need to go into the background under which this body was created and the identification of issues warranting the restructuring of the NIRC. The views have also been advanced by certain quarters to altogether abolish this body. Some people might be expressing this view at present. In this regard it should be stated that positive criticism for corrective measures is always good, but negative criticism or views like the statement to do away with an institution cannot be considered as desirable and healthy, because institutions are difficult to create but easy to destroy and destruction of an institution is always a great national loss. The same opinion should apply in the case of the NIRC.

The NIRC was established under the Labour Policy, 1972 as a quasi-judicial authority with three main aims:

* to promote genuine trade unionism at the trade level and ensure representative character of unions;

* to help setting up industry-wise federations of unions;

* to help formation of federations at the national level.

The other important function assigned to the NIRC was to deal with cases of victimization of office-bearers of trade unions and unfair labour practices on the part of employers as well as trade unions. It’s role in the determination of unfair labour practices and registration of national level trade unions has remained over the years significant. Despite criticism, the NIRC’s contributory role in the maintenance of industrial peace cannot be overlooked or underestimated. In case, the credibility of any member becomes questionable, credibility and usefulness of this body can be kept in tact in accordance with the prescribed procedure and in a judicial manner.

The authority so created should remain in place to perform its role effectively. It rather needs to be strengthened, further empowered and manned with competent persons of sound integrity. Its efficient and judicious functioning depends on the degree of its independent performance without any administrative or political interference and influence. Improvement in the employment conditions of its members and staff serves as an added factor in enhancing its prestige.

A ‘gherao’ and ‘jalao’ situation had existed prior to the creation of the NIRC. The President of Pakistan while announcing the labour policy on February 10, 1972 had clearly stated that the strength of the street will be met by the strength of the state and in future the full weight of the law will be visited on such forms of illegal demonstration. The establishment of the NIRC, subsequently proved to be helpful not only in controlling the situation but also proved instrumental in providing a suitable forum to create a balance in industrial relations.

A party against whom a decree is passed by the court is always aggrieved. Such a grievance is resolvable through judicial process by the conferment of the right of appeal to a higher forum. In cases before the NIRC, the right of appeal is available against the decision of a single bench to a double bench. The High Court has inherent writ jurisdiction to scrutinize legal issues despite finality of the judgment of the full bench.

But the institution of the NIRC is quite sensitive due to sensitivity of industrial relations. Parties to industrial relations, which are collective and organized bodies, are stronger. Instead of appreciating judicial process, they treat the NIRC as a check on their authority. They try to destabilize this institution by reaching the government with bundle of complaints against it. What is needed, in fact, is to learn to promote industrial relations culture and to live with it. Rule of law is required to be established by respecting the law and accepting and complying with final judicial decrees.

The NIRC that has survived almost three decades has been able to develop the labour law. Further measures are needed to strengthen this institution while undertaking its revamping. I would like to highlight new areas and further issues in this regard.

In the first place, I would like to explain that the law relating to industrial relations was developed on the pattern of the US model. The US law provides for the establishment of National Industrial Board (NIB) with the object to further the government policies of peace and harmony between labour and management and to bring about a speedy and fair disposal of labour-management disputes.

A five-member presidentially-appointed labour relations board is responsible to administer the National Labour Relation Act1935, as amended up-to-date. The Act affirms the rights of employees to self-organization and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing or to refrain from such activities. It prohibits certain “ unfair labour practices” by employers and labour organizations or their agents and authorizes the Board to conduct secret ballot elections in appropriate bargaining units to determine whether employees desire representation by a labour organization.

The Labour- Management Relations Act 1947, commonly called the Taft-Hartley Act, amended the 1935 Act to place restrictions on strike activity that threatened to curb a rapidly growing US economy’— (Foreign Labour Trends by US Department of Labour). The NLRB under the American law seems to perform more extended and powerful functions as compared to those of NIRC under Pakistani law, but stakeholders in America would hardly speak against their institution. They rather pay full deference to their institutions and help maintain their continuity.

Being a quasi-judicial authority, the NIRC or NLRB or a judicial forum such as an industrial tribunal in the UK is an off-spring of administrative law, a legal framework, which derives from the need to create and develop a system of public administration under law. As a corollary, the NIRC or any other similar body can be treated as a functionary of labour administration under a labour law.

A quasi-judicial body such as the office of ombudsman in any country or the forums like the NIRC in Pakistan or NLRB in the US to deal with labour-related matters or procurators-general in eastern Europe or a parliamentary commissioner in Great Britain or the Administrative Management Agency in Japan, All these bodies in their respective spheres act as legislative commissioners to deal with citizens’ complaints. In this sense, NIRC should provide not only an apex judicial forum but also a supra-administrative body to entertain and dispose of labour-related complaints. As such, the NIRC’s functions should not remain confined to limited areas but should be made more comprehensive and extensive.

Over a period of time, emphasis for compliance of international labour standards has been intensified and is being underscored nationally and internationally. Need for social accountability to pursue SA 8000 is also being felt. The government is being advised regularly by the ILO’s specific committees to ensure: a) strict implementation of the ILO Conventions ratified by Pakistan; and b) enforcement of laws relating to child and bonded labour. The NIRC in this regard should have concurrent jurisdiction and should have the power to take cognizance of the offence suo moto.

The complaint about poor implementation of labour law by law-enforcement agencies is generally lodged with the government, which is disposed of in a routine and bureaucratic manner. Legally, there is no procurator or supervisory judicial body to take cognizance of the situation for rectification or corrective measures and redress the grievance. The NIRC by virtue of its status should be given this function to perform. In Britain, the ACAS was founded in 1974 to improve industrial relations in terms of rendering conciliatory, advisory and arbitrary service. The NIRC besides adjudication particularly in unfair labour practices acts as a registrar of industry-wise and national level trade unions. There is no regular body to render conciliatory and arbitrary service in disputes of national level and of national importance. It would equally be desirable to call on NIRC to also render these services.

Improvement and development of labour legislation is basically the responsibility of the government, federal as well as provincial. Presently, the ministry of labour and a provincial labour department are not fully equipped with legal experts to deal with the subject in a professional and specialized way. The ministry of law or provincial labour departments are too over-worked to render full time service to draft a labour law. Their job remains confined to vetting the law. It would be pertinent to involve NIRC for making federal labour laws and a labour court for a provincial labour law which may also consult NIRC if need arises with regard to cross references.

Parties to industrial relations: employer, worker or the government may refer a well-formulated legal question through a legal practitioner to the NIRC for interpretation of any provision of the law relating to industrial relation. A party aggrieved of interpretation by NIRC may prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court for a final verdict. It will help resolve many complicated legal issues and make easy the implementation of the law.

It may be advisable for the government to ponder on these issues while revamping NIRC in pursuance of the new Labour Policy. Revamping the NIRC in these terms may, however, require strengthening it further to make it more viable and effective institution. The NIRC should in fact act as an ombudsman in the labour field.