OSAMA bin Laden’s death was a momentous event in Pakistan’s turbulent history. Apart from immediate, unanswered questions, the event has raised some longer-term issues which will require careful reflection.

Many illusions have been exposed, including the dysfunctional nature of our state and the contradictions in our relationship with the US.

The immediate issues are clear: how could the world’s most wanted man be safely residing in a secure military cantonment for so long without discovery? An intelligence failure on this scale is embarrassing for the ISI. An admission of incompetence is probably less harmful than accepting complicity. And yet the denial of complicity has not been readily accepted by the western media or security experts.

Another serious issue is the violation of our sovereignty by the US without being detected. They pour salt on our wounds by saying, through Leon Panetta, head of the CIA, that “we did not inform Pakistan because they would have alerted the target”.

So much for trust and confidence in a relationship that has lasted over five decades.

Apart from China, Pakistan has not received any significant diplomatic support from any other major country on this issue. India, meanwhile, has been taking full diplomatic and media advantage, even though the initial threat of a similar operation by India was quickly denied.

The longer-term issues highlighted by this event and reinforced by the attack on PNS Mehran are even more daunting and complex. For the first time since 1971, the overriding role of the armed forces in formulating and implementing the country’s foreign and security policies is being openly questioned. The implications of the strategies and policies designed primarily by military rulers and followed in the past three decades, in Afghanistan and Kashmir, are being debated in the media: is it conceivable that Pakistan would not have been facing such a serious existential threat from within and such a serious imbalance in its relationship with the USA if these strategies had been formulated in consultation with the political leadership, parliament and foreign office experts?

The intelligence failures of the past few years can partly be explained as a structural problem: the demotion of the ISI’s intelligence gathering role in favour of large-scale operational responsibilities in the wake of the Afghan jihad of the 1980s. In most countries, these two functions are not combined in one agency because operational requirements can adversely affect the quality and objectivity of the intelligence function. In Pakistan, this flaw has been further compounded by the creation of a political wing in the ISI.

In this turbulent environment, the people of Pakistan are angry. They are blaming every institution, civilian and military, and all present and past governments. The most visible manifestation of public anger is directed towards USA.

This anti-American surge is unfortunately matched by an equally strong anti-Pakistan media campaign in the US: Pakistan has become a dangerous breeding ground for terrorists and it cannot be trusted because it sheltered bin Laden. Against this tense backdrop, President Obama, in his June 23 announcement of gradual withdrawal from Afghanistan, also had a tough message for Pakistan.

The joint session of parliament held on May 13 did provide a sense of direction for the future. The unanimous resolution condemned the Abbottabad operation as an attack on national sovereignty and asked the government to take measures to stop drone attacks. It called upon the government to review its terms of engagement with the US with a view to ensuring that Pakistan’s national interests are fully respected in policies for countering terrorism and achieving peace in Afghanistan. It also called upon the government to appoint an independent commission on the Abbottabad operation.

The resolution affirmed full faith in Pakistan’s defence forces. Meanwhile, the military leadership asked the elected leaders and parliament to devise a security policy that it would implement. Subsequently, a communiqué issued after a Corps commanders’ conference on June 9 stated that “cooperation with the US has to be assessed afresh in view of the parliament’s resolution and the army shall take into account the aspirations of the people while reviewing military ties with the US”.

How does Pakistan, as a nation, deal with these complex issues, restore national confidence and emerge with clearer objectives and a broader political consensus in dealing with this and any future political upheavals?

First: The unanimous resolution by the joint session must be implemented in letter and spirit. The independent commission to find out the facts and assign responsibility must complete its work without further delay.

Second: This is not time to undermine our military establishment and security institutions. Instead, we must address the structural weaknesses and adjust civil-military relations by reorganising civilian responsibility in the formulation of foreign and security policies. This goal has to be pursued gradually as the civilian capacity to address these objectives improves.

Third: A key element in this restructuring is the establishment of an effective national security system under the prime minister which brings together the foreign policy, security and economic dimensions of national security. It must have a proper research and advisory infrastructure. The present Security Council, which doesn’t include even the ministers concerned, is not properly constituted. In 1999, I finalised a detailed proposal to reconstitute the Defence Committee into a Cabinet Committee on Defence and National Security with a proper secretariat and advisory infrastructure. However, the military takeover in October 1999 interrupted its implementation.

Fourth: There are calls for reviewing our relations with the US but this has to be done in a dispassionate and nuanced manner.

We must reduce our dependence on foreign assistance to prepare the ground for a more dignified relationship. Bin Laden’s death offers a new opportunity to shift the focus. There is also an opportunity for the US, given that the paramount objective of capturing Osama has been achieved, to accelerate efforts for a political solution in Afghanistan keeping in view the pivotal role Pakistan can play in formal talks with the Taliban. US policymakers should also recognise that ‘anti-Americanism’ does not mean that Pakistanis don’t admire its democratic values, its respect for freedom and its scientific, literary and cultural contributions. The reaction is against certain aspects of US foreign policy.

Fifth: The prevailing ambiguity about our policy on militancy and insurgency must be removed. A national consensus must be evolved on the basis of the resolution passed by the joint session of parliament on October 22, 2008, and the recommendations of the parliamentary committee on national security in April 2009, to deal effectively with this growing threat to Pakistan’s security.

The writer has formerly served as Pakistan’s finance and foreign minister.