ANTI-Americanism does not fall into clearly demarcated realms of rationality as opposed to visceral or essentialist anti-Americanism; necessarily, it has to be a hybrid of both.

It also seems reasonable to posit, as many analysts have done, that due to the complexity of the world and international relations, people will see it as such and will be able to distinguish between aspects of the same object, correctly deciphering the various nuances and intricacies of world politics and political roles; ostensibly this stands for anti-Americanism as well.

Thus, there will be numerous anti-Americanisms. It has been demonstrated that anti-Americanism in contemporary Europe correlates directly with education and social status: the higher the level of education, the greater the perception. The subject clearly has many polycentric layers; this is because the concept is too complex to be summed up in a term which can be utilised in a non-pluralist, polemic discourse. The topics discussed are also subjective, with strong opinions held by parties on both sides of the fence.

The term anti-Americanism does indeed have a gate-keeping function. ‘Anti-Americanism’ is essentially a political and subjective term. If freedom of speech and democratic debate are true American values, then one may rightly ask the question:

‘is there anything more anti-American than accusing someone (anyone) of being anti-American?’ Thus, if the theory of ‘many’ anti-Americanisms is accepted, it should logically follow that there should be at least as many different forms of audience which subscribe to a particular aspect of the sentiment.

It also seems that the oft-extolled statement about the US always being the ‘kicking boy’ of the world is not justified. Polls carried out since the 1940s by the UN and other organisations reveal comparatively little resistance to American influence.

Indeed, the world was quite generous in its support for the Yankees, indicating that only a small minority opposed US policies, and was not opposed to the permeation of American culture and values.

This was corroborated by independent polling carried out mainly by the United States Information Agency (USIA) during the Cold War. These studies found comparable results: there was hardly a country in the world where a majority was hostile to the United States. Even in those states which had unfavourable opinions, the tally often added up to single-digit totals, with most respondents differentiating between specific policies and those of the US as a whole.

Taking specific instances, Latin Americans, for example, desired economic security and favoured the US strongly, with exceptions mostly confined to urban, militant fringe groups of students or workers. A very small percentage of Latin American and Central American urban respondents perceived ‘resisting foreign influence’ as a priority. This is a far cry from the more recent figures: 64 per cent favourable in Mexico, 52 per cent in Brazil and 34 per cent in Argentina, drastically down from the 80 to 90 per cent approval ratings observed during the Cold War.

This anti-Americanism is reflected by continental Europeans, the other global icon of modernity. Thus, although the French can hardly be defined as anti-American in the virulent sense generally ascribed to the Arabic audience, an overwhelming 80 per cent shun the American lifestyle. The non-American world’s perception changed from America being focused on power, dynamism, wealth and liberty in 1988 to violence, power, inequalities and racism in 1996. Large European majorities characterise America as domineering, racist and violent.

In March 2003, only 48 per cent of British, 31 per cent of French and 14 per cent of Spanish held a favourable view of America. A majority in 34 out of 43 countries polled in 2002 disliked America’s influence in their country. Neo-con scholar Robert Kagan’s catchy aphorism, “Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus”, is quite apt for describing the European-American divide.

The anti-American views also seem to have a nuanced stratification; a 2007 Pew survey asked the target population if they “liked or disliked American ideas on democracy”. Pluralities in 33 of 47 polled countries expressed a dislike for American ideas about democracy, with 76 per cent in France and 92 per cent in Turkey expressing dislike.

Significantly, these two Nato allies are, respectively, a birthplace of modern democracy and a showcase of its taking root in a developing, predominantly Islamic, society.

Numerous polls in these and other countries repeatedly show strong commitments to or yearnings for democratic governance. So the problem here is American policy, not democratic principles. When confronted with favourable/unfavourable attitudes towards the US, West Germans replied with remarkable consistency by expressing favourable opinions over a 30-year period from the mid-1950s to the mid-1980s. However, responding to a ‘your overall opinion of the United States’ question, German views fluctuated widely over the years, reaching highs over 80 per cent and lows below 35 per cent.

Gebhard Schweigler posits that this demonstrates the German public’s disheartened attitude between Americans as a people and the policies of the American government. If the anti-Americanism of the German people was rooted only in envy of the supremacy of American culture and power, or emerged from a collective cultural memory of negative images and metaphors, the favourable rating would not fluctuate this much. Americans have maintained their position of supremacy since the Second World War, and the image of America appearing in German writing has also been quite consistent over the past century.

As Schweigler points out, fluctuations of German opinion vary with the temporal variations of American policy, with the highest rating in the early 1960s corresponding to president Kennedy’s commitment to West Germany. From thereon, since 1965, there is a precipitous decline which increased dramatically after 1968 with the advent of the Vietnam imbroglio; then followed the era of Watergate and revelations about CIA covert actions, including assassination attempts, in the Third World.

Jimmy Carter’s era, that promised a focus on morality and respect for human rights, showed a revival of favourable German opinion towards the US, which again declined after Ronald Reagan’s confrontational stance on the Soviet Union and the talk of nuclear war, falling to lows again after Desert Storm.

This is a not an untypical attitude towards the US by Europe and many western countries, and thus is an indicator of American policies shaping perceptions towards the US rather than any essential, visceral dislike for America and all things American.

The writer is a security analyst.