ARE the Pakistani Taliban amenable to negotiations and would that lead to sustainable peace? After the Oct 18 All-Party Conference resolution, which endorsed talks with Pakistani militants, the government has received offers for negotiations from some Taliban factions.

The popular argument in Pakistan is that if the US can talk to the Afghan Taliban, why should Islamabad not do the same? However, it remains to be seen whether talks between Kabul, Washington and the Taliban will yield positive results.

Secondly, a nationalistic trait dominates the Afghan resistance but the Pakistani Taliban lack this 'legitimacy', and ideological and tribal characteristics have persuaded Pakistan to look at the Pakistani Taliban from its own perspective.

Although prospects for a successful peace process in Pakistan's tribal areas are not entirely bleak, the state must first decide what it wants to achieve. Is the desired objective minimising terrorist attacks in the country, or dismantling terrorists' networks? Are the decisions swayed by a craving to regain lost ground or to reintegrate the militants into society?

Also of crucial importance is what the state demands of the militants, and what it can offer in return. What is required is a comprehensive approach based on a lucid policy that is mindful of the lessons learned from previous peace deals.

With the exception of the Swat peace agreement, all other pacts were signed between the military and the militants, with the principal objective being to secure an end to attacks on the security forces. The local tribes' participation in these talks was nominal, their only function being to serve as guarantors. The state negotiated from a position of weakness, offering too much and demanding too little. Most importantly, the Taliban enjoyed public support at the time, which strengthened their hand at the negotiating table.

Public support for them has plummeted after the military operations in Swat and South Waziristan. The extent of the effect this would have on their bargaining position is of critical importance. Besides other structural and tactical flaws in the previous agreements, a major strategic deficiency was a consistent failure to assess the militants' ideological and political strength.

The real advantage the Pakistani Taliban possessed was their ideological and political cause. The cause has a central place in counterinsurgency studies. Without an attractive cause, a militant movement is little more than a criminal syndicate. The Pakistani Taliban got their political inspiration from Afghanistan, but ideologically they were influenced by both Al Qaeda and Pakistani militant and radical groups.

Initially, the Pakistani Taliban focused on Afghanistan or on acting as facilitators for Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban in South and North Waziristan. Punjab- and Kashmir-based groups introduced foreign militants to the religious discourse for change in Pakistan.

Pakistan's religious political parties have for long been striving for the Islamisation of the state and the socialisation of society along religious lines. This is a common narrative in Pakistan but after 9/11, militant organisations have promoted this narrative with greater vigour.

Al Qaeda came up with an ideological and political agenda which appeals to militants in countries all over the world. These internal and the external factors transformed the Pakistani Taliban movement. Although many Pakistani Taliban groups had a far from prominent role in Afghanistan, even that became a source of political legitimacy for them. However, under these influences their focus gradually shifted to Pakistan.

Punjab- and Kashmir-based militant organisations became invaluable assets for Al Qaeda as their objectives converged. The Taliban absorbed both tendencies and became agents of change in their respective areas. They felt empowered in a system where tribesmen had been the victims of colonial-era laws, political agents and maliks. The nexus of these three elements still exists and has grown even stronger.

Prospects for sustainable peace will remain bleak unless this bond is weakened. The Pakistani Taliban will fear losing political and ideological legitimacy. A long-term strategy to weaken this bond can meet the challenge.

Fortunately, there is a desire among sections of the clergy in Pakistan to play its role in curbing violent tendencies. They can offer an alternative to the Taliban groups to strive for their causes through peaceful means. This would not be an easy task and the option of use of force against Al Qaeda and inflexible elements among the Taliban should remain on the table and must form an unambiguous provision in any future peace agreement.

A selective approach may also work as the Taliban are far from being a homogenous entity. There are three major factions among them: the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), local Taliban groups (such as groups led by Gul Bahadar and Mullah Nazir, with whom peace treaties are still intact), and other militant groups such as Lashkar-i-Islam who are not part of the two major factions. The TTP itself is an alliance of many small militant groups. Although these groups share common ideological and political views, their objectives vary and include sectarian and Islamisation agendas as well as tribal and ethnic priorities.

A strategy based on an accurate assessment of the militants' ideological and political strengths can be used to engage these factions. However, different approaches would be needed to engage different groups and a successful policy in one area may not work in another. There are other critical dimensions too but the key to success in any peace process lies in active engagement with the local tribes, and political and religious actors in conflict areas. A persistent, flexible and accommodative approach which can adjust to changing situations just might do the trick.

The writer is editor of the quarterly research journal Conflict and Peace Studies.

mamirrana@yahoo.com