THE Pakistani and Indian foreign secretaries met in June to discuss peace in the region and confidence-building measures (CBMs). For nuclear and conventional CBMs, it was agreed to retain the two-track format for the next round that begins at the end of the month. The negotiators must recall what has been achieved so far. They must agree on what is in the pipeline; identify the restraining blocks; and work towards CBMs with a view to moving on from managing a difficult relationship to improving it.

Five rounds of nuclear CBMs talks and four rounds on conventional CBMs were held between 2004 and 2007. In the first round of nuclear talks in New Delhi, it was agreed that “the nuclear capabilities of each other, which are based on their national security imperatives, constitute a factor for stability”, and that both countries were, “committed to work towards strategic stability”.

The achievements of the nuclear CBMs talks were: establishing a hotline between the foreign secretaries; upgrading the existing hotline between the directors-general military operations; coming to an agreement on pre-notification of flight testing of ballistic missiles, and one on reducing the risk from accidents relating to nuclear weapons.

At the foreign secretaries’ joint press conference of March 2007, it was stated: “…It is agreed that there should be regular expert -level discussions on doctrines for ensuring security in an environment of strategic deterrence that is maintained by the two countries and is a fact of life in South Asia.”

In the forthcoming nuclear CBM talks the following approaches could be considered: a) going beyond the 1999 Lahore MoU on which talks have been based so far; b) understanding perceptions on strategic stability and working towards the latter; c) avoiding an arms race and promoting credible restraint in line with the declared responsible nuclear status of both countries; d) evolving and implementing approaches guided by defensive rather than offensive doctrines; (e) including cruise missiles in the agreement on pre-notification of flight testing of ballistic missiles; (f) discussing the impact of ballistic missile defence on strategic stability; and (g) cooperation between the nuclear regulatory authorities of both countries on civil nuclear power plants after Fukushima.

The fundamental objective of these CBM talks should be to remove or diminish mistrust and misunderstandings, and to ensure minimum deterrence giving priority to socioeconomic development in each country within the framework of improved bilateral relations.

Earlier, in the conventional CBM talks, there was reaffirmation by both sides of the commitment to uphold the ongoing Line of Control (LoC) ceasefire; the implementation of the 1991 agreement on air space violations; no new posts or defence works along the LoC; holding monthly flag meetings between local commanders at the Kargil/Olding, Uri/Chakothi, Naushera/Sadabad and Jammu/Sialkot sectors; the speedy return of inadvertent LoC crossers and working out a comprehensive framework to that end; and periodically reviewing the existing CBMs.

A draft agreement for avoidance of incidents at sea, foreseen by the Lahore MoU, was handed over by Pakistan.

In the forthcoming conventional CBM talks the following approaches would be of utility: (a) reviving earlier discussions on a no-war pact; (b) clarification of security threat perceptions to reduce the arms build-up; (c) evolving doctrines with defensive rather than aggressive objectives; (d) linkage between nuclear and conventional CBMs; (e) discussions on conventional stability as the term ‘conventional balance’ is unacceptable to India; (f) military CBMs on both sides of Kashmir for reducing tension (a Pakistani proposal to remove heavy weapons is still on the table); (g) finalising the draft agreement on avoidance of incidents at sea; (h) completing the draft agreement on not developing new posts or defence works along the LoC; (i) finalising the draft agreement on the holding of monthly flag meetings between local commanders at the Kargil/Olding, Uri/Chakothi, Naushera/Sadabad and Jammu/ Sialkot sectors; (j) finalising the draft agreement on the speedy return of those inadvertently crossing the line; (k) initiation of helicopter flights for Kashmiris to travel between Muzaffarabad and Srinagar; and (l) resolving pending issues along the LoC including the fate of Point 605, a no-man’s land peak.

What are the stumbling blocks? Pakistan fears that the aim of India’s expanding strategic and conventional capabilities, American alliance and involvement in Afghanistan is to diminish and contain Pakistan.

For India it’s no-first-nuclear-use pledge if adopted by Pakistan would remove the threat of nuclear war from South Asia. For Pakistan this would permit India to attack with conventional predominance as aimed for in its Cold Start Doctrine.

Pakistan feels that a no-war pact would go beyond a no-first-use policy. But India believes that this cannot be reached until Pakistan is able to restrain low-intensity conflict and terrorism.

In the last round, it became apparent that India was losing interest in bilateral nuclear CBMs as it felt that it was entering a bigger league. This has to change for progress to be made.

Thinking globally but acting locally applies just as much to arms control as to environmental action. The reality defining this important process, in which diplomats and military officers sit together in civilised dialogue, is that CBMs are not a substitute for progress on dispute resolution and cannot thrive until efforts are made by both sides to improve relations.

The writer is a retired diplomat who headed Pakistan’s delegations at the nuclear and conventional CBM talks with India from 2002 to 2007.