PAKISTAN’S strategic sensitivities are growing on its western borders. Pakistan has set up more than 700 security check posts along the Pak-Afghan border, as ‘low-intensity warfare’ has increasingly gained more importance in the national security doctrine despite efforts to ward off such scenarios.

The May 2 US operation to track down Osama bin Laden and the Nov 26 Nato air strikes on two Pakistani military check posts in Mohmand Agency, which caused the death of 24 Pakistani soldiers, the subsequent suspension of supplies to Nato forces in Afghanistan through Pakistan and the vacating of the Shamsi airbase by the US further increased these concerns, which need to be adjusted in the strategic doctrine.

Changes in the strategic doctrine cannot come about overnight and have to factor in how the situation would evolve after the exit of Nato troops from Afghanistan. Pakistan did not have any major armed conflict along the Afghan border and had not deployed regular army units there until after 9/11.

Pakistan deployed its regular forces at the border for the first time to stop infiltration of Al Qaeda and Taliban remnants when US-led coalition forces invaded Afghanistan to oust the Taliban regime from power. Afghanistan has also stationed troops along the border where small-scale armed clashes with Pakistani forces have become the norm.

According to data compiled by the Pak Institute for Peace Studies, from 2007 to 2010, Nato forces and the Afghan National Army violated Pakistan’s borders at least 194 times. The violations included missile and rocket attacks on Pakistani check posts by Afghan forces, clashes between security forces and air and land incursions into Pakistan. In 2011, as many as 67 such incidents were reported in which 57 Pakistani soldiers were killed.

A new and worrying development for Pakistan on its western borders has been cross-border attacks by Afghanistan-based militants on Pakistani security forces’ posts. At least 30 such strikes have been reported across Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan at Chitral, Upper and Lower Dir and Bajaur and Kurram in Fata, leading to the killing of 250 Pakistani security personnel and civilians. These militants are part of Taliban factions, who fled to Afghanistan’s border provinces, mainly Kunar, and their attacks have contributed to escalation in bilateral tensions.

The third issue of concern is Afghanistan’s internal stability and the Afghan army’s continued lack of capacity. According to analysts, US and Nato efforts to develop the security forces in Afghanistan have focused on numbers rather than quality. Also, the loyalty and credibility of Afghan security forces remain highly questionable. Analysts argue that the Afghan National Army is far from ready to assume operational command and tackle security responsibilities on its own.

A major concern for Pakistan is the likely scenario of growing instability in Afghanistan after the Nato troops pull out. That can create trouble on the Pakistani side of the border as many political elements in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province are tied to power brokers on both sides. The nature of relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan may trigger border tensions from time to time.

The fourth major reason for growing strategic sensitivities is the concentration of militant forces along both sides of the border, which may continue to play the role of irritant not only in bilateral ties but also in relation to the international community. India’s role in Afghanistan is also an issue central to the changing thinking on matters of strategic interest to Pakistan.

The major casualty in this strategic transformation has been the Afghan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement considered an important pact for expanding economic ties between the two countries and also with the Central Asian region. International gas pipeline and electricity transmission projects such as Tapi and Casa-1000 have still not materialised because of security concerns, mainly the decade-long insurgency in Afghanistan.

In this perspective, some attempts have been made by the two countries and by the US to improve the situation. Although most of these attempts were aimed at normalising bilateral relations through developing cooperation in the security and economy sectors, the border security issue has remained at the core of these efforts. In April 2011, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, army chief Gen Ashfaq Kayani and ISI director general Lt Gen Shuja Pasha visited Kabul in a bid to establish an ‘Afghan-led and Afghan-owned joint peace commission’ and made efforts for negotiations with the Taliban.

The process continued relatively smoothly until the assassination of ex-Afghan president and head of the High Peace Council Burhanuddin Rabbani in September 2011. Despite a cooperation mechanism in the form of the Pakistan-Afghanistan-US tripartite commission established in 2003, which also comprises a border security sub-committee, and provisions and blueprints for sharing intelligence under the military intelligence-sharing working group, blame for cross-border incursions and attacks has been hurled from both sides of the border.

A meeting of the tripartite commission’s military border working group was convened in Peshawar on July 6 this year on Pakistan’s request. The committee suggested the establishment of a single point of contact with all Afghan national security forces through a hotline contact between the Pakistan Army and Afghan National Army, regular border flag meetings between local commanders and interaction/jirgas between the maliks of villages on either side of the border. But all these attempts have failed to find a workable mechanism, which has emboldened the militants to roam freely across the border and launch attacks on both sides of the border. This is a very delicate situation for Pakistan as any adjustment in its security doctrine would not only be related to the geo-political interests of the country but also to a change in the military structure which the Pakistan economy would barely be able to sustain. Another important aspect of any possible shift would be the sensitivities on Pakistan’s eastern borders with India. The threat perception on the eastern border would be crucial to adjustments in the national security doctrine.

The writer is editor quarterly research journal Conflict and Peace Studies.

mamirrana@yahoo.com