IN recent days, Pakistan experienced extremely tense moments, ranging from a series of memogate revelations hitting right, left and centre, followed by their reverberation in the Supreme Court hearings, to Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani's outburst against the military establishment.

The fear of the army often surfaced in the negotiations of civilian governments with foreign countries. In 1972, Z.A. Bhutto asked Indira Gandhi not to send him empty-handed back to the army. In 1999, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif requested Washington to ward off the danger of a military takeover in Pakistan. The latter duly issued a warning against any extra-constitutional move. That, of course, did not stop Musharraf from usurping power.

The present PPP-led government also sought assurances from Washington that the Kerry-Lugar bill should include a provision for safeguarding the civilian set-up. The logjam on this issue was resolved by linking the aid flow with democracy in letter but not in spirit. The tussle between the government and the PML-N opposition over Punjab in 2009, along with the restoration of judges, weakened President Zardari who increasingly sought accommodation with the army.

As per Mansoor Ijaz's rendition of the events, the DG ISI toured the Arab countries straight after the Abbottabad operation to sell the idea of a military takeover. Was it a replay of Nawaz Sharif's plea in 1999 to control Bonapartism?

Why did the prime minister react in the manner he did? It seems that he felt snubbed by a series of factors: the DG ISI earlier travelled to the UK to cull information about the memo without seeking his permission. Both army chief Gen Kayani and DG ISI Lt Gen Shuja Pasha submitted their affidavits bypassing the prime minister. The contents of these affidavits were made public, thus overriding the confidentiality of the matter.

Further, the ISPR sought to clarify that the telephone conversation between the president and COAS lasted for only one minute. This confirmed that there was no forgiving and forgetting between the two sides. On the day after Mr Gilani's speech in parliament, the army chief reiterated his demand to pursue the inquiry into the memo, thus keeping his pressure on the government, even as he formally denied rumours about a coup.

Meanwhile, the touts of the get-Zardari camp condemned what they considered the arbitrary issuance of 16,000 visas to Americans. In the process of judicial inquiry, this figure was stated to be less than 100. The prime minister curtly asked what kind of visa Osama bin Laden had to stay in Pakistan for six years. He seemed to say that nobody's hands were clean, with an implicit reference to the army leadership.

Mr Gilani reminded his audience that all institutions were accountable to parliament as the supreme sovereign body. He declared that a state within a state could not be tolerated. He claimed that it was the public money procured by the civilian government that kept the military going and therefore the latter should not dictate to public representatives.

However, the real theatre of conflict surrounding the memo is in the Supreme Court. Nawaz Sharif decided to bypass parliament for investigation into this matter. The anti-Zardari elements generally supported his initiative. Apparently, he wants the government to go, and fresh elections to follow, even as he continues to issue statements against the army's role in politics. Shahbaz Sharif feels uninhibited on that count as the new defender of the sanctity of the armed forces.

Obviously, Nawaz Sharif's recourse to the judicial route favoured the army by default and put the PPP on the spot. If the army moves in, Nawaz Sharif's fate is sealed. The army chief's statement has provided some relief, but it can be temporary. Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry has declared that the days when coup makers had their action validated through the courts were over, and that any extra-constitutional change would not be allowed.

What are the army's options? One way can be looking the other way, cooling the temperature and holding its own overbearing style of putting pressure on the democratic dispensation responsible for the government's insecurity. That is not the military way, not in Pakistan any way. But, a coup will face four formidable factors: a strident — at times killer —media, a hyperactive, independent judiciary, a hugely politicised citizenry and the western capitals frustrated over the deficit of trust with security establishment in the war against terror.

A coup will remove the buffer between the army/ISI and Nato/US, invite another spate of democracy sanctions from the world, and push the democratic forces to the wall that can boomerang. The army has been uncomfortable with all civilian set-ups. This feeling has led to a high-profile and prolonged conflict with civilian governments, and thus to political instability. It needs to re-evaluate its role in the state system and reduce its hyper visibility.

The incumbent civilian governments are rendered unpopular due to governance's myriad problems. Military presidents from Ayub to Musharraf were likewise publicly discredited and had to leave in disgrace. There is no monopoly over virtue. The extra-parliamentary forces seek to destabilise civilian governments, and political parties and civil society seek to destabilise military governments. For how long?

What are President Asif Zardari's options? One is rapprochement with Nawaz Sharif. The distance between the two leaders who shun the army's political role is senseless. Both must keep the system alive and kicking. Both need to outgrow the pressure of their fuming and frothing lieutenants and close their ranks. Both need to be more imaginative, sagacious and accommodating than they ever have been.

The writer is a professor at LUMS.