THE memo affair shows that there is a hydra-headed conflict in Pakistan. It has sent all the decorum and the vertical and horizontal arrangement of the state authority that underscored the political dynamics down the drain.

Various PML-N leaders have given mixed signals, some saying 'yes' to the army in a muffled voice, others saying no' to the army in a loud voice. The celebrated opposition leader Nawaz Sharif first gave 10 days to the government to initiate an investigation into the memo affair but then filed a case in the Supreme Court on the fourth day after issuing the deadline. Whatever prompted him to advance his action by a week remains undisclosed.

The current situation of estrangementbetween the civilian government and the army has lent an explosive character to his move. The media openly que s tione d whether thePML-N had allowed itself to be used by the establishment for bringing the government down. As if that were not enough, the PML-N leader declared his agenda to establish military courts, if need be, to bring peace in Karachi.

Apparently, he has yet to make a move beyond the 1990s.

The court's short decision confirming the maintainability of the nine petitions filed in the memo case appeared to have divided both the legal and political communities in the face of a 'united' bench.

From 2007 to 2010, there was a national consensus on the high level of credibility of the current leadership of the higher judiciary. Gradually, the public mood changed as the executive and the judiciary appeared to occupy opposite sides in controversial legal battles that carried the potential to destroy democracy.

The lordships have taken notice of the alleged contempt of court committed by certain PPP stalwarts. While the court takes a legal view of politics, the government takes a political view of the law.

Both operate from different starting points, the black letter law and the mass mandate respectively. Both give a different interpretation of what is at stake,respect for the law in the former's case and the power of making and breaking the government unlawfully drifting towards the judiciary in the latter's case.

The issuance of a notice to President Zardari, among others to file his statement is an interesting development.

Initially, this led to wild speculation that the endgame was near. On its part, the PPP high command decided that the president should not tender a reply and that the federation's statement should be deemed to be the president's statement. It seems that the government feels obliged to fight back and regain the political initiative.

In a sudden move, the court demanded that the government should implement its order on the NRO, passed nearly two years back, within the time span of a week. The political situation was already charged by the opposite standpoints taken by the government and thearmy on the memo affair. The media speculated that the judiciary had been asked to do a hatchetjob.The PPPleadership claimed that it had already implemented the decision. It refused to send a letter to the Swiss government in this regard.

There are four stakeholders in the field: President Zardari, Gen Kayani, Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry and Nawaz Sharif. They appear to be locked in a combative mode of action in three different arenas, defined by the tension that exists between the government and the army, the executive and the judiciary, and the government and the opposition. President Zardari is at the centre of each of the three bipolar conflicts. The party feels that the top brass, the judiciary and the PML-N are together against him.

At their end, the PPP's opponents feel that the party is over. There are various theories floating about the mode of political change. One is a solicited resignation. Another is an in-house arrangement. The PML-N has already sought cooperation from the ANP and MQM to out-vote the government on the floor.

The third way is the judicial knockout.This is complicated because the courts lack the executive authority. Finally, the impeachment way is a far cry inasmuch as the logic of numbers does not support the opposition.While the stakeholders are thus engaged in the power game on top, the oft-billed third force, the Pakistan Tehrik-i-Insaf, has moved offstage. The cluster of Islamic parties that recently staged a Defence of Pakistan rally has also receded into the background. Currently, the stage is occupied by two state institutions the army and the judiciary and two political institutions the PPP and the PML-N.

Together, they are drawing on their respective legal and popular resources to project their power in the current situation.

The court feels that it has grossly suffered from the high-handedness of a military president in recent years. It has issued a series of warnings that it wouldnot allow extra-constitutional change.

It also declared that military courts would never be tolerated again.

Meanwhile, the two mainstream parties have shown a meeting of mindsabout holding elections for the Senate in February and the National Assembly as well as provincial assemblies in October. Their minimum shared agenda of democracy seems to have bounced back.

Where do we go from here? Can the elasticity on the part of the PPP-led government in the context of advancing the date of elections dissipate tension among the parliamentary parties? Would the army leadership shy away from pursuing the matter to an unsavoury end in the form of a constitutional breakdown in the country that is already infected by a hydra-headed conflict? Will the court continue to follow the pattern of modus operandi, warning and accommodating in succession? Will Pakistan avoid another bout of political instability? A lot depends on how the two mainstream parties weigh their chances in future elections in the context of maximising their gains. Adoption of the wrong means to achieve the right ends often failed as a political strategy. One can hope that the political elite will not shoot itself in the foot again this time.?

The writer is a professor at LUMS.