AS expected, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani’s brief meeting with President Barack Obama in Seoul on the sidelines of the nuclear security summit produced no breakthroughs, but it did serve to clarify the issues.

Obama reiterated his hope that the parliamentary review of Pak-US relations would keep American security needs in mind. Dream on, Mr President.

In Islamabad, the long, convoluted review — set in motion by the US attack that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers along the Afghan border last November — is revealing the festering anti-Americanism that has taken hold in Pakistan. No surprises here, then. And members of the opposition who sat on the parliamentary committee are now edging back from their own recommendations. No surprises here, either.

The fact is that our relations with the US have long been hostage to the army’s perceptions. Soon after 9/11, the ISI was expecting to be a key partner with the CIA and US forces in the Af-Pak region. In the event, it was kept at arm’s length, despite several joint operations with the CIA and FBI.

The reality is that right from the very start, the ISI was viewed by its American counterparts as an organisation that had been in bed with Al Qaeda and the Taliban for years. So while the Pakistani spy outfit was useful for nabbing mostly foreign terrorists, it could not be trusted with any top-secret intelligence.

Obviously, this rankled deeply with our generals. To emphasise the ISI’s importance, our spooks began playing footsie with extremists to get back at the Americans. Of course, having the Taliban on our side after the eventual and inevitable Nato pullout was also part of the GHQ’s overall strategy.

A major part of the army’s calculus was that the US needed Pakistan more than we needed it. So it figured that it had a lot of leeway while conducting its policy of running with the hare while hunting with the hounds. But when the Kerry-Lugar Bill came to be debated in the US Congress, all hell broke loose in Pakistan.

When I was asked by my foreign friends what all the fuss was about, it was a bit difficult to explain. After all, here was a bill that sought to transfer $1.5bn a year for five years to invest in Pakistan’s economy and its neglected social sector. So what was there in this package not to like?

The sting lay in the wording of the legislation that called for non-interference in politics and the judiciary by the army. Additionally, there were strictures about nuclear proliferation that the military found galling. Behind the language of the bill, many in the army and the ISI saw the hand of Husain Haqqani, then our man in Washington.

Having served briefly in our embassy in the US many years ago, I can certify that with the possible exception of the Israeli envoy, no ambassador can dictate the contents of legislation specific to his or her country. However, if Haqqani did indeed manage to persuade US legislators to insert clauses aimed at keeping the army from staging another coup, then good for him.

Haqqani has been a bête noir for our generals ever since his book Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military appeared in the US in 2005. A penetrating study of the poisonous nexus between the army and various extremist groups, the book did the rounds in the American media and think tanks.

So when Haqqani was sent as our ambassador in Washington in 2008, the appointment did not sit well with our military. Their suspicion that he was somehow serving American interests was reinforced when the draft of the Kerry-Lugar Bill became available. Since then, he has been a marked man.

When Mansoor Ijaz wrote his bizarre piece in the Financial Times, alleging that a ‘senior official’ had dictated the famous memo to him to pass on to Adm Mike Mullen, I’m sure the ISI saw a chance to nail Haqqani.

The rest is history. Haqqani was made to fall on his sword. Pushing back, the government — unable to save its ambassador — sacked the defence secretary. Nawaz Sharif got into the act and petitioned the Supreme Court to investigate the allegations. Generals Kayani and Pasha added their voices to this demand.

After several hearings, the SC set up a commission to cross-examine witnesses and make its recommendations on whether a criminal act had been committed and, if so, by whom. Ijaz’s eventual testimony was as full of contradictions as Swiss cheese is of holes. And unbelievably, months later, the ‘memogate’ affair continues to be an issue. Yet the reality is that by now, Nawaz Sharif and Gen Kayani have already distanced themselves from the whole affair, while Gen Pasha has retired. The ISI has got its man, and is no longer interested. Even the media have moved on.

I know that common sense is in short supply, but it does dictate that we put this entire murky episode behind us. This whole wretched matter should finally be laid to rest.

The writer is the author of Fatal Faultlines: Pakistan, Islam and the West.

irfan.husain@gmail.com