SINCE my article a fortnight ago on ‘green-on-blue’ killings — incidents in which Afghan soldiers or police attack Isaf forces — there has been a further spike in these and in incidents of ‘green-on-green’ killings.

The most recent occurred on Monday when an Afghan serviceman killed two US soldiers in Laghman province and 10 Afghan soldiers were killed in Helmand province by what initial reports suggest were Taliban who had infiltrated the ranks of the Afghan National Security Forces.

Isaf has taken a number of steps to mitigate both the physical and psychological impact of such attacks at a time when the American public has in repeated polls opposed the continuation of the war in Afghanistan. As a first step they have decreed that these will no longer be referred to as green-on-blue attacks, but rather as insider attacks. The rationale is that Afghan turncoats are attacking their Afghan colleagues just as often as they are attacking foreigners. Isaf chief Gen Allen pointed out before Monday’s incidents that Afghan servicemen had killed 53 of their own colleagues as against 40 Isaf soldiers.

In an article in The Washington Post, he also sought to reassure American readers that “the solution will be found in our growing strength and will not be defined by incidents of ‘green-on-blue’ violence…. We are, in fact, prevailing.” This is going to be a hard sell, particularly after recent incidents and a spate of stories showing that Isaf’s decade-long presence has done little to establish the rapport that is an essential part of any joint military effort.

On the political level, President Obama has also addressed the problem, suggesting that it was arising because contact had grown much closer in the process of transitioning to Afghan security forces. Overall, however, the Afghan conflict generates, as one American journalist has put it, “barely a whisper on the US presidential campaign trail.” There seems to be a tacit understanding between the rival camps to stay off this subject, partly because the latest statements from Romney suggest that his position is the same as Obama’s — end the combat role by 2013, complete withdrawal by end 2014 and maintain a minimum residual presence to train the Afghans and continue the counterterrorism operation. But will there be a desire to maintain a residual presence if such incidents continue?

There also seems to be a pause in the effort to move the reconciliation process forward. Nobody seems to be talking of the first step in this direction — the exchange of certain Afghan Taliban held at Guantanamo for the lone American soldier the Taliban are holding. This may have to wait for the November elections in the US and a clearer Taliban indication of willingness to renounce ties with Al Qaeda. What will be the position by that time?

There also seems to be no movement on bringing the Haqqani network closer to reconciliation. There has been a carefully choreographed move by Congress and the US administration, which was given a month to indicate why the Haqqani network should not be declared a terrorist organisation. To my mind this was done to give the Haqqanis a time frame to indicate a readiness to talk or to face the prospect of increased American pressure on Gulf states and others to stop the flow of funds to the organisation, increased pressure to cut off its other sources of revenue, and all other steps that would be necessitated by the ‘terrorist’ designation.

This month-long gap lasts till Sept 10, but if reports that Badruddin Haqqani, a key Haqqani leader, has been killed in a Nato air strike are correct, the ensuing disarray within the Haqqani ranks, as also the desire for vengeance, would probably ensure that there is no response by that date. One can only hope that the Obama administration will on Sept 10 tell Congress that even while the network is being degraded it would be politic to leave open the possibility of negotiations or of persuading Pakistan to take action that would render the question moot.

There are other reasons for concern. The Afghan administration seems to have made no progress on the structural reform needed to give its people confidence in the government’s integrity or competence. The dismissal of two ministers by the Afghan parliament and the charges of corruption levelled against the finance minister may be for substantive reasons, but these are also the ministers who have worked best with international forces and donors. Can the Tokyo conference accountability provisions be met without these ministers?

Meanwhile, the Afghan regime has maintained that Taliban infiltration of the ANSF is the work of a foreign intelligence agency (meaning the ISI). Nato has said in private briefings that there is no evidence of this. But it is not a good omen for Pak-Afghan cooperation.

On the Taliban side, the number of civilian killings by the Taliban is on the increase, the latest being the beheading of 15 men and two women in a Helmand district. It appears that local commanders are paying scant attention to Mullah Omar’s directives to avoid civilian casualties. Does this mean that the command structure of the Taliban has broken down? If so, it augurs ill for the prospect of Mullah Omar being able to deliver on a reconciliation agreement if it were to be reached.

The only bright spot in this otherwise gloomy picture appears to be a better US-Pakistan understanding. Gen Allen, taking credit for the killing of TTP leader Mullah Dadullah in a drone strike, said that “close cooperation with our Pakistani partners is critical in combating the menace of terrorism, and dealing with this target furthers that objective”. How can this be built upon?

Time is running out. As the country that will be most directly affected if an orderly endgame cannot be worked out, Pakistan needs to focus on innovative initiatives that a united political and military leadership can take to promote this goal while rebuilding trust with both our American and Afghan interlocutors.

Perhaps the prime minister and foreign minister should bring together all Afghan experts in or outside government to devise such initiatives and to suggest means by which they could be sold to a Pakistani public that has been misled in the past.

The writer is a former foreign secretary.