The PTI is generally typecast as a Pakistani middle class archetypal party, with the backing of the youth bulge, aiming to bring about change in the country while engaging in the traditional craft of power play.

Revolutions of all shades have long been the mantra of urban-based political parties. The PTI portrays itself as an agent of reform in Pakistani politics, but is struggling to keep its momentum amidst the dynamics of power play and an ambiguous model of change, which it seeks to exploit to create a support base.

The party leadership realises the need to adopt robust political tactics for electoral success. But the PTI has also taken extreme positions on certain issues, mainly security-related. It has also tried to take the moral high ground to increase its political profile against the political elite of the country. All this may come across as paradoxical, but it is compatible with the urban middle-class thinking pattern.

The urban middle class is caught between modernisation and conservatism. The average Pakistani wants to be progressive in a conservative framework but has not managed that very well. The middle class in developing countries including Muslim states, mainly Turkey and Malaysia, has somehow resolved this dilemma but Pakistan is still in a state of confusion.

The manifestation of this mindset in political and ideological realms can be summed up thus: a desire for Pakistan to be a politically sovereign and assertive state, with all the benefits of international engagement but without any compulsion or reciprocity; economic self-reliance with the advantages of globalisation; individual freedom and choice but ‘piousness’ and conservatism at the societal level; ideologically less receptive to new ideas; emotionally reactive and inclined to put the onus on others. In this perspective, the PTI’s approach to critical issues, mainly related to security, extremism and governance is quite understandable. The approach can be branded as idealistic, actually rather simplistic, that the party holds solutions to all the problems and can deliver those within a short span. This is what the common man wants to hear but does he consider it pragmatic?

Another related question that may help understand the PTI phenomenon is whether it is a unique party or movement in the history of Pakistan. Although parallels and overlaps can be found among the mainstream and peripheral political and religious parties, PTI supporters feel pride in pointing out ‘distinctions’ that set their party apart. However, closer scrutiny may suggest otherwise.

A similar anti-corruption and anti-US campaign was launched in the early 1990s by Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) chief Qazi Hussain Ahmad. Many similarities can be drawn between the circumstances of the two periods — the hype over corruption and the situation in Afghanistan were central planks of the campaign then, as they are now. Qazi Hussain had knitted the movement around a similar urban middle class and the youth bulge. He had formed a youth party called Pasban, and in order to make the JI’s political and social credentials more moderate and accommodating, had established the Pakistan Islamic Front (PIF) for electoral politics.

The JI chief was inspired by the electoral success of the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria and Necmettin Erbakan’s Welfare Party in Turkey and he followed their strategy that reliance on a purely religious anti-West agenda was not enough to win popular support.

In order to motivate the youth and attract the urban middle class, Pasban adopted popular methods such as massive youth shows, street parades, plays, sports festivals and public welfare activities. But among the most popular were the anti-corruption squads and catchy slogans. However, the campaign ended in failure, created rifts in the party. Pasban and the PIF were finally dismantled and the JI took a long time to recover.

This was the time when PTI was in its infancy; many half-hearted Pasban members joined the party. PTI chief Imran Khan tried to organise his party along similar lines but left-wing dreamers led by Meraj Mohammad Khan initially dominated the PTI. After the party’s first electoral defeat, Imran Khan realised that the leftist ideology might be good as an alternative opinion in society but it could not help in electoral politics. He then started on a new journey to the power corridors and got close to Gen Pervez Musharraf. At the same time, he also developed cordial relations with the JI and nationalist parties.

This was the transformation stage for the PTI during which it absorbed the popular argument of the left, Pasban-oriented youth activism, right-wing ideological tendencies and the tactics of political power play.

The country has passed through the same transformational phase over the decades — from the left-right divide, to dictatorships, ethno-political confrontations and then ideological and strategic pressures. These have shaped the prevalent thinking patterns.

That may not apply to the entire urban middle class, as it has evolved differently in Karachi, with a comparatively developed and pragmatic profile. The MQM, the political voice of Karachi’s majority, has taken a clearer stance on critical challenges including extremism and terrorism. One can disagree with the politics and other alleged activities of the MQM, but its stance on critical national challenges reflects the mindset of the industrial-based urban middle class whose economic stakes lie in internal stability.

On the contrary, ideological and political ambiguities prevail in the services-based urban middle class in central and north Punjab and urban areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. These are potential constituencies for the PTI. But the MQM has more potential to further consolidate its electoral strength in urban Sindh although it has a smaller constituency. The PTI has many contenders in its vast constituency, including experienced mainstream and regional right- and left-wing parties, which know how to manipulate the confusion and keep their positions on critical issues intact.

The main differences between the PIF and Pasban of the 1990s and PTI today are the religious and conservative credentials, which the JI had tried to hide and the PTI wants to flaunt. The PIF proved a fatal experience for JI and the jury is still out on the PTI’s fate.

The writer is editor of the quarterly research journal Conflict and Peace Studies.

mamirrana@yahoo.com