US DEFENCE Secretary Chuck Hagel, on his first overseas trip after a bruising confirmation hearing, arrived in Afghanistan probably hoping to hear some words of praise for the “blood and treasure” that the Americans and their allies had expended in Afghanistan.

He must have also hoped for appreciation for the aid they had promised to continue supplying to Afghanistan after the withdrawal of most of the foreign forces there by 2014.

Before his arrival Nato Secretary General Fogh Rasmussen had been in Kabul and had confirmed that Nato was planning on supporting the retention of the 350,000-strong Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) up to 2018 rather than drawing them down to 230,000 as originally planned. This would mean that the $3.6 billion in annual assistance pledged at Chicago would be raised to $5.6bn at least until 2018.

Before his arrival there had also been statements by American spokespersons reassuring Karzai that the US supported an Afghan-owned and Afghan-led reconciliation process and that the planned Taliban office in Qatar would be used only for negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan High Peace Council.

Hagel probably entertained the hope that he would be able to persuade Afghan President Hamid Karzai that the first step needed for reconciliation was the exchange of the American prisoner held by the Taliban and the five Taliban whose release from Guantanamo Karzai and the Taliban had both demanded. The second would be a Taliban renunciation of ties with Al Qaeda and the third talks between the Taliban and the High Peace Council along the lines of the blueprint for peace formulated by the latter.

Perhaps Hagel had also hoped he would be able to persuade Karzai to withdraw his decree calling for the cessation of all operations by American forces in Maidan Wardak and for the withdrawal of all American Special Operations forces from that province by March 12.

Hagel had reason to believe that an agreement on the transfer of control over Bagram prison to Afghan forces, which Karzai saw as an assertion of Afghan sovereignty, would be implemented during Hagel’s visit. Karzai had insisted on this during his visit to Washington and on return had informed his parliament in January that this was now on the verge of being achieved.

This transfer, which was to have happened on Saturday, was cancelled after Karzai vetoed an agreement that his officials had negotiated with the Americans. The point of contention apparently was the American insistence that formally or informally the Americans needed to retain a veto power on the release of prisoners they perceived as “enduring security threats”.

To my mind, the loss of face Karzai suffered because of this “last-minute hitch” as much as the suspicions he has entertained of American intentions since his 2009 re-election prompted the broadside he launched against the Americans in a nationally televised speech on Sunday.

In essence he said that the two suicide attacks by the Taliban in Khost and then outside the gate of the defence ministry in Kabul, which killed 19 people, were not a show of force by the Taliban rather “a service to the foreigners”. “These bombings,” he said, “aimed to prolong the presence of the American forces in Afghanistan.” He accused the Americans of talking to the “Taliban leaders and Taliban representatives abroad everyday”.

As a result the Americans, citing security reasons, cancelled the scheduled joint press conference but went ahead with the private dinner Karzai had arranged with Hagel.

For the moment the Americans seem to be engaged in damage control. The new American commander in Afghanistan Gen Dunford addressing his own press conference said, “President Karzai has never said to me that the United States was colluding with the Taliban. I don’t know what caused him to say that today.… It’s categorically false. We have no reason to be colluding with the Taliban”. He went on, however, to say “we do not have a broken relationship” and went on to suggest that Karzai had engaged in political gamesmanship given that he has both “an internal and external audience”.

Hagel after his dinner with Karzai told reporters that he had reassured Karzai that the US had no unilateral back channel talks with the Taliban. “Obviously,” he said, “the United States will support efforts if they are led by the Afghans to come to some possible solutions.”

On the issue of Bagram prison, Karzai’s office had issued a statement after a Karzai-Dunford meeting late Saturday evening that the transfer would now take place in the coming week “allowing time for some of the remaining technical details concerning the handover to be resolved”.

This seems unlikely since if this had really been the expectation Karzai would not have made the speech he gave on Sunday. The Americans are clear that they will not allow the release of those they consider to be “enduring security threats”. Karzai may believe that securing the authority to release the mostly Pakhtun detainees will improve his domestic standing but he will have to accept some limitations.

Karzai is capable of changing his stance. He has done so in the past. But given the current situation and his current attitude it appears unlikely that the Americans can reach an agreement with the Karzai administration on a residual American/Nato troop presence. It also seems unlikely that reconciliation will move forward on the terms that Karzai desires and which the Taliban reject. Will Western assistance to Afghanistan continue?

It would be pertinent to ask where all this leaves Pakistan which more than any other country has a vital stake in Afghanistan’s stability. We must find ways to help achieve reconciliation without which there can be no peace in Afghanistan. We must find ways to ensure that the international community is not so put off as to walk away from Afghanistan. Our domestic preoccupations notwithstanding this is some-thing that we must address using all the diplomatic and political tools we can muster.

The writer is a former foreign secretary.