AFTER receiving an invitation personally delivered in Kabul by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s special envoy, Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai will visit Pakistan on Aug 26. It remains to be seen if the visit will serve to reduce tensions and restrain Mr Karzai’s anti-Pakistan rhetoric.

In any event, it is unlikely that Karzai will remain relevant to the political and military outcomes in Afghanistan or to future Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. Next year, Afghans are to elect a new president. Reportedly, Karzai has tipped Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, a former leader of one of the seven anti-Soviet jihadi groups, to be his successor. Karzai’s endorsement may not ensure Sayyaf’s election. Anyway, Karzai is unlikely to retain influence over the next president unless he is from his own family or coterie.

Karzai may also be marginalised by other dynamics. The real power brokers in Kabul — Vice President Mohammed Fahim and other warlords of the Northern Alliance — will not stay their hand if Karzai’s plans post-2014 impinge on their privileges. Unlike them, Karzai has no personal militias. And the Afghan National Army’s (ANA) unity and loyalties have yet to be tested.

The proximate American objective is a safe and orderly exit for the major portion of its troops and equipment from Afghanistan. This requires at least a modicum of understanding with the Afghan Taliban during the withdrawal, even if an agreement for a more permanent political solution is not possible. Although the Doha process has been scuttled, mainly due to Karzai’s fear of exclusion or marginalisation, the US is likely to use other channels, including the good offices of Pakistan’s agencies, to facilitate such an understanding with the Taliban.

If Karzai remains an impediment to a deal the US wants with the Taliban, he will be quickly sidelined. In the absence of an agreement or understanding with the Taliban, the regime in Kabul — whether it is Karzai’s nominee or one led by another personality — is likely to survive post-US-Nato withdrawal only if a foreign force is left behind to sustain it.

The so-called US-Afghan strategic agreement will legalise this remnant US force. But its deployment could be aborted or reversed if this force faces serious military setbacks and high casualties and opposition from the American Congress and public. The US may also give up this presence as part of a deal with the Taliban.

Even with the presence of this remnant US force, the Kabul government will come under tremendous military pressure from the Taliban and affiliated insurgent groups. Najibullah’s Soviet-trained forces lasted two years. The larger but hastily recruited ANA may not remain a cohesive force for that long. Given its ethnically diverse composition, ‘green on green’ violence may proliferate and the ANA could splinter along ethnic lines and local loyalties.

Due to its old links with the three principal Afghan insurgent groups — Mullah Omar, the Haqqanis and Hekmatyar — Pakistan is well placed to assist in facilitating an understanding with the Taliban to ease the US-Nato withdrawal and, perhaps even promote a more durable political solution in Afghanistan. It is in Pakistan’s interest to do so. Reportedly, Pakistan’s army chief played a major role in facilitating the aborted Doha process.

However, Pakistan will obviously accord priority to addressing its own concerns. These are: one, to neutralise the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan-led attacks and anti-Pakistan terrorism; and two, to ensure a ‘friendly’ Afghanistan post-2014 which, at a minimum, does not pursue India’s agenda and ends its alleged support to the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) insurgency in Balochistan.

To these ends, Pakistan will need to pursue parallel negotiations with the Afghan Taliban seeking the termination of their links with the TTP (and Al Qaeda); and with the US to eliminate the TTP’s safe havens in Afghanistan, moderate if not reverse American support for India’s goals there, and accommodate some of the Afghan Taliban’s conditions for peace, especially the demand for the complete withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan.

Pakistan will need to open an informal dialogue with major elements of the erstwhile Northern Alliance with a view to ending their presumed support for the TTP and the BLA and securing their support for a new and inclusive political order in Afghanistan post-2014. Without this, Afghanistan could well witness another round of its 30-year civil war.

The political and military outcome in Afghanistan will also be strongly influenced by the positions of other regional powers, in particular Iran. Given its long standing links with the Northern Alliance, and more recent relations with Hekmatyar, Tehran could play a positive part in promoting a political consensus within Afghanistan. It could equally disrupt the endeavours for peace and a political solution and ally again with India’s anti-Pakistan agenda in Afghanistan.

Iran’s position will be no doubt heavily influenced by the evolution of its relations with the US. With President Rouhani’s election, it is possible that the US and Iran can reach a ‘grand bargain’ similar to one that the incoming foreign minister, Jawad Zarif, attempted to negotiate with the US in 2003. Even some reduction in tensions may help. The situation now is, of course, more complex due to the series of sanctions imposed on Iran and the further expansion of its nuclear capabilities in the interim. And, hawks in Washington, Tel Aviv and Tehran could readily scupper a deal.

Thus, securing peace in Afghanistan and on Pakistan’s western frontier remains a daunting task. With so many ‘moving parts’, there are no neat or clear solutions or strategies that can be prescribed and pursued. Success will require all involved parties to adopt flexible positions and imaginative solutions responsive to the interests of all.

Pakistan cannot afford to be a passive player in this ‘Great Game’. It should take the lead in promoting positive and viable outcomes to the various components of this political puzzle. Islamabad can do so successfully only if its politicians, diplomats and military work together cohesively and coherently.

The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.