PEACE within Afghanistan could largely depend on how regional states view their geo-strategic and geo-economic interests in the country in the backdrop of the 2014 withdrawal.

This is borne out by the policy statements of the new governments in Pakistan and Iran. China’s unusual dynamism in the region and President Asif Ali Zardari’s Central Asian visit some months back also lend credence to this assumption.

The boundary skirmishes and the subsequent exchange of allegations between Pakistan and India can also be viewed from the perspective of enhanced regional rivalry, especially with post-2014 Afghanistan now in sight.

Given this situation, policymakers and think tanks are mostly concerned with the identification of shared interests of regional states.

On the face of it, regional states would like to ensure their security and economic interests, an adequate flow of energy to keep economies afloat and routes for trade and commerce. There is cut-throat competition among the states to get as much as possible at minimum loss to themselves post 2014.

The competition among these states, with financial support from countries not in the region, has over time been virtually transformed into non-state proxy clashes within Afghanistan and in the Afghanistan-Pakistan tribal region.

It has been observed that the alleged Iranian quest for influence in Afghanistan is being resisted by Saudi-funded militias spread out in parts of Afghanistan. The newly emerged trade dynamism of China and India has been described as one reason behind the expansion of the war economy in the region.

Thus the scene has been set for complex regional politics involving conflicting interests and cross-cutting objectives.

The US no doubt continues to play its cards cautiously and pragmatically. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in the meanwhile are reportedly engaged in deliberations to minimise the losses that will accrue to their respective states in the aftermath of 2014.

However, the most formidable competition in the context of Afghanistan is seen as the one between Pakistan and India. There is a body of opinion which holds that a major cause behind the instability in Afghanistan would be neutralised if the Indian and Pakistani security establishments agreed to cease their proxy war in Afghanistan.

Experts on the Afghan imbroglio and those who have been closely observing events leading to the withdrawal of the combat forces of Nato and the International Security Assistance Force from Afghanistan in 2014 suggest that the perceived geo-strategic and geo-economic imperatives of Pakistan and India are among the most vital strands of regional instability.

It has been observed in the last several years that the Pakistani security establishment has expressed concern over increasing Indian investment in the development of communications, education and healthcare facilities in Afghanistan.

In the view of the Pakistani security establishment, India’s premier intelligence agency, RAW, has been able to acquire a foothold in Afghanistan in the garb of development. On the other hand, the Indian government has blamed Pakistan’s ISI for attacks on its diplomatic missions in Afghanistan. Whatever the truth of these versions, it makes plain the serious distrust between the governments and security establishments of India and Pakistan.

Could there be any common ground for cooperation between Iran, Afghanistan, China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, the US, and especially between India and Pakistan, in the run-up to 2014 and after in Afghanistan?

The answer to this single question may decide the future of South and Central Asia in terms of strategic balance, economic well-being and political stability.

In fact, the answer would incorporate aspects of a broader civilisational role: how the wisdom and intelligence of visionaries, political leaderships, the academia, researchers, policymakers, security establishments, regional media and civil society organisations can coalesce to demystify and work positively to resolve a complex scenario.

The real test for the region’s political leadership lies in the success or otherwise of shunning the temptation before their respective security establishments to make gains at the cost of each other’s interests.

Academia across the political divide agrees that succumbing to the pressure of regional security establishments would mean further fuelling the security establishment-driven proxy wars in Afghanistan. It would be a matter of great significance if political leadership in the region can identify and work towards shared interests of their respective states.

The losses that have accrued to the states due to the current tensions among them have so far outweighed the results of all attempts to find common ground at the negotiation table.

There are at least three shared interests that should make for a vibrant debate among the intelligentsia and policymakers.

First, agreement on human security might become the rallying point for all stakeholders in Afghanistan to find positive goals which all can agree on, despite the complexity that prevails at the moment.

Second, the sovereignty and stability of Afghanistan as a state should be considered the central focus of shared interests — it would after all be an extension of the sovereignty and stability of the states promoting this as well.

Moreover, encouraging and helping the Afghans take a decision on their own political system and social institutions is instrumental for sustained peace and progress in South and Central Asia.

Third, the regional states (including Afghanistan) are home to large, culturally diverse communities. Cultural exchanges between these regions can pave the way for economic opportunities and a better understanding of security concerns.

The alternative to these points is an ugly scenario where regional states march stridently on the path of implosion. This can only have severe consequences for the region.

The writer is a political analyst based in Peshawar.

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