Reforming the UN

In light of the increasingly faltering credibility of the United Nations, reforms have recently been proposed to resurrect this organization, which ostensibly was founded as a peacekeeper about 60 years ago. One proposal involves the broadening of the Security Council to include new powers, with India, Brazil, Japan and Germany being the chief claimants.

As expected, Pakistan is opposing India's bid to become a permanent member of the United Nations. It is certainly not difficult to contest India's application. Its human rights record in Kashmir is not enviable. The performance of its judicial system after the massacre and lynching in Gujarat have made a mockery of its claims of being democratic and having a just legal system.

Its close relationship with Israel, which has flouted every UN resolution ever imposed on it, does not do it any favours when applying to become an executive in the UN. Finally, its own record at upholding UN resolutions in Kashmir does not stand it in very good stead either.

However, to oppose India's bid on these grounds is likely to be futile for the simple reason that becoming a veto-carrying member of the UNSC has never been about upholding the noble values of human rights, democracy or justice. As Stephen Schlesinger's excellent book Act of Creation: The Untold Story of the Founding of the United Nations vividly describes, the structure of the United Nations represents a brilliant piece of institutional engineering, in the making of which, the have-nots of the world were enticed into unconditionally accepting a permanent hegemony of the haves.

Founded officially in October 1945, two months after President Harry Truman had ordered two atomic bombs to be dropped on Japan, the United Nations was set up to institutionalize the newly acquired power of the US and the USSR, which they were going to share with the old colonial empire of UK.

However, while Stalin was content with its control of Eastern Europe, and the UK simply trying to protect its colonies from American domination (the US wanted to open these markets for its own industry), the real force behind the project remained the United States, which sought to propose and eventually dominate an all-powerful Security Council, with powers to decree international law.

With the USSR and UK also present and eager to influence the world order through the Council the Americans brought in China. Instead of three, four representatives would keep order round the world, it was argued. What had China done to deserve this honour? Not much, except that Chiang Kai-Shek's utterly venal and crumbling regime had assured the Americans of their complete loyalty in the Security Council.

It took no time for the British to recognize this ploy. As Peter Gowan wrote recently in the New Left Review, Churchill repeatedly referred to China as the United States' "faggot-vote". When he failed to convince the US to drop China, Churchill, in a retaliatory mode rather typical of him, responded by proposing yet another member, De Gaulle's France. Churchill of course was not doing France any favours, but simply sought to ensure that the balance of power in the Council, tilting towards the Americans, was redressed.

Schlesinger's account of how the new institutional mechanism for keeping order around the world was worked out during a two-month conference of delegates in San Francisco between April 25 and June 25, 1945, is eye opening.

While the delegates were deluged with never-ending attractions (free Hollywood movies were shown daily in a special UN cinema; aerial tours of the Bay Area offered by blimp; marine excursions provided; and champagne flowed unendingly amidst the numerous dazzling receptions that were provided for the entertainment of guests), the structure took shape. All this while, according to Schlesinger, US military intelligence systematically intercepted all cable traffic by the delegates to their home countries, and supplied it to the US delegation on a daily basis.

Amidst this carefully orchestrated revellery, the UN took its totalitarian form. The General Assembly was given no significant policy-making powers, while decision-making authority was concentrated in the Security Council. The discussions mainly took place between the WWII victors, i.e., the US, the UK and the USSR, with the other delegates providing a cloak of legitimacy to the proceedings through their presence and signatures - as soon as all the delegates had signed the Charter, this precious trophy was rushed in a special army plane to Washington by the Secretary General of the Conference himself.

In the 60 or so years since, the UN has served its purpose well for its chief designers, either by giving the big powers a "universal mandate" to implement agendas that had rather murky motives behind them, or by conveniently ignoring some of the worst excesses that they have committed.

Before it opened its eyes, the UN had already accepted the legitimacy of the WWII victors' rule over various colonies and satellites (e.g., Russia's domination in Eastern and Central Europe, and British rule over India). It went on to achieve much more. Its first memorable achievement was the partition of Palestine and the creation of Israel. In 1948, it effectively supervised the expulsion of Palestinians from the new Israeli state.

Then, came the "universal" recognition of the puppet regime in Seoul as the only lawful government in Korea, and a complete rejection of the socialist government in Pyongyang. It subsequently gave the US a mandate to invade the North. Notably, this was during the time when the Soviets were boycotting the UN over its refusal to hand over China's seat on the Security Council to the People's Republic of China (the Chinese seat on the Security Council was, perhaps not surprisingly, occupied by Taiwan till 1971).

In the last half-century, the veto-powers have not only used the Security Council to sanction their military campaigns, but equally to defend themselves from universal opposition. Indeed, the impotence of the whole establishment in face of aggression from its architects was exemplified with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The General Assembly passed resolution after resolution, but the Security Council was powerless to act in face of the Soviet veto.

The Russians of course argued that rather than breaching the principle of sovereignty, they were merely assisting a friendly country overcome a threat posed by lawless Islamic fundamentalists, an argument that we were to hear many times in the future.

Despite its overall dictatorial structure, American and Soviet representation on the UNSC ensured some degree of balance, with each countering the other on numerous occasions. After the fall of the USSR, however, the going became much easier for the axis formed by the US and UK.

The post-cold war period began with the American invasion of Iraq in 1991, with the blessings of the SC. Iraq, of course had provided an excuse to the SC by invading Kuwait. However, once inside Iraq, America and its allies took their radical interpretations of the UN Charter to new heights.

The continued occupation of Iraq and the imposition of "no-fly zones" (under Resolution 688), for instance, constituted steps that were undertaken outside the UN mandate. Indeed, in 1993, the UN legal department announced that it could find no existing Security Council resolutions authorizing the United States, Britain, and France to enforce the no-fly zones. They were never explicitly mentioned in Resolution 688 or elsewhere.

Furthermore, Resolution 688 was not enacted under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, the section that is used to authorize and legitimize the use of force. But such details failed to ruffle feathers in the Security Council. Resolution 688 meant whatever the allies wanted it to mean, and its violation was considered a breach of the UN Charter.

More recently, we witnessed the humanitarian bombing of Afghanistan. However, since unlike Saddam Hussain, the Afghans had not invaded another country, the excuse this time was the human rights abuses carried out by the "mediaeval" and "barbaric" regime of the Taliban.

The UN Charter theoretically guarantees the sovereignty of a country. Article 2(7) states: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter 7."

While the Security Council had passed a resolution asking Afghanistan to hand over Osama Bin Laden or face sanctions, the bombing campaign was a breach of the UN Charter in broad daylight. Chapter 7 calls for any enforcement by force of a UNSC resolution to be ratified by the UNSC first. Yet, the world watched helplessly as daisy-cutters dropped from the sky on the hapless Afghan population.

The most recent American invasion and then occupation of Iraq is perhaps a good time to start thinking about an obituary for the UN Charter. The obituary will probably record that the charter was born without teeth or a spine. For the last several decades, its carcass was propped up to give the impression of life. But even that doesn't seem to be working anymore.

The world has had enough. Through the UN, it has been served so many farcical interpretations of its charter that its digestive system has finally given way. Words like "justice" or "sovereignty" do not wash down easily now. Justice was supposed to be ensured, not banned. Sovereignty was supposed to be protected, not bestowed and then taken away depending on one's acceptance or resistance to either the military or trade-related agendas of the dominant powers. When Iraq invades Kuwait, it is a violation of Kuwait's sovereignty. When the US invades Iraq, it is not.

The UN has already overstayed its welcome. In fact, it is quite miraculous that it has managed to survive all these years. However, its neutrality, never there to begin with, is now openly questioned. Its officials, once considered above criticism, are now pelted with stones wherever they go.

Kofi Annan recognizes this slide and is making feeble attempts to further prolong the unexpectedly long life of the UN. He recently voiced his concern to the Security Council, suggesting that "many in the present generation are losing confidence in the ability of the United nations to make the difference between war and peace." Is it any surprise that the present generation is losing confidence in the UN? After half a century of legitimizing the various designs of its primary architects, and of making a mockery of its charter, as also of the General Assembly, there is little that is left unexposed about this once venerated institution.

Kofi Annan hopes that broadening the composition of the Security Council will "strengthen the moral authority of the Security Council" (as if it has any to begin with). Unfortunately, adding India, or for that matter, any of the other aspirants to the ranks of permanent members will do no such thing. In order to redeem itself, the United Nations will simply have to change the balance of power within it, eliminate all vetoes and convert the General Assembly from a purely decorative element to one that has some teeth.

Pakistan's response to the proposed reforms should be based on principle, and its actions geared towards opening the dictatorial structure of the Security Council to scrutiny. The proposed reforms of the UN represent an ideal opportunity to expose the injustice and inequality, which currently lie at the heart of the organization.

The writer is an assistant professor at Cambridge University, UK.

Living with the Republicans

The American presidential election has given the world another four years of President Bush. The victory margin was relatively slim, indicating a deeply divided nation. But it was sufficient to declare a winner.

The outcome was not altogether unexpected. In fact, two Economist journalists, John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, in their book published earlier this year, The Right Nation: Why America is different, had pointed out that those hoping that a John Kerry victory in November would halt the onward rush of conservative triumphalism in America were fooling themselves.

They stated that Bush's "accidental" victory in 2000 may come to be seen as the beginning of a prolonged period of Republican dominance and that the Democratic party, bereft of policy ideas, disorganized and permanently on the defensive, was reduced to being the anti-Bush party. The Democrats will, of course, do their post-mortem in the next few months to find out where they had gone wrong.

John Kerry's ideas, to be precise, were too liberal for an American public that had developed a refined propellant conservatism. The Republicans had over the years successfully cultivated Christian fundamentalism to the extent that they were able to create a mass base for reaction and militarism. And - this is the hard part no Democrat wants to readily admit - Kerry just lacked warmth and charisma. Many of the people with whom he came into contact found him slightly aloof and distant.

Bush, on the other hand, exuded warmth and what passes for sincerity in the Bible belt. In parts of Texas, he scooped the audience into his pocket by simply being on stage. He had a one-point agenda, keeping America safe, and he circulated this with all the authority of scripture. He was able to harness the Evangelical Christian vote by playing on the fears and insecurities of a confused electorate that was led to believe that the terrorists were out to get them, and that the only people capable of defending them were the Republicans.

This is being increasingly regarded by the intelligentsia with leftist leanings both in the United States and elsewhere, as being totally inconsistent with the secular foundations of the United States which has always believed in an open society. This was in direct contrast to Kerry's broader agenda, which not only contained a number of inherent contradictions, but also covered so many domestic issues, that it eventually lost focus. There is absolutely no doubt in anybody's mind that had the Democratic party been represented by somebody like Bill Clinton instead of John Kerry, the White House would have had a new occupant.

In fact, if there had not been a constitutional bar on a third term, there is every likelihood Bill Clinton would have continued in office. Such was his popularity.

The election can hardly be regarded as a popular endorsement of the policies of the Bush administration. There is already criticism of the retrogressive corporate and financial oligarchy behind President Bush, with its tunnel vision, and its own reactionary agenda, which is beginning to remind critics of the clandestine activities of the United Fruit Company in Central America.

It is also not clear what the Republicans, who have now been given a new lease of life, propose to do about creating new jobs, the deepening economic crisis, the weakening dollar and the soaring national debt caused by squandering the budget surplus that Bill Clinton had hoarded "under the national mattress." It is imperative that America reaches out to Europe and adopts a policy of multi-lateralism. But so far there has been no indication of change in style or policy.

Bush's victory has not been favourably received in parts of Europe, particularly France and Germany, two countries which were in the forefront of the opposition to the invasion of Iraq. While the president and the chancellor have, nevertheless, sent congratulatory messages to the Republican leader, both CNN and the BBC have demonstrated in random interviews that the verdict of the American people has not been a popular one.

Even in England, where a large opposition had developed against American chauvinism, there are many people who would have liked to have seen Kerry elected as president. The North Koreans were also not too happy when they got the news, and resent the way the United States is using the Peoples Republic of China to discipline them.

In Pakistan the reaction in Islamabad has been in sharp contrast to the reaction in Peshawar, where there is deep resentment against the unprovoked attacks by the Americans against the Taliban in Afghanistan and on the NWFP border.

Then, there was a common belief that Bush is good for Pakistan and Kerry is good for India. It was as simple as that. Most people in this country from the patwari in Toba Tek Singh to the fruit seller in Matiari believed it. And so the perception developed that the future of President Musharraf was inextricably linked to President Bush being returned for a second term.

However, a large number of Pakistanis don't see things quite the same way as the ruling clique and the turncoats in Islamabad. They do not have a kind word for either the Republican leader or the American people, which includes the Democrats who eventually supported the strike on Iraq.

How is it, they ask, that a nation that prides itself on its Christian principles and moralistic values that preach peace and brotherhood, a nation that once censured President Clinton for his "inappropriate encounters," condones the indiscriminate bombing of men, women and children in Afghanistan and Iraq, which left over a hundred thousand civilians dead on the streets of Baghdad, Fallujah and Ramadi?

In spite of what President Bush is likely to say about his future strategy, the Muslims of the world will continue to treat the war against terrorism as a euphemism for the war against Islam. The more Iraqis the Americans soldiers kill, the more they will stiffen the resistance.

Pakistanis are also a nation of cynics. No sooner had John Kerry thrown in the towel, the conspiracy theories began. The most amusing is the one about the election being rigged by the FBI and the CIA to ensure that the colossal investment that the Texas oil companies have made in Mesopotamia is protected. The other theory, which is a little more sinister, is the one about President Bush storing in the top drawer of his desk in the White House, an F.I.R. against the Pakistani government for being a nuclear power, which he is going to action after he has sorted out Iran, Syria and North Korea.

Meanwhile, the government in Islamabad looks complacent. It is business as usual. Sheikh Rashid continues to spew out prophetic words of wisdom, while the television cameraman hangs on to his every word, and the people who handle donations from abroad are once again laughing all the way to the bank. Things have never looked better.

Development aid which involves taking money from poor people in rich countries and giving it to rich people in poor countries, will continue unabated. One is not sure if Condoleezza Rice, who is the new rising star in the Bush firmament, and who will certainly have a say in the amount of largesse that is directed to this country, has read Francis Fukuyama's eminently readable book State Building; Governance and World Order in the 21st Century. In case she hasn't, I would strongly recommend she does, especially the passage about strong states not being an end in themselves, particularly when - as in so much of the non-western world - it is simply a vehicle for tribal or clientelist pilfering.

It is time the western donors expended a little effort in determining how their money is spent. If they stand back, as they have done in the past, and rely on economic conditionality, by tying aid to certain public sector reforms, they will provide irresponsible and unscrupulous local elites with a pretext for cutting back on basic infra-structure in education, health and roads. The resulting misery is then blamed on international financial institutions, while the ability of these elites to line their own pockets remains unabated.

Should the US supply F-16s?

The failure of the United States to honour its commitment of delivering the first batch of 28 F-16s that the PAF had contracted (in 1988) and paid for is a sensitive issue for Pakistan.

The F-16s have a special place in the psyche of the people of Pakistan and the question has military, financial, psychological and political dimensions. With President George Bush back for a second term, the issue needs to be revived.

The PAF had contracted for 71 F-16s from General Dynamics (now Lockheed Martin) in 1988 and paid about $658 million in cash as advance for the batch of the first 28 planes. In 1990, the US president refused to certify that Pakistan was not engaged in development of nuclear weapons and the Pressler Amendment was invoked where all military sales to Pakistan, including the partially paid for F-16s, were stopped.

General Dynamics went ahead with the production of the planes, assuring Pakistan that a way around the embargo would eventually be found. Pakistan was asked to continue paying the instalments, which it did, making full payment of the 28 planes by around 1995.

The 28 planes were manufactured, but permission for delivery by the US government was not forthcoming and the aircraft were kept in storage. When finally it became apparent that the US would not allow Pakistan to receive the airplanes, the Pakistan government asked for a refund of the money paid in advance.

After protracted negotiations, Pakistan was coerced into accepting payment refund partly in cash and partly in the form of soya beans that it had neither asked for nor wanted.

To add insult to injury, the company deducted storage charges for the period from the $658 million paid in hard cash. Despite the effort of the US to sell these planes to other nations at a throwaway price of as little as $3 million a piece, there are to date no takers. Pakistan on the other hand is still interested in acquiring them.

From the military point of view, the F-16s fall in the class of the French Mirage 2000s and the Russian MiG-29s. The French Rafale, Russian SU-30 and the Swedish Gripen are supposed to be superior.

Nevertheless, the addition of 28 F-16s in the PAF's inventory would have an immediate and substantial impact on its capability, especially in the air defence role.

With the availability of established in-country first, second and third line maintenance facilities for F-16s and of trained pilots and maintenance staff, the assimilation of these aircraft would be smooth and rapid. The planes (hopefully followed by another 43: 71 F-16s had been originally ordered by the PAF in 1988) would help reduce the current yawning technological imbalance and greatly improve Pakistan's conventional deterrence - a factor very critical now that both Pakistan and India are nuclear weapon states. And this enhancement of the PAF's deterrence will be achieved at a fraction of the cost of purchasing a new weapons system of a similar class like the French Mirage 2000-5s.

For the people of Pakistan, stoppage of the delivery of the paid-for F-16s has been an emotive issue. It has heightened their perception that the US befriends and helps Pakistan when it suits it, ditching them as soon as its purpose has been served.

Now that Pakistan has once again become America's close ally and is a key figure in its fight against global terror, releasing the F-16s can demonstrate to the people of Pakistan that the United States is also committed to their country's long-term security interests.

The current US-Pakistan relationship is delicately poised. The Pakistan government has gone many extra miles in helping the US-led war on terror in Afghanistan, even to the extent of waging a campaign against a portion of its own population residing adjacent to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border in South Waziristan - an action that has not gone down well with a majority of its people. Pakistanis continue to be wary of America's intentions and feel that the present goodwill being displayed by the US will evaporate once their objectives are achieved.

The US needs a stable Pakistan. While the government is cooperating fully with America, the people are not very supportive of their government's actions as on the one hand they have witnessed the strengthening of the IAF offensive capability, with American approval, of the sale of the sophisticated Israeli Phalcon AEW&C system to India while on the other hand it refuses to strengthen the PAF's air defence capability by unblocking the F-16s.

Winning the hearts and minds of the Pakistani public is in the larger interest of the US as only then will the government's effort in wiping out the remnants of Al Qaeda from the Pakistan/ Afghanistan border become truly effective. A $3 billion economic and military assistance package has already been approved and its disbursement is in progress, but it has not had the desired effect on the public mind as most people never see direct evidence of US aid. The release of the 28 F-16s that would cost a mere $280 million approximately would have a far greater impact. It will be a visible manifestation of the USA's commitment to a long-term relationship with Pakistan.

The American approval of the sale of the Israeli Phalcon radar systems to India was despite Pakistani protests and apprehensions. A similar policy should be adopted for the release of the beleaguered F-16s.

The writer is a retired air commodore of the Pakistan Air Force.

Challenges ahead for Bush

The election campaign that has mesmerized America - and the world - is over. What remains are the challenges that gave rise to this occasionally frenzied battle and the responsibility of dealing with them.

No president has faced an agenda of comparable scope. This is not hyperbole; it is the hand history has dealt this generation. Never before has it been necessary to conduct a war with neither front lines, nor geographic definition and, at the same time, to rebuild fundamental principles of world order to replace the traditional ones that went up in the smoke of the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon.

The newly elected president's task is perhaps most analogous to that inherited by President Truman at the end of the Second World War. In 1945, the Soviet Union was emerging as a threat to the global equilibrium, while the war had left a vacuum in Central Europe. But the Soviet challenge was concrete and geographically definable. Today's principal threats are abstract and mobile.

Terror has no fixed address; it has attacked from Bali to Singapore, Riyadh, Istanbul, Moscow, Madrid, Tunis, New York and Washington. In the 1940s, the solution to the crisis was straightforward, albeit difficult: to construct a defensive line in the centre of Europe and an economic programme to close the gap between public expectation and the reality of shortages that threatened domestic stability.

The contemporary security challenge arises from two unprecedented sources: terror caused by acts until recently considered a matter for internal police forces rather than international policy, and scientific advances and proliferation that allow the survival of countries to be threatened by developments entirely within another state's territory.

Truman could take the legitimacy of the international system for granted; the Atlantic alliance rallied America's West European allies from the Second World War. President Bush will have to lead an effort to define and then maintain an international system that reflects the new, revolutionary circumstances. The United States cannot tackle this agenda except in the context of a commitment by all sides to healing.

All concerned with the future of the country must find ways to cooperate so that the world will again see Americans working toward a common destiny both at home and in the community of nations. It is to such an effort that this article seeks to make a contribution.

No issue requires bipartisanship more urgently than the next phase of Iraq policy. If President Bush prevails, it is important that America's adversaries not confuse the passion of an election period with lack of unity regarding ultimate goals. The seeming agreement on at least immediate objectives between the presidential candidates was reflected in their endorsement of the 9/11 Commission Report, which pointed out that terrorism is a method, not a policy.

The basic adversary is the radical, fundamentalist militant fringe of Islam, which aims to overthrow both moderate Islamic societies and all others it perceives as standing in the way of restoring an Islamic caliphate. For that reason, many societies that questioned America's intervention nevertheless have a stake in a successful outcome.

If a radical government emerges in Baghdad - because the United States is defeated or tires of solitary exertions, even more if Iraq falls into terrorist chaos - the entire Islamic world will find itself in turmoil. Moderate governments will topple or struggle for their existence; countries with substantial Islamic minorities, such as India, Russia and the Philippines, will witness a mounting challenge. Terrorism will spread across Europe. The challenges to America will multiply.

Today the U.S. acts as the trustee of global stability, while domestic obstacles prevent the admission - and perhaps even the recognition - of these realities in many countries. But such a one-sided arrangement cannot continue much longer. Other nations should find it in their interest to participate at least in the tasks of political and economic reconstruction. There is no shortcut around the next steps: the restoration of security in Iraq, especially in areas that have become terrorist sanctuaries, is imperative. No guerrilla war can be won if sanctuaries for insurgents are tolerated.

Having witnessed the challenges of creating local security forces in Indochina, I would warn against approaching the security effort in too mechanical a manner. In Vietnam, it took far longer to make units ready for combat than simply fulfilling the requirements of a training manual. The effectiveness of Iraqi forces will depend not only on their military training but on the degree to which the emerging Iraqi institutions gain domestic legitimacy. Units without political allegiance are generally least reliable when most needed.

The first national elections scheduled for the end of January are the next step. They should be viewed not as a culmination but as the first and perhaps least complicated achievement in the quest for Iraqi self-government. Democracy in the West evolved over centuries. It required first a church independent of the state; then the Reformation, which imposed pluralism of religion; the Enlightenment, which asserted the autonomy of reason from both church and state; the Age of Discovery, which broadened horizons; and finally capitalism, with its emphasis on competition and the market.

None of these conditions exists in the Islamic world. Instead there is a merging of religion and politics inimical to pluralism. A genuine democratic government has come about only in Turkey, paradoxically through the imposition of democratic forms by an autocratic leader. The emergence of democratic institutions and of the arrangements that hold them together cannot be engineered as an act of will; it requires patience and modesty.

It is particularly important to understand the obstacles to democracy in a multiethnic and multireligion society such as Iraq's. In the West, democracy evolved in homogeneous societies. There was no institutional impediment to the minority's becoming a majority. Electoral defeat was considered a temporary setback that could be reversed. But in societies with distinct ethnic or political divisions, minority status often means permanent discrimination and the constant risk of political extinction.

This is a particularly acute issue in Iraq. The country is composed of three major groups: Kurds, Shias and Sunnis, with the Shias representing about 60 percent of the population and the other two groups about 20 percent each. For 500 years, the Sunnis have dominated by military force and, during Saddam's rule, with extraordinary brutality.

Thus national elections, based on majority rule, imply a radical upheaval in the relative power and status of the three communities. The insurgency in the Sunni region is not only a national struggle against America; it is a means to restore political dominance. By the same token, the political process means little for the Kurds if it does not ensure a large measure of autonomy. The Shias tolerate the US presence - sometimes ambivalently - to achieve the goal of reversing the historic pattern of Sunni rule and as a first step to Shia dominance. To what extent they will continue to support our role as the transfer of power progresses remains to be seen.

The January elections in Iraq, therefore, must be regarded as the beginning of an extended contest among the various groups, involving the constant risk of civil war, or of a national struggle against the U.S., or both. All factions maintain militias for precisely such eventualities. It will be necessary to augment the national electoral process with a significant element of federalism and to establish clear-cut constitutional protections for those who might find themselves in the permanent minority.

Democracy must not be seen as a suicide pact by the Sunnis and the Kurds. Federalist structures and the assurance that free speech, freedom of conscience and due process of law are constitutionally beyond the reach of any majority might provide some guarantee for the concerns of the various groups and a safety net if national reconciliation proves impossible.

In the potential cauldron after the January elections, some degree of internationalization is the only realistic path toward stability inside Iraq and sustained domestic support in America. The survival of the political process depends in the first instance on security - for which the United States retains the major responsibility - but ultimately on international acceptance to enable the Iraqi government to be perceived as representing indigenous aspirations.

During the political campaign, there has been much talk of beginning this process with an effort to induce our European allies to increase their military participation and to lure recalcitrant allies into joining the security effort. Such a course cannot succeed in a time frame relevant to the immediate necessities.

Germany and France - the two most difficult allies on Iraq - will not reverse their stand in sending troops to Iraq at the beginning of a process of reconciliation. (The German Foreign Minister has said so explicitly.) And countries that have sent troops have enough domestic difficulties maintaining their participation and little, if any, scope for increasing it.

Meaningful internationalization requires a focus other than security and the participation of countries other than - or in addition to - NATO. After the January elections, an international contact group, under U.N. auspices, to advise on Iraq's political evolution is therefore desirable. -Dawn/Tribune Media Services