Changing equations in Asia

LESS than 35 years ago, while in Moscow, we were stunned to learn that the Soviet Union and India had signed a wide-ranging agreement, the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. It was this document that gave India the confidence to take advantage of the mess in Pakistan’s eastern wing and break the country apart.

Today’s diplomats must be trying equally hard to understand what the Indo-US agreement, signed in Washington recently, portends for peace and stability in this region in general and in Pakistan in particular.

How far we have travelled in such a short span of time. But then, who could have predicted the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War and the cataclysmic events of 9/11, all within a decade or so? These developments have transformed the world. The Nixon era saw the American president refer to the Indian prime minister as a “a witch”. Now, India is the darling of the West.

What explains this transformation? Of course, the major event was the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which brought to an end the historic basis of inter-state relations, as provided for in the Treaty of Westphalia. For the first time after 1648, the principle of the balance of power was shattered and the world was dominated by a single superpower. The United States no longer had to overcome such irritations as UN approvals or lose sleep over superpower rivalry. President Bush could unveil the New World Order, and later, his son could unleash the policy of unilateralism.

But even before the US had time to flex its muscles, the events of 9/11 took place. This most reprehensible action revealed not only the fallacy of the lone ranger approach, but also exposed how this powerful nation had a fragile psyche, that could send it into a paroxysm of rage and paranoia. Ever since, the Bush administration has pursued a policy of relentlessly tracking down and destroying all those it suspects of harbouring anti-American sentiments, while strengthening political and military ties with strategically important states, so that its supremacy is not challenged. This explains the rush to set up military bases in far-off places, with a preference for regimes that are authoritarian, so that there are no voices of dissent.

Of course, India is not just any country. An emerging power on the world stage, its size, population, economic growth, defence forces and a democratic secular polity, make it an ideal country to befriend. The Bush administration’s political gurus have long touted the advantages of establishing close ties with India. American scholars and officials have spoken frequently on how they view India’s role in the coming years. In fact, had 9/11 not taken place, the US would have already taken measures to cement its ties with India. But Pakistan’s acceptance of the American demand to abandon the Taliban and join the war on terror pre-empted the Indians, who were prepared to offer similar services to the Americans.

With the agenda expanding beyond merely the war on terror, the administration decided to move aggressively on resurrecting its long-held desire to enhance US presence in this region. The decision by the two countries to enter into a 10-year “New Framework for the US-India Defence Relationship” is the most dramatic manifestation of that desire. But according to sources in Washington, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has told her associates that the “sky is the limit” as far as the Indians are concerned and that nothing must impede the enhancement of ties to Delhi. What has led Ms Rice and others to court India with such vigour?

There are many substantive reasons. American political analysts are convinced that Europe has seen its best days. This is going to be the Asian century. The challenges are formidable, but the opportunities are unlimited as well. In this wide swath of territory between Morocco and Indonesia, (earlier known as the crescent of crisis), the Americans can see only Israel and India as “natural allies”. By invading Iraq, blackmailing the PLO leadership into acquiescing in the Bantustan option, keeping the Iranians and Syrians under intense pressure, and finally, by establishing military bases all over Central Asia, the US has ensured that there are no voices of dissent anywhere.

The Chinese are aware of what is happening. They appreciate that influential figures in the Bush administration have already determined that China is a major, long-term threat to the US and would like Beijing to react in an irrational manner. But the Chinese have not been a nation for 5,000 years for nothing. They will continue on the present track of increasing their trade with the US, attracting greater investment in sensitive sectors, emphasizing the commonalities in their relations and generally doing all to avoid provoking the Americans.

The Russians are not sitting idle either. They have made it clear that they are not amused at the way the Bush administration is going about encircling Moscow. Russia sees its influence disappearing even from areas historically recognized as its preserve. The result is that Moscow finds itself increasingly isolated.

It appears that both the Chinese and the Russians anticipated what the Americans had in mind. Recently, they moved rapidly to cement their bilateral ties, as evident from the agreement that brings them together against attempts by any state to “dominate international affairs”. While the document does not name the US, it is clearly an attempt to counter Washington’s growing influence in Central Asia and appears to underscore a cooling off in US-Russia relations. The document emphasized the “inadmissibility of efforts at monopolizing world affairs, the dividing of states into leaders and led, the imposition from outside of models of social development, the application of double standards”.

The Chinese have not neglected to reinforce their relations with India either, as was made clear by President Hu, during his visit to Delhi, in mid-April, when he offered India strategic ties. We thus have this strange spectacle of India being courted by all the three major powers, all offering India special concessions to gain its friendship. This is not only proof of India’s current strength, but of its estimated future potential as well.

When Ms Rice visited Delhi earlier this year, she had told Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that it was now America’s policy to “help India become a major power in the 21st century’. So, in that sense this 10-year agreement is not a surprise.

For one, it identifies their “common belief in freedom, democracy and the rule of law” as the basis for advancing “shared security interests”. These are buzzwords that the Americans use to indicate how they are different from the Chinese and can, therefore, be considered a thinly veiled reference to the need for containing China. The agreement envisages expanding two-way defence trade, increasing opportunity for transfer of defence-related technology, co-producing and developing new armament and expanding collaboration in missile defence.

On efforts to contain proliferation, the Indians have been offered membership of the exclusive club known as the Proliferation Security Initiative. The offer of co-production of the F-16s and the F-18s and the supply of the BMD systems and the likelihood of transfer of “dual use” technologies are important carrots being offered to India. From the Indian point of view, the possibility of American assistance in the nuclear field may be the most tempting, given India’s energy needs.

The Americans have certainly made their offer attractive. But will India accept a subservient role? I have my doubts. India is too big and too proud to play second fiddle to anyone, least of all America, whose policies have aroused great hostility the world over. It will surely make every effort to eat the American cake, while nibbling at the Chinese pie. That is how Indians have always conducted their foreign policy.

We are thus witnesses to a most fascinating game. While the Americans are going out of their way to pander to most of India’s whims, they are also encouraging the Japanese to abandon many of the self-imposed limitations on the pursuit of a militaristic agenda.

Washington is also pushing Australia to get more aggressively involved in Asian affairs, while reinforcing its linkages and commitments to South Korea and Taiwan. The foreign policy pundit, Dr Henry Kissinger, in confirmation of these views, observed recently that “the centre of gravity is shifting from the Atlantic, where it was lodged for the past three centuries, to the Pacific”. He also acknowledged that “now India is, in effect, a strategic partner (of the US), not because of compatible domestic structures, but because of parallel security interests in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, and vis-a vis radical Islam”.

Pakistan’s reaction has been mature and restrained. The need of the hour is to engage in sober deliberation at home, serious consultation with neighbours and major powers and finally, to adopt strategic initiatives.

We need to make it clear to the Americans that their desire to contain China should not help create a new hegemon. We have to caution the Americans as well that given the history of the region, Pakistan will be constrained to ensure strategic parity with India. Does the US then favour another debilitating arms race in the region? We also have to use our ties with the major Arab states to sensitize them to the emerging dangers, urging them to use their influence to convey to Washington their anxieties on this development.

Finally, new and more substantive initiatives must be taken to give our relations with China, a truly strategic depth and substance. No less important is the development of understanding and consensus at home. Foreign policy can only enhance and improve what we have: it cannot make up for domestic deficiencies and shortcomings.

The writer is a former ambassador.

Two memorable days in July

AMERICANS celebrate the Fourth of July because on that day 229 years ago the 13 British colonies in America issued their “Declaration of Independence.” Many Pakistanis have reason to mourn the following day, the Fifth of July, because on that day 28 years ago Pakistan’s fragile democracy once again fell prey to the ambition and whim of a grasping army general. I shall address myself to the second of these events today and leave the American Declaration for next Sunday.

The coup did not result only from Mr Bhutto’s doings and Ziaul Haq’s treachery. The shortsightedness and vengefulness of certain prominent opposition politicians had a substantial role in bringing it about. The more noteworthy of the proceedings that culminated in Mr Bhutto’s ouster may be recalled here.

The PPP was declared to have won 155 of the 192 general seats in the National Assembly, including 108 of the 116 seats in Punjab in the election held on March 7, 1977. The size of this victory startled even Mr Bhutto, and it incensed a great many people in the country. It was generally understood that the election had been rigged on a very large scale. The Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), an electoral coalition of nine opposition parties, saw in this public reaction an opportunity for launching an effective mass movement to get the election annulled, and such a movement it launched, beginning March 12. The government arrested the top PNA leaders on March 25, and many of the second-ranking leaders later, leaving the movement to be guided by the khatibs and imams in mosques, who added “Nizam-i-Mustafa” to the PNA’s charter of demands.

Two months later, Mr Bhutto decided to negotiate matters with the PNA. Negotiations began on June 3 and went through 13 rounds. A little before midnight on July 3 the two sides reached an agreement, leaving a few minor points for Mr Bhutto to consider and accept. During the day on July 4 he decided to accept all of the PNA’s demands, and late in the evening of the same day he conveyed his decision to his cabinet, General Ziaul Haq, and a few journalists. The general, unwilling to let the agreement take effect, struck shortly after midnight.

The PNA’s decision-making body, a council consisting of two representatives from each of the nine-member parties, appointed Maulana Mufti Mahmood, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, and Professor Ghafoor Ahmad as its negotiators, while Abdul Hafeez Pirzada and Maulana Kausar Niazi assisted Mr Bhutto. Any understanding that the PNA negotiators might reach with Mr Bhutto had to have the Council’s unanimous approval to go forward.

The PNA representatives were conciliatory and so was Mr Bhutto. Each time they came for a meeting, Mr Bhutto greeted them outside the front door of the prime minister’s secretariat. On a few occasions he entertained them to dinner and, knowing that Mufti Mahmood had a “sweet tooth,” he ordered special desserts for him.

Mr Bhutto accepted the PNA’s demand for holding new elections fairly early in the negotiations, and the PNA withdrew its earlier demand for his resignation. The talks then focused on the ways and means of ensuring that the next elections would be free and fair. It was agreed that an “Implementation Council,” consisting of an equal number of government and PNA nominees, presided over by Mr Bhutto and, in his absence, by Mufti Mahmood, would have wide-ranging governmental powers to oversee arrangements connected with the conduct of elections, including authority over the appointment and transfer of governors, higher ranking civil servants and police officers.

On three occasions the two teams came close to a satisfactory agreement, and then something happened to thwart it. At their ninth meeting on June 15 they reached agreement on all basic issues: new elections and the dates on which these would be held, a new election commission with enhanced authority, release of political prisoners, and the establishment of the Implementation Council referred to above.

Mr Bhutto then went abroad for a week, leaving it to Pirzada and Professor Ghafoor to fill in the details. This they did not do because they could not work together. The PNA Council confronted Mr Bhutto (on his return from abroad) with a new draft, containing provisions regarding the legal status and modus operandi of the proposed Implementation Council.

At their meeting on June 25 Mr Bhutto accepted most of the PNA’s new demands, suggested a few minor changes, and asked that the Implementation Council limit itself to matters relevant to the conduct of new elections. Instead of picking up the thread where it had been left at this meeting, the PNA prepared still another, and this time the “final”, draft.

At their twelfth meeting which began at 8 pm on July 1 and ended at 6:30 the following morning, the parties once again reached agreement. Both made concessions and, as a result, the PNA’s final draft got changed a bit. The PNA negotiators believed that the changes they had accepted were indeed minor, and that their Council would not hesitate to approve them. It met in the evening of July 2 and some of its members denounced the negotiators for having entertained Bhutto’s proposed changes. The Council then came up with nine additional demands and instructed Mufti Mahmood to sign the agreement if the prime minister accepted them without further ado.

The PNA negotiators presented these new demands to Mr Bhutto at 10 pm on July 3. After consulting Pirzada and Kausar Niazi, he asked for time to consider the new situation. As mentioned above, the following day (July 4), he decided to accept all of PNA’s demands and so informed his cabinet, General Ziaul Haq, and some journalists later that evening. But then during the night between July 4 and 5 the general intervened.

It is now time to ask who in the PNA Council had the main role in frustrating their own negotiators’ efforts to reach an accord with the prime minister. It appears that four of its members did not really want an accord to be reached, and they preferred military intervention in the expectation that the generals would hold fair elections shortly after seizing power. They were Asghar Khan (Tehrik-i-Istaqlal), Begum Nasim Wali Khan and Sher Baz Mazari (National Democratic Party), and Shah Ahmad Noorani (JUP).

Asghar Khan regarded Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as personifying unmitigated evil and despised him. At a press conference in Lahore in April 1973, he described him as “foolish, mentally sick, insane, a fascist, and, above all, a goonda” (gangster). In the summer of 1977,seeing that the prime minister had got himself into trouble, he determined to do all he could to stop him from remaining in power. Even before the negotiations began, he had urged the generals to mutiny, and to refrain from killing their own people to support Bhutto’s illegal regime. He wrote: “As men of honour it is for you to do your duty and the call of duty in these trying circumstances is not blind obedience to unlawful commands. There comes a time in the lives of nations when each man has to ask himself whether he is doing the right thing. For you that time has come. Answer this call honestly and save Pakistan.” (Full text of Asghar Khan’s message is included as an appendix in Professor Ghafoor Ahmad’s book, Phir Marshal La Aa Gia, 1988.)

Begum Nasim Wali Khan had reasons of her own to detest Bhutto. He had unjustly dismissed her party’s government in Balochistan in March 1973 and put its leaders in jail. In 1975 his government arrested her husband, Abdul Wali Khan, on a charge of treason and sent him to Hyderabad jail to be tried, along with the other ANP leaders already there, by a special tribunal authorized to set aside the ordinary due process of law and rules of evidence. Sher Baz Mazari also had a good reason to hate Bhutto: he had been arrested and detained on a probably bogus charge of gunrunning in 1972. I am not aware of any violence that may have been done to Shah Ahmad Noorani, but he would appear to have let himself be persuaded that Bhutto must be made to go.

I wonder if there were occasions during the long and terrible decade of Ziaul Haq’s tyranny in Pakistan when Asghar Khan, Begum Nasim Wali Khan and Sher Baz Mazari regretted the disruptive role they had played during the PNA’s negotiations with Prime Minister Bhutto. Surely, there was abundant reason for them to regret it.

Mr Bhutto himself may unwittingly have contributed to the army’s disposition to intervene. He kept Ziaul Haq and some other generals informed of the progress of his negotiations with the PNA, invited them to the cabinet meeting where these matters were discussed, invited their participation and their reactions. They took a strong position in opposition to the PNA’s demand for the withdrawal of armed forces from Balochistan and disbandment of the special tribunal trying the NAP leaders in Hyderabad, knowing full well that this was a matter of vital concern to some of its Council members.

On three occasions Kausar Niazi and other members of the cabinet referred to the danger of a military coup. Each time Ziaul Haq and his colleagues in attendance stood up to repudiate this suggestion and pledge unfailing support to Mr Bhutto and his government. But it appears that at the same time they were getting ready, and making all necessary arrangements, for their intervention.

A military coup cannot be executed at a moment’s notice. General Ziaul Haq learned of Mr Bhutto’s decision to accept the PNA’s demands at the cabinet meeting on the evening of July 4. He struck within a few hours of this meeting. It is clear that his officers and their men had been standing by, waiting for his signal to move out and seize the government, a signal that he gave on his return from the prime minister’s house to the GHQ.

The writer is professor emeritus of political science at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, USA.

E-mail: anwarsyed@cox.net

Speedy justice at grassroots

THE courts in Pakistan work under multiple pressures emanating from the executive branch of the government, the police and the politicians in and outside the government and, increasingly, from that section of the press that has taken up the cause of aggrieved individuals, instead of informing the community at large of the laws and their rights. All these stresses were seen at their worst in Mukhtaran Mai’s case.

Extraneous pressures and inducements, coupled with falling standards of competency and honesty, have all but clogged the course of justice for the people or for at least those among them who do not, or cannot, hire lawyers or tutor witnesses.

In response to a general public outcry on the delay or denial of justice the whipping boy for the judge is the investigator or the prosecutor and for them in turn, the judge. Ultimately, all agencies or individuals involved in the legal process from the occurrence of the crime to its final adjudication agree to pin the blame on the financial managers of the state for not providing enough resources to cope with the work.

The least cause for the delay or denial of justice is, thus, made into the first. In reality, the law, procedures and after these the men responsible for administering justice, from police stations to the highest court, are to be blamed more than scarce resources as a reason for the rising crime graph and growing public discontent.

The dispensation of justice was much fairer and quicker until the introduction of new and parallel codes of law and hierarchy of courts. Ostensibly, this was done by successive governments to make the legal machinery accessible to the common man and to deter criminals by tough penalties quickly awarded. What actually happened for every change in law and procedure was the opposite because the hidden intention of the men in power was to prolong their own rule and to punish the dissenters.

Whether it was Ziaul Haq’s Hudood ordinances and Shariat courts or Nawaz Sharif’s anti-terrorism act and speedy courts, the result has been increased corruption in the institutions and greater harassment of the people without any improvement in the quality of justice. Harsher punishments handed out after hasty trials by anti-terrorist and Shariat courts are mostly overturned by the appellate courts. In the end, neither expense nor time is saved.

The agony and expense of it all may best be illustrated by referring to two cases of kidnapping cum robbery in which this writer was the victim. Both cases are still awaiting final adjudication — one for 10 years and the other for seven — bogged down in conflicting laws and jurisdictions. If the intention was to punish the kidnappers and compensate their victims for the loss, the outcome has been exactly the opposite. The kidnappers got away lightly through years of lingering proceedings and the victims suffered more loss in addition to a million the kidnappers took away.

Another instance of the absurdity of laws and the pain they inflict was quoted some time ago by columnist Ardeshir Cowasjee: A villager was prosecuted for writing religious verses on his house and then went on to compound that “offence” by praying in the police lock-up. Mr Cowasjee calculated the distance the villager travelled between his home and the court over the trial years, before a benign judge sentenced him to prison till the rising of the court. This distance was equal to circling the globe twice over.

A third instance: no drinker surely has ever been whipped nor a bootlegger sent to prison for five years though the consumption of liquor has increased enormously since Zia’s 1979 Hudood order on prohibition.

The purposelessness of the Hudood and other obscurantist laws and summary procedures can be demonstrated no better than by the fact the crimes they were intended to prevent and punish have spread faster and wider.

To break this cycle of legal corruption and decay and to bring back a semblance of order and fairness to the administration of justice, it is imperative to have one set of penal laws, a single hierarchy of courts and uniform procedures without discrimination against any citizen or class of citizens.

The trend, unfortunately, is to the contrary. NWFP’s Hasba (accountability) bill, likely to be enacted into law any day, empowers the police and volunteers to discipline the private lives of the citizens and to punish the defiant. Thus yet another door to corruption and public harassment is being opened. Ironically, this piece of Islamic legislation takes cognizance of beggary but shows no concern for the sick and the needy.

The key to the success of General Musharraf’s devolution idea lies in taking justice, and not politics, to the grassroots. The panchayats may succeed where the councils have totally failed. There are many other agencies for services at the grassroots but none for dispensing justice.

The ancient Aryan tillers of the soil when they arrived from the northwest to settle in the interfluvial tracts, or doabs, of the plains that now form Pakistan converted every settlement of theirs into a mini-republic. This village republic paid tribute or owed a degree of allegiance to the state but managed its own affairs and settled internal disputes through an elected body of five (panch) respected elders. Shariat is our religious inheritance but panchayat belongs to the soil.

The Hudood and other religious laws may remain on the statute book waiting for the institutions and the people to rise up to their exacting standards but the elected panchayats can be put in place straightaway. To begin with, adjudication by the panchayats can be made subject to the consent of the accused in a criminal offence and of the contending parties in a civil dispute. Thus, at least, the people who wish to save themselves from the expense and harassment of litigation in distant courts will be able to do so.

In one of his lesser known poems, Faiz laments in despair: “Yeh bara shehr jo abadiey viran bhi nahin, iss mey kis waqt kahan aag lagi thi pehley — ik zara sochney do.”. Crudely translated, this means: “In this splendid city (meaning the country) which is now not even a desolate village when and where was the first fire lit — give me pause to contemplate for a while”.

A curt answer to this sad poetic refrain is — when the flame of justice went out.

For Britain, it’s 7/7

MORE than most great cities, London has a history of destruction — and rebuilding. The great fire of 1666 destroyed St. Paul’s Cathedral; World War II bombings devastated whole neighbourhoods; later, the Irish Republican Army planted bombs in the city’s pubs, parks and even outside Harrods department store. Thursday’s explosions on the city’s subway and an iconic double-decker bus killed at last count 52 people and brought home terrorism to a younger generation. But the attacks also seemed to strengthen the resolve of Britons, as world leaders hastened to promise anew that they would fight terrorism whatever its source.

Open societies are tempting targets. Cities dependent on mass transit, such as New York, Paris or London, are particularly vulnerable. Bomb-sniffing dogs, heavily armed police officers and alert transportation officials were on duty in all major cities after the London attack, but that level of security is not infinitely sustainable. London has closed-circuit security cameras on nearly every lamppost; the movements of people are monitored; abandoned packages are checked. The video should help the investigation, though electronic eyes did nothing to stop the criminals.

London’s shock and dismay contrasted sharply with the joy of the previous day, when Blair exulted as the city won the right to host the 2012 Olympics. Blair’s somber statements on Thursday were firm and free from cant. A previously unknown group claiming ties to Al Qaeda took responsibility, but Blair took pains to note that most Muslims not only obey the law but condemn such violence. Islamic organizations in many nations joined in denouncing the attacks.

After the attacks Blair said British values would outlast the terrorists and “we will hold true to the British way of life.” Those who slaughtered more innocents on Thursday may not understand that, but survivors of New York and Washington, Bali and Madrid, affirm the sentiment in their daily lives.

— The Los Angeles Times