The quagmire called Iraq

IDENTIFYING the basis of international law, many jurists argue that ‘no benefit can be received from an illegal act’. Juxtaposed with dictates of realpolitik, this principle may sound like an oversimplification worthy of a textbook but irrelevant to a world where legality is often subordinated to the logic of power.

But the ever worsening situation in Iraq reminds us daily that power divorced from moral and legal legitimacy unleashes forces that will not be easily controlled and may, in the end, defeat the very purpose for which the illegal act was first committed.

The case history of Iraq is a vivid demonstration of the fact that subsequent efforts to salvage the situation by undertaking projects to build a new ameliorative order get hopelessly vitiated as available options wither away. Each and every plan that is being launched now to stem the chaos left behind by an unlawful invasion carries risks for the people of Iraq, the integrity of their country and the security of every neighbouring state, except perhaps Israel.

Robin Cook, the foreign secretary who resigned from the British cabinet after opposing the invasion of Iraq and whose recent death has left British politics much poorer, reminded the invading powers in January 2005 that ‘the starting point of any search for an alternative strategy (in Iraq) is to be frank that the present one has failed’. What we have seen during the last six months is a depressing repetition of cliches about freedom, democracy and terrorism that bear little resemblance to the Iraqi situation. So far the bitter harvest of the invasion is most visible in the transformation of the most secular country is the Middle East into the new epicentre of terrorism that it has become and in the increasing threats to its territorial integrity.

No conflict in recent history has witnessed so many twists and turns in the rationale of military intervention as in Iraq. A vast body of literature already illuminates the violation of moral and legal principles of international law in this case. By far the shortest and also the most revealing document on the Iraq is the Downing Street Memo on Prime Minister Tony Blair’s meeting with an elite group of cabinet ministers, military leaders, security specialists and media experts disclosed by Sunday Times on May 1, this year. Three things stand out in this disclosure that defines the truth about the occupation. First, the decision to invade Iraq was taken as early as July 2002.

Secondly, it was to be justified by mixing allegations of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and terrorism. By implication, the available information that Iraq had no WMD and no truck with international terrorists of any kind was to be brushed under the carpet. Nothing that Iraq was prepared to do to reassure the international community in this context was to be considered. Third, nobody was prepared to give much thought to the consequences of a speedy collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime.

It is not churlish to reiterate these indisputable facts as they continue to shape the great tragedy in Iraq. Inevitably, there would be resistance to occupation. Multiple options available to the international community to resolve the ensuing conflict were brushed aside simply because the invading powers would not countenance them. Since the occupation relied heavily on the use of force, legitimate national resistance started degenerating into mindless violence. By far the most distressing event in this downward plunge was the frustration of the slim hope that the US presidential election held in November 2004 might bring about a change of tactics, if not strategy,

It was hoped that in his second term President Bush would be less susceptible to the influence of the neo-conservative war party in Washington. Furthermore, having achieved his military objectives, he would focus on the larger political aim of creating a new synergy with the Middle East. Instead, within 72 hours of the election, the US military began an assault on Fallujah that would be remembered by future historians as much for the ferocity directed against civilian population as for the tactic of dividing Shia and Sunni Iraqis. The operation was not just a demonstration of the occupation’s firepower in one specific centre of resistance; it engulfed many Sunni towns.

This was a bizarre way of setting the stage for the political process of building a post-conflict democratic and united Iraq. After engineering the virtual independence of Kurdish areas, the rest of Iraq was now being turned into an arena of sectarian conflict and antagonism by targeting the so-called Sunni triangle. This was a recipe for sectarian strife; it also led to relentless terrorism against the emerging Iraqi government suspected to be a party to the conspiracy to marginalize the large Sunni population.

A horrific daily death toll in terrorist attacks would alone detract from the initiatives to rebuild Iraq’s security forces and its battered political institutions. What destroys their credibility even more is the manner in which they are made. It is questionable if we are witnessing the rise of a genuine Iraqi national army that can one day replace the occupation forces. Instead, we see a fairly extensive use of the Kurdish peshmerga. It is a battle-hardened force that already ensures a de facto independence of Kurdish areas and provides the muscle for the Kurdish hopes to establish a regional control of energy resources.

By directing Sunni frustrations against their Shia compatriots, a case has been made for strengthening Shia militias. Some of these militias were trained by Iran to take on the brutal regime of Saddam Hussein. This outsourcing of State authority to ethnic and sectarian armies reduces the casualties suffered by the occupying forces but it is also the shortest route to civil war; it will undermine the project of a viable federal state more than anything else.

The national election held in January 2005 could have by now provided a forum for working out a national consensus on some very complex issues of ethnicity and sectarian identity if the occupiers had not used extreme violence against ‘the Sunni triangle’. Indiscriminate punishment led to a Sunni boycott of elections and a noticeable criminalization of resistance. Subsequent efforts to give the Sunnis some representation have not allayed apprehensions that the constitution that will replace the transitional administrative law (TAL) would create ethnic and sectarian hierarchies.

If this fear vitiates the adoption of the normal majoritarian principle for deciding constitutional issues, the emergence of the Kurdistan national assembly under the leadership of Masoud Barzani raises the spectre of Iraq becoming a loose confederation rather than a democratic federation with a viable centre. Nothing has spurred and sustained violence more than the suspicion that the occupiers aim at a three-way split of Iraq under the thin veneer of a federal state.

The so-called Sunni heartland fears that it would be stripped of most of Iraqi economic assets and would fester as a vast reservoir of militancy and violence. The saving grace is that future arrangements are not being decided by a head count but are being negotiated with a deadline in mind and that opportunity for the exercise of higher statesmanship has not been exhausted.

The occupiers have committed such grave mistakes that even if Iraq escapes sliding into the anarchy of a civil war, they will have to contend with unintended consequences of such momentous nature that their original script for the region will need a major revision. While ‘the Sunni triangle’ dissipates its energies in a deadly conflict with foreign forces and the emerging Iraqi authority, Ayatollah Sistani and other Shia leaders have successfully protected their followers from the ravages of alien occupation and set them on a far more effective political course to power. This will give the new Iraq an orientation, if not an ideology, that may also not be palatable to the neo-conservatives in Washington. The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq which had forged strong bonds with Tehran during the Iran-Iraq war will strive hard to open a new chapter in Iran-Iraq relations. Its efforts will resonate well with Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari’s Da’awa. Notwithstanding its adversarial relations with the United States, Iran has not lost any time in seizing the opportunity.

In fact, a tacit understanding between the leading political parties of Iraq and the government in Tehran carries the best chance of persuading the Kurds to scale down their ambitions to a level that Tehran (and Ankara) can live with. Admittedly, the Shias of Iran and Iraq have not embraced radical theology in equal measure but, at the end of the day, they will probably work together to thwart alien hegemony in the region.

The need of the hour is that Arabs and Kurds rise above their parochial and sectarian interests and reach a grand compromise that brings peace to Iraq and assuages the apprehensions of all the neighbouring states. It is not easy to arrive at such a settlement under foreign occupation.

But not to do so would only prolong the occupation which, in turn, would exacerbate conflict in the country. There is no evidence as yet that President Bush and his principal advisers are contemplating an exit strategy. This will require an admission of the fact that they carried out a perfect demolition job but failed to create a new and just order in Iraq.

It is time to contemplate the termination of the occupation. If the region is to move towards democracy and greater integration in a globalized economy, a plan of withdrawal that progressively replaces invading armies by a UN or Arab-Islamic peacekeeping force to protect a freely elected national government has to be announced soon. An agreed constitution that legislates the right quantum of regional autonomy and contains explicit measures to protect the rights of all religions and sects will be the bedrock of such a representative government.

An international conference on Iraq’s sovereignty and freedom should provide international legitimacy and support for the decisions made by the Iraqi people. It will also devise security assistance to Iraq till it can take up the burden itself. The invasion of Iraq must be the last of highly disruptive unilateral pre-emptive military interventions.

The writer is a former foreign secretary.

US opposition to gas pipeline

“WE have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual and these interests, it is our duty to follow”. This axiom by Lord Palmerstone is in full evidence with the growing controversy aver the tri-nation pipeline.

India and Pakistan, woefully deficient in energy sources and their energy needs growing at a fast rate, have made them both allies of sorts. Some regard it as one of the dividends of the peace process currently underway between Delhi and Islamabad. In their neighbourhood, Iran has the world’s second largest gas and oil reserves. After much scrutiny and apprehensions as to the feasibility, both India and Pakistan have agreed to cooperate in a gas pipeline project from Iran to meet their growing needs.

The pipeline would run about 1115 km in Iran, 705 km in Pakistan and 850 km in India and total investment is estimated at four billion dollars and may take four to five years to complete. Two other options of getting gas — one from Turkmenistan and the other from Qatar — were explored but found more time consuming and expensive.

Pakistan would be required to invest about one billion dollars as the pipeline would enter into Indian territory either from Rahimyar Khan or Multan. However, besides meeting its requirements Pakistan would earn about 700 million dollars in transit fee every year.

The three governments have started preliminary discussions on the project in right earnest. Special joint working groups have been set up and consultants are to make presentations on the technical and economical aspects by the end of the year.

The project, however, has run into some political impediments, raising a question mark over its prospects. Washington has warned India and Pakistan that the proposed project would invite US sanctions, under the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) that empowers the US president to order punitive measures against any international company that invests more than $20 million a year in Iran’s energy sector. The US regards Iran as a “safe heaven for terrorists” and also wants to punish it for its current stand on its nuclear programme.

Initially both India and Pakistan declared their resolve to go ahead with the project. Pakistan also signed an agreement with Iran providing for 200 million dollar investment in the project and to establish an “Iran-Pakistan Investment Company” to improve bilateral investments.

According to the Indian government’s statistics, New Delhi’s energy requirements are estimated to be 274 million tons and 400 million CU meters for gas per day in the next 20 years. These demands make the pipeline project an absolute necessity. It may be recalled that India has signed a $22 billion deal to buy liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Iran, for 25 years starting from 2009. It has also concluded a similar deal with Qatar, to avoid excessive dependence on the pipeline project.

Indian position, however, has of late, become somewhat ambiguous. During Manmohan Singh’s visit to Washington last month India changed its stance. The Indian Prime Minister talked of the project being “fraught with serious risks,” and also expressed doubts about its funding by any international consortium. The statement came few days after Manmohan Singh signed a deal with Washington, under which the US, in violation of the international nonproliferation regime, has agreed to provide nuclear fuel and reactors to India to meet its energy needs.

The Indians later changed their stance again and the Petroleum Minister Manishankar Ayar declared that “all the fog has been cleared and India is working towards the realization of the much delayed project”.

Earlier New Delhi had serious reservations about the security of the pipeline running through Pakistan, given the chequered history of bilateral relations. The current thaw in two countries’ relations may have allayed some of these apprehensions but India would remain vigilant and may not commit itself fully to such a project.

The ambiguity created by cryptic statements of Manmohan Singh during his US visit were not casual remarks. The doublespeak was deliberate and indicated possible policy change, particularly in view of the US reservations earlier conveyed by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice during her New Delhi visit. Another factor for the Indian scepticism could be to draw a hard bargain on the price. India has asked Iran to sell gas at the domestic rate. Obviously this will not be acceptable to Iran.

The US threat to impose sanctions if the pipeline project goes ahead is real, and as Condoleezza Rice observed, even if the US administration gave up its resistance, the energy lobby in Congress could derail the process.

Both India and Pakistan have shown themselves sensitive to the US concerns, but also underlined their requirements. The two other options — Qatar and Turkmenistan — are economically not feasible, requiring more time and more financial outlay.

The pipeline project is absolutely indispensable, both for Pakistan and India. However, Indians have secured their interest through the recent agreement with the US for the supply of nuclear reactors for energy generation and may not be desperate for, or solely dependent on, the Iranian pipeline. Pakistan has no option but to stick to the gas pipeline project. It would however be a test of our diplomacy and of relations with the US that America’s “concerns” on the score and the “US law and policy” will not stand in the way of Pakistan securing its energy needs from one or the other regional source in the future.

India has already made its position pretty flexible. The project remained under discussion over the last few years and did not take off, as Indians had serious misgivings about the project’s security. They suspected that the pipeline running through Pakistan could be interrupted by its neighbour in a situation of hostility. Besides a qualitative improvement in bilateral relations, in the backdrop of significant CBMs, Pakistan has now offered sovereign guarantee under an international agreement to allow India uninterrupted supply of gas.

However, if the relations between the two countries deteriorate not an unlikely possibility, Indians would have a perfect excuse to withdraw from the project on security grounds, or find technical, legal or financial flaws relating to the project to walk out of the tripartite arrangement. Given India’s track record of going back on its commitments, the scenario is plausible.

The bottom line, therefore, is that since the US regards the project “against US law and policy”, and that it believes that the “project would undermine US energy policies” and is “harmful to global stability”, the US will not relent on the issue. Pakistan being a recipient of a sizable annual aid from America, would be vulnerable, and could not afford to ignore the risks involved.

Besides, the current state of relations between Tehran and Washington or rather the absence of it, does not hold any promise of an early rapprochement. In fact, the US reaction to the election of a hardliner president, the tension and acrimony between the two could only escalate.

The raging nuclear controversy further complicates the matter. Under the given circumstances, it would be advisable for Pakistan to explore alternative options to meet its energy needs while pursuing the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline project as realistically as possible.

The writer is a former ambassador.

Making the best of foreign loans

TOP persons in authority have spoken about the national debt reduction and the criteria for seeking new loans. But most of the time when national debt is mentioned by the political leaders or finance officials they mean only the external debt, currently about 36 billion dollars.

They do not try to include the large domestic debt of Rs2,018 billion which carries a higher interest rate, and cumulatively a heavy burden on the tax payers.

The government is under no compulsion to repay the domestic loan on the nail as that comprise largely of floating or unfunded debt. As old loans are retired, new loans are secured, often larger loans and at reduced interest rates.

These days the government is paying very low interest rates on the domestic debt. Hence, the interest payments on domestic loans which had reached the peak of Rs210 billion in 1999-00 came down to Rs170 billion last year while the domestic debt actually increased by Rs268 billion in the last five years.

The foreign debt which is now well within manageable limits always runs the risk of getting inflated through devaluation of the rupee which can raise the amount of interest payments. But luckily for the country the rupee continues to be steady against strong currencies. The new budget is based at a conversion rate of Rs61 to a dollar in 2005-2006. The US dollar has been going down against other strong currencies, particularly euro to which it had lost 30 per cent in three years.

Although like Pakistan, India too has a free float policy, its rupee’s fluctuations against the dollar have been limited. So the Indian rupee is now 43.5 to a dollar. A year ago it was 46.3 to a dollar and so has gained against the weak dollar, while the Pakistan rupee has been rather static against dollar. So imports from India into Pakistan will cost more in Pak rupees even when they are duty-free and without the withholding tax. And it is cheap for India to import more and more from Pakistan.

The lower the exchange rate of the rupee the higher the inflation and rupee cost of the exports, particularly when oil costs 67 dollars a barrel. At that rate of exchange the 21 billion dollars of imports, as made last year, cost far more in rupees and aggravate the inflation. It is, therefore, the duty of the government to make the rupee strong step by step instead of following the cheap rupee policy to promote exports as demanded by the exporters.

Recipients of the home remittances — four billion dollars last year — have also to be paid at the rate of Rs60 a dollar. That increases the money supply in the country and adds to the inflationary pressures. But the government welcomes the remittances gladly as that reduces the balance of payments deficit and makes more dollars available for imports.

Compared to Pakistan the Philippines received 10 billion dollars as home remittances last year and the current year too shows the same accelerating trend. The average wage of a Filipino worker is far higher than that of the Pakistani worker abroad as they are more skilled.

President Musharraf wants Pakistan to adopt a need-based strategy for seeking more aid instead of seeking loans simply because they are available. And he wants their positive effect to be seen on the ground. The purpose should be to effect a qualitative improvement in the life of the people, he stresses. he also wants the country’s borrowing requirements to be assessed on a quarterly basis so that there is a tight control.

He also wants the ongoing and under-processed projects to be reviewed to ensure they fall in line with the government’s economic reforms and developmental priorities.

What matters is not only the volume of new loans being sought but also the purpose for which they are required, the price at which they are secured and the interest rate. The government is already seeking loans from the World Bank at nominal rate of 0.75 per cent, after having repaid some more costly loans. It is not looking for any financial assistance from the IMF. The new loans of 440 million dollars sought from Japan carry an interest rate of 1.2 per cent. These must not be misused and the projects for which they are obtained should be efficiently executed and completed in time.

Disagreements between the centre and the provinces or between the provinces should not delay the aid-financed projects. Choice of contractors should not take much time, as had happened in the case of Ghazi Brotha project, and as a result it was completed long after the deadline. Nor should there be delay in making available the right site for the project. And the provincial bureaucracy should be made as helpful to the project as possible. Political rifts should not delay the projects.

Corrupt practices should not be allowed to vitiate the projects and make them more costly. Nor should the projects be delayed by an excess of red tape. Above all, the projects should be completed in time and serve the purpose for which they were set up, particularly if they relate to infrastructure.

Prime minister Shaukat Aziz says that in order to maintain fiscal discipline the parliament had already passed the fiscal responsibility and debt limitation law. He considers that a major development on the country’s economic scene.

But since the law was passed, after an inordinate delay, we have not seen the parliament trying to get to grip with the financial waste in government. Its members have been more interested in getting more salaries and allowances for themselves.

The parliament has to ensure that the government does not spend far in excess of the money sanctioned for any purpose and the money sanctioned is well spent. It has to take up the lapses seriously as pointed out by the Auditor General and the Public Accounts Committee and try to recover the wasted or embezzled money. It should check the usual practice of the government spending far in excess of budget sanctioned and finally presenting to the parliament a large supplementary budget, as happens at the end of each budget session.

Instead, the government should seek prior parliamentary approval for incurring expenditure in excess of the budgetary sanction. In that case the parliament will be able to examine whether the funds already sanctioned through the budget have been well spent and whether the additional expenditure is really necessary.

While the legislature has already passed the fiscal responsibility and debt limitation law, it did not hold a session to consider the state of the country’s finances. At least two full days are needed for a proper assessment of the finances of the state, and for most of the members to become well acquainted with it.

This is all the more essential when larger foreign loans are being sought and obtained. In the latest instance the new World Bank president Paul Wolfowitz has offered a 1.5 billion dollars a year for infrastructural development and social sector advancement. While that will help develop the country over the years substantially, the parliament has to ensure the money is well spent and the desired results obtained.

The National Assembly’s two major committees — the key public Accounts Committee and the standing committee on finance and revenue — have a major role to play in this regard. When the government is not moving along the right lines they have to bring that to the notice of the parliament and set it right.

The governor of the State Bank of Pakistan Dr Ishrat Husain says that a four per cent increase in foreign debt annually is sustainable. But a cumulative increase of four per cent annually in foreign debt can become a huge burden, unless of course the old debt is simultaneously reduced. A four per cent increase annually is also high when the base is high.

What really matters is not the rise in the debt in terms of percentage annually but the purpose for which the loans are sought and how well they are used and whether the purpose is achieved in time. If large projects are completed after undue delay they can have an adverse impact on the economy, including a rise in inflation because of the vast funds spent on the project.

Now we are seeking loans at a low interest rate — the average being 1.7 per cent. The grant element in the aid is also now quite large. But when it comes to the net debt which by March will be 36.6 billion dollars, it becomes heavier if we let the rupee float down in relation to the dollar. Then, the people will have to be taxed more to make up the difference.

We have already a trade deficit of six billion dollars due to the high prices of oil and industrial imports. The balance of payments which was in surplus earlier has become a deficit for the last two years.

With foreign companies making a great deal of profit and sending much of that home the balance of payments is strained further. Foreign investment is being sought with the assurance that the capital with profits could be repatriated any time. That means the country has to keep large foreign exchange reserves all the time.

Now the mutual funds are to be allowed to invest up to 30 per cent of their assets abroad. There are about 30 of such funds now and many of them may want to try their hand at foreign investment after securing the services of a good adviser. Are they supposed to raise the money to be sent abroad from the open market or will the State Bank provide the foreign exchange?

Meanwhile companies in Pakistan are stated to be paying the highest dividend in South Asia, which is apparently true. In that case most mutual funds may prefer the home markets to distant companies of which they know so little.

President Musharraf says rebuilding of the economy has taken six years of hard work; but it takes no time to slide back. That is true when the foreign exchange reserves are 12.5 billion dollars and the trade deficit is six billion dollars. If our positive points are many, our negative points are not a few. We have to be very watchful and fortify our strong points and make them irreversible.

The truth about integration

FOR years it has been taboo to question our society’s record of integrating people of different colours, creeds and backgrounds. We were told that we had one of the finest records, bar the odd blip. That complacency was shattered by the London bombings.

We had to face the terrible truth of being the first western country to have suffered terrorist attacks perpetrated by “home-grown” suicide bombers — born and educated in Britain. A good deal of soul-searching is in order about the role of minority groups in our society. Where should we begin?

First, a word about multiculturalism. It means so many things that it is capable of being championed or challenged by people who may largely agree with each other about what they really want. And on that fundamental point, I believe there is widespread agreement.

Surely most people in this country want to share a strong sense of British identity while recognising that that is not incompatible with a continuing attachment to other traditions. I believe I can speak with some authority on this. I am the child of immigrant parents. Until the day he died, my father was fiercely proud of being British, and my mother still is. They never thought their Britishness was inconsistent with their Jewishness. They would have recognised the difference between integration, which they supported, and assimilation, which they did not.

Gandhi put it very well in a different context: “We must cease to be exclusive Hindus, or Muslims, or Sikhs, Parsis, Christians or Jews. Whilst we may staunchly adhere to our respective faiths, we must be Indians first, and ... last.”

What do I mean by being proud to be British? At its core is a profound respect for, and allegiance to, the institutions that make Britain what it is, and the values that underpin those institutions. So my parents, and generations of immigrants, were easily able to distinguish between loyalty to those institutions and to the state itself, and support for the government of the day. They frequently disagreed with a government’s policies, but never allowed that to affect their allegiance to the country.

By all accounts, the US has been more effective in integrating Muslim communities than we have been. Yet we ought to find it easier than the US does. We have a monarchy rather than a presidency. So here it should be easier to distinguish between political opposition — on Iraq, Palestine or anything else - and disaffection from the state. But it doesn’t seem to happen that way.

Perhaps one of the mistakes we have made in recent years is a tendency to place too much emphasis on the need to encourage the retention of attachment to other traditions, and not enough on the British identity we all share. Rather than cherishing the ties that bind us, we have been focusing on what divides us. Surely it is time to reverse this trend; our democracy, monarchy, rule of law, history, these are the things we need to increase understanding of. And it needs to be a two-way process.

A few days ago I visited the mosque in my constituency. A young imam asked why he and his colleagues were not invited into schools to talk about the real teachings of Islam and why schoolchildren did not visit the mosque. I asked if the mosque had invited them, and if he had invited himself to schools. They hadn’t, but I was assured that they will. And I have written to the area education officer urging him to get such contacts under way.

But this kind of thing is just a small start. One of the reasons why America may seem more successful at integration is that minority communities buy into the American dream. The notion that the boy from the log cabin can make it to the White House is more myth than reality, but it is a myth with a powerful hold. In reality ordinary people in Britain are more likely to make it to Downing Street and to the top in other walks of life. But no one here talks about the British dream.

We should. We need to break down the barriers that exist in too many people’s lives — and minds — that prevent or deter them from making a success of life. We need to inculcate a sense of allegiance to the values that are the hallmark of Britain — decency, tolerance and a sense of fair play.

This sense of allegiance needs to be made more meaningful. For example, the government has powers to revoke the citizenship and right to remain in this country of people who acquired those privileges by naturalisation. These should be used more widely, particularly in respect of people who make it clear that they do not recognise any allegiance to our country, and could constitute a threat to national security.

At the same time we should celebrate the merits of our national community, and our virtues as a nation, which can yet provide an antidote to the poisoned thinking that led to last month’s horrors. — Dawn/ Guardian Service

The writer is leader of Britain’s Conservative party.

Emptying Guantanamo

THE agreement announced last week to repatriate 110 Afghan detainees from Guantanamo Bay Naval Base is a breakthrough of sorts in the thorny problem of managing captives in the war on terrorism.

Unlike previous detainees to be sent home, this group is still deemed of considerable risk, not eligible for release. Yet along with 350 others being held at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, they gradually will be turned over to the custody of Afghan authorities, who have given assurances that they will be prevented from rejoining the fight.

The United States, in turn, will help build infrastructure to detain them and train Afghan forces to staff it. According to a report by staff writers Josh White and Robin Wright, the administration is pursuing similar arrangements with Saudi Arabia and Yemen. If it succeeds, the inmate population of Guantanamo will be reduced by 68 per cent.

Repatriating detainees for incarceration at home makes sense. There is no good reason for America to shoulder the entire burden of locking up captives in the war on terrorism while allied countries wax indignant about treatment of their nationals who pose as much threat to their home countries as they do to US forces or civilians.

If these people are dangerous — as review panels have found them to be — it is reasonable to ask their countries to take some responsibility for them. In general, if the administration can accomplish this without releasing people who will quickly take up arms anew, it would be a considerable accomplishment.

But turning these people over raises potentially significant human rights concerns that the administration must confront. The legal authority of the home countries to continue detaining people must be clearly articulated lest the United States be seen as encouraging lawless jailings.

More fundamentally, these are not countries with stellar human rights records; Saudi Arabia’s is absolutely dreadful. Shifting the indefinite detention of enemy fighters from Guantanamo could, therefore, end up meaning worse treatment for the detainees. For this reason, it is essential that the administration receive serious assurances of humane treatment — including access by international organizations — not just the sort of paper pledges it has gotten in some instances.

In the case of Afghanistan, which has a responsible government and where American forces will play some supporting role, this should be manageable. Less clear is what sort of assurances and international access might make detentions viable in Saudi Arabia, one of the world’s most closed societies.

Repatriating detainees en masse offers an opportunity for the administration to relieve pressure on its own detention facilities. But it must take care to avoid a situation in which abuse of large numbers of inmates by foreign surrogates could appear to have taken place on America’s behalf.

—The Washington Post