Again at a crossroads

WILL the next series of elections, promised by General Pervez Musharraf for sometime later this year or early next year, help to address many economic, political and social problems the country faces these days? This is the question for which I am searching for an answer in this series of articles. Before looking for an answer, it would be useful to pause for a moment and reflect on the uncertainties that surround the current political situation.

“Standing at a crossroads” has become a popular cliché for describing Pakistan’s situation at any number of points in its troubled history. At a number of previous crossroads, the country, with one exception, managed to take the wrong turn.

After the death of Mohammad Ali Jinnah in 1948, it could have chosen to establish a fully democratic order supported by a constitution. Instead, Liaquat Ali Khan, Jinnah’s anointed successor, decided to wait, hoping to cultivate a broader base of support for himself.

Following his assassination in October 1951, there was an opportunity to leave the matter of succession to be decided by the legislature. Instead, the ruling elite opted for a bureaucratic solution, placing Ghulam Muhammad, a former civil servant, as governor-general and Nazimuddin, a weak politician from Bengal, as prime minister. This shifted the base of power from the National Assembly to the bureaucracy. The die was thus cast for the arrival of the military on to the political stage.

In the 1948-58 period, the squabbling politicians could have chosen to hold elections soon after they had agreed on a constitution. Instead, they continued to maneuovre against one another, forming and reforming political parties. Their quarrels led to bad governance and gave the military under General Ayub Khan the opportunity it was looking for. The coup was explained in terms of a necessity rather than the product of personal ambition on the part of the senior commanders of the armed forces.

In March 1969, Pakistan’s first military leader President Ayub Khan — weakened by a serious heart problem and the defection of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, his popular foreign minister — could have used his own constitution to transfer power to a civilian leader. Instead, he allowed himself to be bullied into placing the country under martial law.

In December 1970, following the impressive victory of the Awami League in the first national elections held in the country, the military and the PPP should have allowed power to be transferred to the Bengali political party. Instead, both erected all kinds of barriers in the way of the Awami League which eventually led to the break-up of the country.

In 1977, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto could have placed trust in the people and allowed free elections to be held in which his party would have won more seats in the National Assembly than any other political party if not an outright majority. Instead, the government opted for a rigged election that upset the opposition. The resulting campaign against Bhutto brought economic chaos and gave another opportunity to the military for getting back to power.

The only exception to the tendency to move in the wrong direction during periods of grave crises was in August 1988 after the death of General Ziaul Haq. Then the military could have intervened again by placing the country under martial law.

Instead, it chose to follow the constitutional route and invited Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the Senate chairman, to take over as acting president. Ghulam Ishaq went ahead and held elections as required by the Constitution. The elections resulted in Benazir Bhutto becoming prime minister, the first woman in the Muslim world to occupy that position.

The country is once again at such a juncture. Which direction it takes will depend upon a number of things, the outcome of each one of which is hard to predict. There are a number of new variables in the Pakistani political situation. These include the ability of the United States to influence events in the country.

The United States, chastened by the ability of the Islamic parties to capture legislatures if free and fair elections are held as in the Palestinian territory, has given up on President George W. Bush’s dream to bring democracy to Muslim lands. Following many political developments in the Middle East, Bush’s dream has been replaced by pragmatism. Given that, would Washington continue to espouse the return of full democracy to Pakistan?

The PPP leadership seems to have concluded that Washington would support some kind of a hybrid system in which the military retained some authority. This is perhaps the reason why Benazir Bhutto spent so much time in New York in the middle of August in her extremely crowded political calendar.

Her strategy appeared to be to use various forums made available to her by the American media and think-tanks in order to put pressure on the Pakistani president. She said that she would not wait beyond the end of August to receive the general’s response to her demands in return for her support to the president.

In a “newsmaker” interview with Margaret Warner of the Public Broadcasting Service on August 20, she revealed the contours of what could be an understanding with President Pervez Musharraf. She told Warner that she had evolved a complicated formula that would allow General Musharraf’s election first in uniform and later without it. In other words, she was prepared to share power with the president who would continue to draw support from the military.

The Supreme Court has become increasingly assertive and this may impact on its views on the various constitutional issues that pertain to General Musharraf’s wish to get re-elected by the existing assemblies. On August 23, the court decided to allow Mian Nawaz Sharif and Shahbaz Sharif to return to the country, stating that their agreement with the government to stay out for a period of 10 years did not have any legal force.

This introduces another element of uncertainty since the return of the Sharifs may reduce the stature of the official Muslim League. How will the military respond to the string of judgments handed out by the Supreme Court is another question that is hard to answer at this time.

In sum, there are a number of uncertainties that surround Pakistan’s political future. If, in spite of them, the promised elections are held would they lead to a resolution of the deep structural problems the country confronts in the 61st year of its independence?

The problems Pakistan must deal with include, in the field of economics, growing concerns about the widening personal and regional income disparities. The impressive GDP growth of the last five years has occurred because of the investments made and activities undertaken that have contributed to widening the gap in the distribution of incomes.

Political distress is usually the outcome when that happens. It was the perception with respect to the concentration of wealth in the 1960s, a decade during which the economy also grew rapidly, that brought closure to the administration headed by President Ayub Khan.

It was the widening income gap between East and West Pakistan that finally led to the separation of the eastern wing and the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent country. Economic policies, in other words, can have significant political consequences. No group of leaders should ignore this important lesson from the country’s history.

There are many issues on the political side as well. By far the most important of these is the political role of the military. By the time Pakistan celebrated its 60th birthday, it had seen more than half of its life under some kind of military domination. It happened because the military was able to pursue foreign policy that brought economic rewards in the form of American development aid. Aid compensated for the low rates of domestic resource generation.

It was available in large amounts when the country followed the United States; it was severely cut down when Washington had no use for Islamabad. This roller coaster ride is not healthy for the economy. To get off the roller-coaster and move on to a more even course, Pakistan must address a number of structural issues that would make it possible for the country to rely on domestic resources for investment.

This can only be done in the context of a political system that allows wider participation to the people and greater devolution of power to the provinces and institutions of local government.

Then there is the question of Pakistan’s relations with the world outside. As already indicated, leaders belonging to the armed forces have tended to follow foreign policies that brought in economic benefits in the form of foreign aid and also military assistance.

Is this the right approach for the country? More specifically, should Pakistan remain so tied to the United States that a remark by one of the more than a dozen contenders for the American presidency can shake the country? A government that draws its support from the people is likely to pursue a more balanced approach in foreign affairs.

By far the most important problem the country must address is the rise of Islamic extremism and militancy in the country. Is the attraction in the Muslim world for extremism the consequence of political systems that don’t permit popular participation?

During this time the country has been governed by those who believed in highly constrained rather than open political systems. There was fear that taking the top off the bottle would release the pressure and bring the Islamists to power.

If elections are held would the political parties be able to bring benefit to the increasingly restive population? I will begin to address this question next week.

The phantom soldiers at the Lal Masjid

IN the first week of August 1965, in the early hours of the morning, Indian soldiers guarding a vital bridge in Indian-held Kashmir (IHK) came under a sudden attack from close quarters. Five minutes later, they and their bridge were no more.

On a sultry night in September 1965, a convoy of heavy trailers carrying tanks was moving on a road in IHK when it suddenly came under rocket and machine gun fire. A dozen tanks exploded and burst into flames.

In early December 1971, shortly after midnight, a column of Indian infantry was moving towards the front in IHK to reinforce one of their positions that was under attack, when it was hit from a flank by sweeping machine gun fire. Within minutes of the attack, the column had perished.

In all three cases the phantom soldiers who conducted these attacks were the chosen ones of the Pakistan Army — commandos of the Special Service Group (SSG). Skilled in the use of weapons, they handle machine guns, sub-machine guns and pistols as if these were an extension of their hands, firing from the hip with speed and accuracy, even on the move. They are masters of the close quarter battle.

Designed to conduct operations behind the enemy lines, SSG also specialises in guerrilla, anti-guerrilla and anti-terrorist operations. Of these, the most demanding operations are the ones that are carried out deep behind the enemy lines. Such operations require the highest state of physical and mental toughness, resourcefulness, and the ability to remain cool and motivated, far beyond the bounds of conventional human endurance.

Selection for service with the SSG is, therefore, tough. Volunteers from all over the army apply but two-thirds are rejected during the selection phase, and one-third of the selected during the training phase. Those who finally make it, earn the distinction to wear the maroon beret and the coveted SSG badge on their chest. These men are too precious to be wasted on activities of conventional soldiers, yet those who should know better, continue to misuse them on guard duties and personal security functions.

Occasionally, SSG troops too, tend to misuse their skills! One of the SSG units was due to be inspected by a GHQ team. There was a growing sense of anxiety in the unit as many of their jeeps had become unserviceable for want of spare parts, and these were not forthcoming. They solved the problem their way. A night before the inspection, a few men stealthily penetrated the motor park of an artillery unit, some 20 kilometres away, and went about removing the required parts from the jeeps parked there, quickly and in silence. Job done, they returned to base, and come inspection time, the unserviceable jeeps were ready and running.

The following morning, when the commanding officer of the artillery unit learned that his jeeps had been mysteriously cannibalised, he nearly collapsed and had to undergo overnight hospitalisation. SSG commandos are trained to “find a way or make one” — they had done just that…but GHQ was not amused.

Conducted in five phases (planning, preparation, infiltration, attack, and exfiltration), an SSG operation depends entirely on the achievement of surprise to succeed. When the plan is not based on precise and accurate intelligence, the element of surprise is compromised, as happened to the SSG operations in September 1965 against the Indian airbases at Pathankot, Adampur and Halwara. Planned hastily and based on outdated intelligence and maps, they had ended in disaster. The topographical changes that had taken place in the area of operations, were missing from the maps.

The result was that most of the commandos had landed in settlements that were not supposed to be there. As a consequence, within minutes of their landing, the alarm was raised. With surprise lost, the odds were now stacked against them. The next 48 hours saw them fighting running battles with their pursuers until their ammunition ran out. The cream of the army had been sacrificed in a needless operation against targets that were subsequently taken out by the PAF, many times over.

SSG teams are infiltrated behind the enemy lines either by land, air or sea. Insertion by land is hazardous and time-consuming as it involves crossing the frontlines, whereas the air option, in which the preferred means is by helicopter, is the least hazardous and quickest.

But when helicopter insertion is precluded, freefall parachutes are used to make either HALO (high altitude, low opening) or HAHO (high altitude, high opening) jumps. HALO jumps are made inside the enemy territory, with the parachute being opened low, while HAHO jumps are made inside one’s own territory close to the border, with the parachute being opened high, and then manoeuvred towards the area designated for landing inside the enemy territory.

Having landed, whether by helicopter or parachute, they begin the final approach to the target, and once they get within striking distance, all hell is let loose. Minutes later, they are gone as suddenly as they had come, leaving behind a trail of blood and destruction.

Now begins exfiltration, the most challenging of all phases. The quickest way is extraction by helicopter. But the real challenge starts, especially in the plains, when this is ruled out. It is now that their physical and mental toughness, resourcefulness and the ability to remain cool and motivated, come under severe test, as they struggle to get back across a broad expanse of hostile territory with the enemy in hot pursuit.

SSG is a small force, but when employed correctly, it can create effects on the enemy out of all proportion to its size. When viewed against the fact that the Pakistan army will have to fight a future conventional war outnumbered and win it, SSG is a force multiplier. Therefore, it is best used in support of the army’s strategic offensives to create a strategic impact on the enemy.

For instance, in 1965, if the army had followed up Operation Grand Slam with another offensive in Ravi-Chenab corridor, the SSG could have been employed simultaneously against the headworks on River Ravi and the crossings on River Beas, ahead of the offensive. These actions would have isolated the Ravi-Chenab corridor and delayed the induction of Indian army formations into the Ravi-Beas corridor, thus giving a decisive lead to Pakistani war directors in all the dimensions of operational strategy.

Having missed the opportunity to win the war in 1965, they should have atoned for it by doing the same in October 1971 when the build-up of Indian forces against East Pakistan was well underway. Unfortunately for Pakistan, they missed this opportunity too. In the two wars directed by them, their performance was marked by lack of imagination and daring. Stated simply, they had the force, but did not know how to use it. But, that is another story. Fortunately for Pakistan, the Indian captains of war too, were equally incompetent, if not more.

Operation Silence, the SSG operation against Jamia Hafsa/Lal Masjid complex was quite unlike Operation Nimrod, the British SAS (Special Air Service) operation in May 1980 against six terrorists who had seized the Iranian embassy in London and made 26 people hostage. The SAS had complete information about the terrorists, hostages and the 50-room six-storeyed embassy, and had carried out rehearsals on full size replicas. The result was that the operation involving 50 SAS troops, took only 17 minutes to eliminate the terrorists and rescue the hostages.

On the other hand, the SSG operation against the Jamia Hafsa was launched on what was at best, sketchy information about the people holed up inside the complex. Even today a controversy is raging about the number of people present in the complex at the time of the operation. How many were there and how many among them were hostages? If there were hostages, were they lodged separately, if so, where? How many militants were armed and what weapons were held by them? Where were the militants deployed?

These questions must have been raised by the SSG, but were clearly left unanswered. The fact that none inside the complex survived the attack, clearly shows that the SSG was given to understand that everyone inside was armed and dangerous.

That those inside were able to resist the SSG for so long and inflict casualties on them, is a testimony to their preparadness and grit, as much as it is to the courage, dash and skill of the SSG under adversity.

Revitalising land trade with China

TRADITIONALLY, the total trade between Pakistan and China by the land route has been limited by several factors. The most important has been geographical, as the border between the two countries lies along the Karakoram mountains, which contain many peaks more than 7,500 metres high. The range has served more as a barrier than as a link.

On account of the mountainous terrain and problems of communications, the border regions are sparsely populated and possibilities of gainful employment are limited. On the Pakistan side, some areas were affected by three wars with India, in 1947-48, 1965 and 1971. The Kargil conflict of 1999 also cast its shadow on the Northern Areas. As such, their economic development did not proceed on a continuous basis. The south-western part of Xinjiang, lying in a remote region, was also slow to develop, though it picked up speed following the economic reforms introduced by Deng Xiaoping.The completion of the Karakoram Highway, one of the engineering marvels of the world, and its opening to civilian traffic in 1982 was another major milestone in the opening up and development of this region. Finally, both China and Pakistan initiated programmes of development and economic reform with the start of the 21st century that have transformed the outlook for the once remote regions along their border.

The 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations in 2001 saw visiting Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji launch several mega projects involving the investment of over a billion dollars. These included the Gwadar port, Lakhra coal and several other projects including the modernisation of Pakistan railways and completion of the Saindak project.

As India, backed by the US, seeks to dominate the sea routes of the Indian ocean and western China is already linked to Pakistan by the Karakoram Highway, the Gwadar KKH corridor has acquired great economic importance for trade between the two countries.Since the visit of Premier Wen Jiabao to Pakistan in April 2005, when a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Mutual Assistance was signed, both countries have launched a concerted effort to develop this land route and trade fairs have been organised every year at Kashgar, a traditional centre of trade along the silk route from China to South and Central Asia.

The concept of integrated development of South and Central Asia, with Pakistan and China taking the lead, has caught on and the year 2007, which marked the holding of the third trade fair at Kashgar from June 27 to July 3 was particularly successful on account of measures taken by the presidents of the two countries in 2006 which marked the completion of 55 years of diplomatic relations.

Historically land routes virtually provided the only access to countries for trade exchanges, as animals such as camels, horses and mules were the only carriers in the absence of mechanised transport such as railways or motorised vehicles.

From the 19th century onwards the pattern of trade became sophisticated when steam, coal and liquid fuels were mobilised and a spate of inventions facilitated transport. Land routes slowly became secondary as bulk transportation became the main requirement of expanding global commerce. Preference shifted to sea and air transport for internal as well as foreign trade.

China has witnessed all the stages of the evolution of transportation, starting with the silk route of antiquity, then greater use of oceans, followed by mechanised transportation by land, sea and air. As environmental concerns grow, China, home to the world’s second largest economy, is again turning to greater reliance on land routes. Its location at the heart of the world’s biggest land mass, confers a special role on it, notably on the Xinjiang region that adjoins Central Asia, West Asia and South Asia.

The land routes now being developed, notably from the Arabian Sea to Xinjiang across Pakistan, hold the promise of becoming a major corridor for energy development. With older ports becoming congested, Gwadar offers deep-sea anchorage to ships and tankers close to the exit from the oil-rich Persian Gulf, containing two-thirds of the oil and gas reserves of the world to the Arabian Sea. An infrastructure of highways links up to the Karakoram Highway which is being upgraded into a year-round double-track road.

Chinese engineers and planners are also hoping to lay a railway track along the highway to connect with Pakistan’s railway system near Abbottabad, the southern terminus of KKH. With Pakistan Railways linked to Iran, from where connection is planned to the portion linked to Turkey and Europe, the land route gets extended to western markets.

The Kashgar-Abbottabad land route has the potential of facilitating development and progress not only in Pakistan and western China but also in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.

The land route will also facilitate transfer of technology and investment from China into Pakistan, and lead to increased tourism, cultural interaction and people-to-people contacts. Since the increase of Sino-Pakistan contacts by the land route, the scope of relations has expanded and so has the potential, as the rapid increase over the past three years has shown.

As a continuation of the third fair at Kashgar, the Kashgar authorities plan to organise a third fair at Lahore in October 2007. The first two fairs were held at Karachi in 2005 and Lahore in 2006, and contributed to increased economic interaction.

On the basis of the lessons learnt there will be time to address many practical problems that were identified at a seminar on the land route held at Kashgar on June 30, 2007. The commissioner of the Kashgar prefecture, which has a population of four million (92 per cent Muslim), was confident that the target of achieving a five times increase in trade from 2006, announced by President Hu Jintao in Islamabad on November 24 would be reached specially through the full development of the land route. This was both a challenge and an opportunity, requiring concerted and joint efforts by both sides to overcome difficulties.

The advantages of close proximity offered by territorial contiguity can be availed not only to achieve rapid increase in trade but also to enhance scientific and technical cooperation in many areas. Some complementarities already exist while others can be developed, specially between the border areas, and in the region served by the Gwadar-KKH corridor.

The need for joint ventures is obvious as is that for reducing border formalities. Some lessons were learnt this year, and given the close political and strategic relations, there will continue to be a strong impetus for improving facilities and travel services.

The existing frequency of flights between the border areas is proving insufficient and eventually PIA also must resume services to Xinjiang as tourism and trade pick up.

The range of exports from Pakistan would have to increase dramatically and our private sector should capitalise on the Chinese demand for items such as fruit, building materials and even handicrafts. Visas should be liberalised and border passes should be issued valid for Islamabad and Urumqi.

The enforcement of duty free trade and encouragement of cultural and educational exchanges in a remarkably scenic part of the world with a rich historical heritage should make the Sino-Pakistan border areas into economically vibrant and commercially dynamic regions of Asia.