Dealing with the militants

PRIME Minister Gilani presided over a meeting of ministers and other officials on June 25 to devise ways of subduing the militants, mostly the Taliban, in the NWFP.

The Taliban used to be located mainly in our northwestern tribal region, but of late they have spread to other places in the province and the country. They are Islamic fundamentalists, extremists and terrorists. They have two main objectives. First they want to expel American presence and influence from Afghanistan. To this end they attack the American and Afghan government forces in that country.

They want the government of Pakistan to dissociate itself from the American campaign against them. Since it will not do so, they regard it as a friend of their enemy and, therefore, an enemy. But their hostility to the state of Pakistan will not cease even if it abandons its American connection. For their second objective is to have Islamic law and morality, as they know them, to be enforced in this country.

Islamic law and morality have already been made part of our constitution and law. But they have not been fully enforced. Nor is it likely that any future government, emerging from the electoral process or military intervention, will enforce them. Knowing this to be the case, the Taliban aim to do the job themselves; by taking charge of governance in Pakistan.

They are enforcing Islamic law and morality in parts of the NWFP that they control. They go into other areas where they harass and intimidate residents. They close, demolish or burn down music shops and video stores, barber shops, cinema houses and other places of entertainment, and schools for girls. They force men and women to wear clothing consistent with their notions of modesty. They require Muslims to observe all the Islamic practices named in the Shariah and visit horrible physical violence upon those who defy them.

Since they want to overthrow the current political system and take power, they are in effect at war with the state of Pakistan. They attack civil, paramilitary, and military personnel, establishments and installations. They resort to kidnapping, arson, and murder and also kill persons who they suspect are pro-government. They have already taken a fair amount of Pakistani territory and they are poised to take more.

Bewildering reports appeared in this newspaper on June 25 and 26, saying that the Taliban were assembling their forces in the vicinity of Peshawar — the capital of NWFP and home to the army’s Eleventh Corps, Frontier Corps, Frontier Constabulary and the provincial police headquarters — to attack the city and that it was in serious danger of falling to them. The Taliban have grown into a formidable force, equipped with modern weapons and trained in their deployment.

Successive governments in Pakistan have been ambivalent, indecisive, and timid in dealing with the militants. This continues to be the case. The prime minister’s meeting, referred to above, came up with a strategy, apparently relating to the tribal areas, that contains the following elements:

(1) ‘Political engagement’ of the people through their elected representatives (probably meaning that they should be persuaded to reject the Taliban and their advocacies). This may be wishful thinking.

(2) Large scale economic and social development such as education, health, infrastructure, small industry, calls for private investment.

(3) Military operation following the principle that minimum force is to be employed and collateral damage is to be avoided.

(4) Tribal customs and traditions are to be respected by all concerned (meaning that the law of Pakistan will not apply in this area).

The army chief will be the principal agent for dealing with the militants, and he will decide which of the elements in the government’s strategy are to be employed. The governor of the NWFP will handle the political component of the strategy in consultation with the chief minister, federal officials, tribal leaders, and ‘important’ politicians.

The prime minister’s announcement included several platitudes:

(1) the writ of the state must be honoured in all places

(2) the tribes are not to attack personnel and positions belonging to the military and law enforcement agencies

(3) the tribal leaders must fulfil the engagements they have made with the government;

(4) Pakistani territory will not be used to make trouble for a neighbouring country, especially Afghanistan;

(5) the government will abide by the accord and commitments it has made with the Taliban in Swat. (These stipulations are platitudes because none of them will actually work.)

Except in the case of Swat, much of which seems to have been surrendered to Maulvi Fazlullah, I am not aware of any accords the government has made with the Taliban. Those made in the future will probably be violated. The political component of the strategy described above is too nebulous to yield any wholesome result. Economic and social development in the tribal areas is a great idea but it is one that will take years to carry out. Plans have to be made, projects identified, details settled; determinations made as to the kind, number and location of schools, clinics, roads and bridges, recruitment and training of the personnel needed to operate them. The likelihood is that in the absence of this preparatory work, funds professedly allocated for development will actually be used to buy the cooperation or acquiescence of the government’s opponents in the area.

The view is shared by many that America’s war with the Taliban is not our war, and that by joining it our government has been killing our own people. The proponents of this view evidently regarded the Taliban as ‘our own people’. The problem is that the Taliban do not and will not, even if our American connection is broken, treat the generality of Pakistanis as their people. They think of us as nominal Muslims, hypocrites, worse than infidels. They have no interest in our survival and well-being as individuals or as a state.

As noted above, they are at war with the state of Pakistan. There can be no negotiations and accords with them, for they do not believe in bargaining and compromise. They want total victory. If they agree to a pause in fighting, that will only be to replenish their forces. The state of Pakistan cannot respond to this war, which they have imposed on it, except by fighting back. And fight back it must with adequate force, enough to get them out of our lives, and do so without equivocation.

The writer, professor emeritus at the University of Massachusetts, was until recently visiting professor at the Lahore School of Economics.

anwarsyed@.cox.net

Discontent in provinces

THE share of the provinces in national revenues and the relationship between local councils and provincial governments are two long festering issues that call for an early and permanent settlement to stem the rising tide of ethnic discontent and the economic grievances of smaller provinces.

Common religion just could not hold the federation together once the Bengalis finally determined that they were being denied not only a fair share in the national income and services but their language and literature and their art and culture were also threatened by an overawing central authority and the ideologues it patronised. Once the disaffection in any other region of the country reaches the limits it had in East Pakistan, neither religious sentiment nor the might of the armed forces would be able to prevent yet another secession just as they couldn’t in 1971.

More so because, in the intervening years, militancy has made Islam more of a divisive force than a binding one. The argument, often advanced, that the secessionists next time round would be smaller in number and logistics will not be a problem in suppressing violent dissent is derisive. The offence it causes can ignite the smouldering fires sooner than imagined.

The raison d’etre of a federation, and the guarantee for it to last, lies in the consent of the constituent units. Under duress even colonial empires have lasted for centuries. The people of no region or cultural group in today’s Pakistan would submit to injustice or discrimination in any form just to keep the Islamic republic intact. Their other identities like race and language now outweigh their Islamic identity which, in any case, stands ravaged by violent schisms.

This is true of all people but more particularly of the Baloch who have a secular outlook on life. Though akin to Jinnah’s thinking, it makes them pariahs in the eyes of today’s hard core Islamists. And it is in Balochistan that the feeling of economic deprivation and political persecution runs deeper than in any other part of the country. The issue for the ultranationalists among the Baloch is no longer autonomy but independence.

The contemplated amendments in the constitution for greater autonomy and larger assignment of resources to the provinces under the overdue National Finance Commission (NFC) award, therefore, must take into account the changed reality of Pakistan no longer being a unitary Islamic state but a federation of diverse identities and competing economic interests.

There is not much that can be done in legal or material terms to make the provinces politically or culturally more autonomous except to resist the recurring martial laws which tend to curtail whatever little legislative or administrative independence the provinces have. The loss is felt more acutely in Sindh and Balochistan as they have very little representation in the armed forces.

However, the autonomy is chiefly about control over natural resources and power to levy and collect taxes. And that is what makes the provinces — big and small — equally dependent on the centre reducing the federation, all but in name, to a unitary state. The agriculturally rich Punjab and industrialised Sindh are no less dependent than Balochistan and the NWFP. Only they have a larger say.

All the profitable natural resources — oil, gas and water — are controlled by the central government. So is taxation — incomes tax, custom and excise, sales tax — and income yielding commercial activity like seaports, highways, airlines, railways, and telecommunications and banking services. The chief source of income for the provinces is not the taxes they levy and collect or the profits earned from the services they provide but the share they get from the centre’s divisible tax pool and some other grants and loans.

The argument in the NFC — prolonged and fractious — is all about the basis on which the share of each province in the divisible pool should be fixed. Ultimately, and grudgingly, the only basis so far agreed is the population. The award of 1996, which is still operative though it expired in 2001, was based on population as were the previous awards.

Balochistan always presses for weight to be given to its vast area and Sindh for the large taxes its ports, industry, commerce and banks generate. Punjab counters it by arguing that taxes accrue from consumption and that is mostly in Punjab. The place of collection is irrelevant. The NWFP wants consideration for the backwardness of its mountainous regions. The issues are intractable. Sindh’s ebullient information minister may allege betrayal and the more seasoned chief minister may talk of reconstituting the NFC (composition is given in the constitution itself) but the population basis is unlikely to undergo any substantial change.

Even if a particular province or every province gets a bit more going by the diverse criteria it would still not help the cause of autonomy. The provinces would still be queuing up for dole from Islamabad. The only way for the provinces to get out of this humiliating position is to ask for more taxes, especially the sales tax both on goods and services, to be assigned to them by amending the constitution. Of that the possibility is remote and the capacity of the provinces to administer taxes is also questionable. All that the provinces currently can do is to collectively demand a larger share in the divisible tax pool. Balochistan and Sindh would also gain much by a larger share in the well-head royalty on oil and gas.

Now that the NFC is likely to assemble soon — though six years late — there is a need to adopt a realistic attitude. Hollering betrayal, as the Sindh ministers do, will not help nor will Mumtaz Bhutto’s extreme stance that the provinces should levy and collect all taxes and give a part to the centre. Amendments to the constitution to make the provinces financially independent of the centre, or at least less dependent, should stand apart as a medium-term goal.

About the conflict between district governments and provincial governments, all that can be said here is that Musharraf’s devolution plan was conceived in vengeance with a motive that was personal and was thoughtlessly implemented by an obedient general. The system should not be abolished totally as a vengeful reaction with a political motive. The municipal and rural development content of the system needs to be safeguarded. In any case, public representatives and administrative experts should be consulted before making any change.

kunwaridris@hotmail.com

Pakistan turns into Toba Tek Singh

PAKISTAN is like an airplane lost in a dark ominous cloud, running on autopilot. Its coordinates and destination were set by the previous crew members who have been forced to eject or have parachuted out.

Passengers with gurgling stomachs and sweaty brows appear paralysed by the mayhem. They have seen a stream of crew members — mostly shady hunks in khakis with the occasional trustworthy face — pushed off the plane or bail out with a parachute. The captain, Asif Zardari, took over when his wife was forced off the aircraft. The first officer, Nawaz Sharif, is still hanging on propped up by his benefactor Gen Ziaul Haq. CIA operatives on board, as passengers learnt later, had forced Zia to jump off with a crate of mangoes tied to him.

Every so often passengers are shown glimpses of the two self-assured, grinning pilots to reassure them that the plane is out of harm’s way. A sharp journalist on flight notes the lack of sparkle and empathy in their eyes and wonders if their bright smiles are a sham.

Air traffic control is in the hands of Gen Pervez Musharraf supported by American engineers. They built the autopilot and are the only people with the flight plan. Suddenly, a violent pounding on the door disturbs the peace inside the locked control room. Outside, the deposed Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry and Aitzaz Ahsan having caught wind of the plot are trying to force their way in.

Meanwhile absolute pandemonium reigns in the cabin. To avoid further ruckus, the cool-headed flight purser Saadat Hasan Manto puts on the film ‘Toba Tek Singh’, a classic drama about the confusion at the time of Partition when Hindu lunatics in a city in Punjab were repatriated to India. Suddenly there is absolute quiet as passengers fix their eyes on the monitor before them. This is similar to the reassurance of seeing oneself in the mirror every morning. ‘That’s me, that face is mine, I have survived the night!’ you tell yourself. And the few who were lost in the plot finally begin to take in the manner in which the story mirrors their own situation.

The rest of the world retains an interest in the future of this unstable flight — an unfolding drama which is as surreal when viewed from down below as it is onboard. Some characters in the drama are highlighted by the international press. The New York Times’ Sunday magazine elaborates on the life and times of Aitzaz Ahsan. He also makes it to the Prospect magazine’s list of the top100 global intellectuals. In The New York Times, Ahsan talks about himself being the virtual deputy prime minister in Benazir Bhutto’s cabinet after Ziaul Haq was killed in 1988. Inexperience and other flaws of Bhutto mixed with serious interference by the army prevented significant headway.

The president fired the government in 1990 and Nawaz Sharif stepped in and got the courts to try Bhutto and her husband, Zardari. They were defended in court by Ahsan, who now expresses disdain for Benazir and has little doubt about the corruption of the couple which, he said, was evident by their lifestyle and expenditures. He nonetheless remains a member of the party, which is clearly non-democratic within its ranks. Interestingly, no one knows how he balances his alliances.

Justice Iftikhar, who originally approved of Gen Musharraf’s takeover in 1999, has redeemed himself through his activist role in highlighting the cause of countless Pakistanis who disappeared because of the ‘war on terror’. This exposure has earned him the ire of the Americans. He also exposed and thus thwarted the deal to sell the national steel mill to a crony of the Citibanker-turned-prime minister, Shaukat Aziz, who is now safe in America after his five-year stint in a foreign land. The chief justice also helped to stop the New Murree project which would have replaced a pristine pine forest in the hills with luxury hotels and villas for the filthy rich.

Meanwhile as the airborne drama of Pakistan unfolds, the common citizen is burdened with sky-rocketing prices of food and other commodities, as well as a serious shortage of power coupled with severe eco-disasters. And the brutal wheel of poverty spins some more. Take the Afghan refugee on his nightly route, or the scavenger who gathers discarded plastic bottles from various garbage dumps. He earns a sorry Rs60 to Rs100 daily, a sum far below the requirements of basic survival.

The plane can only fly safely if Pakistanis wake up to the reality of their situation and begin to change things for the better. Good sense, courage and political will are levers that will cancel the autopilot and ensure that the plane is in safe hands for evermore.

The writer is an Islamabad-based physicist.