FORTUNATELY for our prime minister, the Chinese are a polite people, especially towards guests. Had they been a more crass nation, somebody might have laughed in his face when he recently told his hosts in Beijing that Pakistan had the ideal investment climate.

Considering that several Chinese engineers have been killed by terrorists while working on various projects in Pakistan, we can hardly blame their government for taking Shaukat Aziz’s words with a large pinch of salt. This is the mantra he has been chanting on each of his unending overseas visits. Surely by now somebody should have told him how ridiculous he sounds in view of what’s happening back home.

A fortnight ago, in its leading article on Pakistan, The Economist wrote: “If sending the army into the tribal areas has failed, and if goading one bunch of Islamists into slaughtering another is hardly a long-term option, what should Pakistan do? First, it needs to own up to the real problem. Swathes of the tribal areas are largely ungoverned, constituting less a failed state than a place where the state, from British colonial days to the present, has hardly even tried…

“His (General Musharraf’s) difficulties are compounded because like military regimes throughout Pakistan’s history, he finds Islamic extremists easier to deal with than secular opposition parties. There are also suspicions that some elements in Pakistan still hope for a friendly regime in Kabul, and still think Pakistan’s best Afghan friends remain the Taliban…”

Elsewhere in the same issue of the weekly, its correspondent writes in an article on Pakistan:

“…A less obscure struggle was launched in Islamabad on April 6th by a mullah named Abdul Aziz. He gave the government a month to close the capital’s brothels and music shops, and tear down advertisements depicting women. He also declared Sharia law within the high walls of his mosque and the adjoining madressah. If the government were to respond with force, he promised it suicide bombings…”Thus, apart from armed uprisings in Balochistan and the tribal areas, we have an insurrection in the capital itself. Given this complete disregard for the writ of the state that seems to be spreading across the country, Mr Shaukat Aziz should not be too disappointed if his appeal for foreign direct investment does not result in a flood of projects and funds. Being a banker himself, he should understand that the first thing investors look for is security for their staff and their capital.

The theme of creeping Talibanisation raised by The Economist was echoed in a TV programme called ‘Between the Military and Mullahs’ last week. Aired by Channel 4 in the UK and written and narrated by Ziauddin Sardar, it takes viewers on an extensive tour of Pakistan, and shows them how the army and the mullahs are tearing the country apart. Mr Sardar is a well-known writer and commentator, and the hour-long programme was shown at primetime, so it was probably watched by millions.

One of the points the narrator makes is that after 9/11, the army has been forced to take on the religious extremists, and this has dented the traditional partnership between the military and the mullahs, posing a grave threat to the fabric of the state. He also explores the extent to which the army has exploited the country for the sake of its officer corps. In one telling image, he empties a shopping bag before the camera, itemising the objects he has bought. All of them were manufactured in factories tied in one way or another to the military. He also points to an army-run bank in the background.

We in Pakistan do not need foreigners to tell us what the military-mullah nexus has done to our country. However, it is true that we have gradually become so accustomed to the present dismal state of affairs that we often forget that it is not the norm for armies to colonise their own countries. Or, indeed, for the clergy to tell us how to live our lives.

In an extreme scenario, perhaps the only justification for the army to intervene in the running of a state is the complete breakdown in the rule of law. But if anything, our army has contributed to this breakdown by its policies and actions. When Musharraf seized power in 1999, Pakistan might not have been entirely peaceful, but things were certainly not as bad as they are today.

In 1964, Nelson Mandela and several other African National Congress members were put on trial for leading an underground campaign against the apartheid South African state. In one of the great speeches of the 20th century, Mandela admitted taking recourse to violence, saying: “…Each (government-inspired) disturbance pointed to the inevitable growth among Africans of the belief that violence was the only way out — it showed that a government which uses force to maintain its rule teaches the oppressed to use force to oppose it.”

And this is the heart of the matter. When a government has no legitimacy — as Musharraf’s does not — it uses force to enforce its edict. But when people cannot get a hearing through the democratic process, they have no option but to take to the streets, and, when the state still refuses to pay heed, resort to violence. This is not a justification for taking up arms, only an explanation. Nevertheless, Musharraf needs to understand that consensus-building, while often a slow and tedious process, works better in the long run than the gruff, gung-ho mannerisms of the sergeant-major in boot camp.

As the debate about Musharraf’s uniform continues, perhaps it is time he thought seriously about retirement from both politics and the army. For all his energy and enthusiasm, the fact is that he lacks the flexibility to make the compromises necessary in the political arena. This October, he will have spent eight years in the presidency. This is about equal to the combined stints Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto have served as prime minister. And he has been army chief for a decade now. High time fresh blood was inducted in both the positions he currently holds.

After all, nobody is indispensable. More and more, Musharraf is seen as a part of the problem, so he can’t be part of the solution.