At what point does concern and interest by one country in another’s affairs become intrusive meddling? When does advice become arm-twisting? Where do diplomats cross the line between expressing their point of view and interfering in the internal affairs of the state they are accredited to?

These are questions that are being asked in Pakistan at a time when the nation is delicately poised between nearly nine years of authoritarian rule and democracy. Many politicians and editorial writers feel that some diplomats and foreign leaders have been engaging in public and behind-the-scene bullying to ensure that past policies followed by Musharraf’s regime are continued by the government that will emerge soon.

To some extent, it is the duty of foreign envoys to establish cordial links with the ruling party and the opposition in the countries where they are based. These contacts are an ongoing and essential part of their job. And countries that loom large on the economic and political horizon of the host nation have a large interest in its stability, welfare and policies. “He who pays the piper calls the tune” is an old adage. To this extent, the American involvement in the recent Pakistani elections and their fallout is legitimate and understandable. After all, Washington has a large investment to protect in Islamabad, and if American diplomats are contacting leaders of the parties that have emerged victorious, they are only doing their job.

However, when Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice says her government will “continue dealing with President Musharraf”, she is clearly out of line. Surely she is aware that under the Pakistani constitution, the President has no executive powers, and certainly does not maintain direct contacts with any foreign power. Diplomatic relations are conducted by the government, and specifically by the PM and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Visiting leaders pay courtesy calls on the President, but matters of substance are not brought up as he does not have the authority to negotiate, or to discuss policy with representatives of other countries.

The vast powers Musharraf has exercised over the last nine years were usurped first by his 1999 coup, and then by having a puppet as a prime minister from 2002 onwards.

The last parliament served as a rubber stamp for his acts, and was certainly not an independent institution. The world, and particularly the United States, had become accustomed to think of Musharraf as Pakistan’s de facto and de jure executive authority. So instead of dealing with the country through its prime minister and the Foreign Office, foreign powers dealt with Musharraf and his coterie of generals and civilian advisors.

But the recent elections have changed this ad hoc arrangement, and the world must get used to the new realities. If by some superhuman act of political jugglery, Musharraf is to hang on, he must get used to the idea that from now on, he is a spare wheel that, hopefully, will not be required, and will stay out of sight in the car. He is no longer the driver, or even a passenger.

Of course it is easier for foreigners to deal with a single leader rather than contend with a gamut of competing power centres. Just as overseas investors ask for a ‘one window operation’, so too do foreign powers prefer contacts with one all-powerful leader who can deliver. The recent fiasco over a major nuclear agreement between the US and India is a case in point. Although New Delhi had negotiated what, on the face of it, was a highly beneficial deal with Washington, it was torpedoed by a fractious Parliament which saw it as being against Indian interests.

Ever since 9/11 and his famous U-turn over the Taliban, Musharraf has been Bush’s main man in the ‘war on terror’. Everybody in Washington from the President down to the assistant undersecretary at the State Department had got used to picking up the phone and chatting with Musharraf.

Now they will all have to learn there is a new pecking order in Islamabad, and Musharraf’s telephone number has been de-listed.

So great has Musharraf’s dependence been on American support that he built up his image as somebody who was indispensable to US interests in the region. He was sure his powerful friends in Washington would protect him from any political threat. And when they coaxed him to enter into a dialogue with Benazir Bhutto over a possible power-sharing deal, he reluctantly went along in the knowledge that when push came to shove, the Americans would support him against her.

In the event, even his American friends were unable to predict or prevent the human tide of Pakistanis who expressed their intense dissatisfaction with Musharraf, his party and his policies on Feb18. As a result, Washington is now obliged to contemplate life after Musharraf, and it is not a pleasant scenario.

Although Asif Zardari has made some soothing noises, Nawaz Sharif is adamant that Musharraf is history. Both leaders have spoken of adopting a different approach to the escalating violence in the tribal areas. In particular, Washington is concerned about Nawaz Sharif’s previous views on Islamic fundamentalism. But Americans can draw comfort from the fact that both leaders have clearly stated that they will not permit terrorism to ravage Pakistan as it has done for the last few years.

In any case, much will change, but the probable emergence of a secular government in the NWFP and the rejection of mullahs there should be seen as another huge plus in Washington. Under Musharraf, his erstwhile MMA supporters in the province prevented the police and paramilitary forces from acting against extremists.

The ANP-led government will, hopefully, adopt a more robust stance, apart from addressing the political and economic issues that have given rise to this phenomenon.

All in all, the West needs to see recent developments in Pakistan as an encouraging victory for moderate forces.

In order to engage constructively with the government that is formed, the Americans need to consciously stop thinking that Musharraf still has a role to play. In international relations, individuals come and go. Only national interests are permanent.