After the rejection of the referendum offer, Bhutto realised that there was no way out except by reaching some sort of agreement that could lead to the resumption of talks. He was haunted by the thought that if everything failed he would have to relinquish power and once he was out, which was the aim of the opposition, he would perhaps not be able to regain power. He recalled the advice of the Russian envoy, Sarvar Asimov, who told him not to quit. However, there had to be some means, no matter how tenuous, that could convince the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) to reconsider a proposal of talks.

Bhutto had earlier used all possible channels to build bridges but owing to either his approach or the ‘unacceptable’ demands of the PNA, all had failed, despite the overwhelming need for such talks. The impasse also troubled friendly Muslim countries which were taking a keen interest in the political crisis. Both Kuwait’s envoy, Rashid Sultan, and Saudi envoy, Riazul Khatib, appeared dismayed but continued to reassure the PNA leadership that talks were the only way to salvage the ever-deteriorating situation. More pressure came from the Shah of Iran who sent his Foreign Minister, Hoshung Ansari, and pressed Bhutto not to delay an agreement with the opposition.

Apparently there was no option left for Bhutto except to make a move to renew peace efforts. He remembered an old foe, the Kashmiri leader Sardar Abdul Qayyum, who wasted no chance to express his enmity with Bhutto. The day Bhutto took over as president in 1971, Sardar Qayyum was elected president of Azad Jammu and Kashmir. He was a supporter of the campaign aimed at bringing an Islamic system in AJK. Maintaining an ideological difference with Bhutto, he had always secured the support of army generals. However, in 1975 he quit as president and bolstered ties with the opposition. With the formation of the PNA in 1977, he joined it and was jailed like other PNA leaders. Bhutto thought that Sardar might bring the PNA back to the talks table or at least create an atmosphere leading to negotiations.

Sardar Qayyum knew his worth and decided to fully exploit it and in the final run lead to acquiring his old Kashmiri status. Since things were to be put on a faster track, Qayyum was released from jail on May 18 and was asked to undertake a hectic campaign to bring the PNA leadership to the talks. He was provided an aircraft and he flew into Karachi, where he called on the PNA leaders detained in Karachi and Garhi Khairo, then dashed to Dadu, where he met Prof Ghafoor in the District Jail. In the late evening he consulted Chaudhry Zahoor Illahi who was jailed in Karachi, flew to Okara to call on Asghar Khan, followed by a meeting with Jamaat-i-Islami chief Maulana Maudoodi and returned to Rawalpindi the next morning where he reported to Mufti Mahmood at Sihala camp jail.

As a result of Sardar’s whirlwind tour all the leaders agreed that while Bhutto’s referendum option would be ignored, talks would be resumed in order to reach an amicable solution and bring an end to the situation that had been creating a panic among the citizens for over eight weeks.

The former air chief Asghar Khan had reservations about the parleys, and had in fact been eyeing Bhutto’s position. Secondly, he still hoped that his letter to the armed forces would bear fruit and they could interfere; this made it improper for him to enter into negotiations. On Bhutto’s insistence, Sardar Qayyum dashed to Hyderabad to hold talks with Wali Khan and Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, who were detained there, before calling back on Chaudhry Zahoor Illahi in Karachi. Winding up his reconciliatory mission Sardar Qayyum reached Rawalpindi on May 22, met the PNA chief at Sihala and finally reported to Bhutto. The envoys of the Muslim countries who were kept abreast of the developments, seemed satisfied and wished the project success. As a result of these efforts it became clear on May 25 that talks would resume. Mufti Mahmood, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and Prof Ghafoor Ahmad would form the negotiating team of the PNA; Pir Pagara had already decided to oversee but not to take an active part in the talks.

At this stage Bhutto felt overwhelmed by the thought that bringing the PNA leadership to talks was his first success and it would ensure that his status as the legal prime minister had been accepted. He was also hopeful that the PNA would give everything in writing denoting that ‘the request for talks came from the PNA’. The Saudi ambassador Riazul Khatib was so involved in the process that he actually went to Sihala and came back with a letter from Mufti Mahmood confirming that they wanted to enter into a dialogue with the government. The letter reminded Bhutto of proposals made earlier, i.e. release of workers arrested during the campaign, withdrawal of cases against them, appropriate financial assistance to the affected people, lifting of martial law, release of arrested leaders and an end to emergency and to negative propaganda against the PNA and lifting of press curbs.

This was on the evening of May 27, creating a hope for talks in the near future.

Next week: The leaders debate whether to go for re-polling or re-election, while Ziaul Haq denies that he intends to take over shaikhaziz38@gmail.com