The ‘harb’ at home
ANALOGIES are inexact. Comparisons quickly become clichéd. Afghanistan was not exactly Vietnam, and Somalia and Syria are not exactly Afghanistan. But it is also true that while history (to paraphrase Mark Twain) does not precisely repeat itself, it certainly does rhyme.
It’s doing that right now in Syria, which has become, as Afghanistan did years ago, a rallying point for radicals. And just as Afghanistan provided the petri dish where the bacillus of Al Qaeda first gestated, Syria is the new breeding and testing ground for the latest incarnation of this transnational phenomenon.
Blame it on, among other things, the flypaper strategy. A retrospective justification for the US invasion of Iraq, here’s how it went: by having a US presence in Iraq, militants who wanted to attack the US would flock to Iraq instead of plotting to attack the US homeland.
The US military was thus the paper, and the militants were the flies. No one bothered to ask the Iraqis how they felt about being ground zero for this kind of experiment. The liberated tend to have little say in these matters. No one calculated whether more flies were being created than were being caught.
Al Qaeda survived, albeit not in its former shape. Its leadership scattered and decimated, it was no longer capable of carrying out complex international assaults against the West. The Americans remained targets of opportunity but the real enemy was closer at hand.
This was not so much new but a return to the old. Traditionally, the ‘near enemy’ was the oppressive Arab state. The ‘far’ enemy was the West; the forces that kept those regimes in power. Osama’s choice to target primarily the US was a departure from tradition, and was by traditionalist jihadis.
That is now largely of academic interest. Al Qaeda 2.0 survived in Iraq in a viciously sectarian incarnation; now more a loose franchise than a traditional corporation. Since then the black flags have been seen wherever in the Muslim world a vacuum has appeared or an opportunity has arisen: in Mali, Libya and of course in the tribal areas of Pakistan.
It may have just carried on that way, with Al Qaeda limited to scattered theatres, its increasingly brutal tactics creating more opponents than recruits. But then two events took place. The first was the Arab Spring. To begin with, this seemed like AQ’s death knell: the birth of democracy in the Arab world put the lie to the argument that the only way to replace moribund regimes was through a violent Islamist revolution.
Indeed, Al Qaeda central seemed deeply confused about the Spring, as evidenced in its messaging. But then came the Egyptian counter-revolution, spurred by the Muslim Brotherhood’s critical, and very stupid, overreach.
Al Qaeda had its ‘I told you so’ moment, its ideological space. The physical space came thanks to Syria, where street protests quickly became armed rebellion. The Free Syrian Army was slowly but surely replaced by what is now a largely Islamist uprising.
While some fly the jihadi colours simply because it makes it easier to attract funding (secular nationalism isn’t very sellable), there are groups like the Islamic State in Syria (an outgrowth of Iraqi Al Qaeda) and Jabaht Al Nusra, which openly fly the Al Qaeda flag and are among the most effective fighting forces on the ground.
They are also openly and viciously sectarian, something that will have severe consequences for the entire region for years to come. Marry this phenomenon to the increased Iranian and Hezbollah involvement and you have the greater Middle Eastern war unfolding.
And, just like in Afghanistan, the ranks of the extremists are bolstered by foreign fighters who number close to 11,000 according to some estimates. This time, they hail not just from the Arab states, but also from many European countries.
The Syrian conflict will end, as all conflicts do, and these fighters will need to find a new war. As with the Afghan veterans of old, they will form a mobile, trained and indoctrinated core which will impart deadly skills onto another generation of militants. It will be the gift that keeps on giving, and none of the littoral states will remain immune for long.
Consider that our part of the world is still suffering from the blowback of what Brzezinski called ‘a few riled up Muslims’. This time around, the aftermath will be wider and deadlier, but barring a few sporadic assaults, the West will remain largely immune.
For America, the ‘Muslim wars’ are effectively over, and the hyperpower has set its sights further to the East. This swarm of flies, this plague of locusts will find thus targets closer to home. We are the near enemies now, and our countries will all qualify as Dar-ul-Harb.
The writer is a member of staff.
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Twitter:@ZarrarKhuhro