TTP ceasefire
A LITTLE resolve can go a long way, it seems. Saturday’s ceasefire announcement by the outlawed Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan has left many questions unanswered, but at least this much is clear: the militant group has blinked and it has blinked because of the firm response given by the Pakistani state. The killing of policemen escorting a polio team and the military shelling notwithstanding, after it became apparent that the government did not intend to carry on with talks if militant violence continued and that the politicians and military were all too willing to explore the use of significant force to push back , the options for the Taliban narrowed. It also helped that even the most vociferous supporters of negotiations in the political and religious quarters grudgingly began to accept that talks in an atmosphere of militant violence were deeply problematic. From there, the TTP had little choice: if militant and terrorist violence continued, the group risked suffering significant damage caused by escalating retaliatory attacks by the state.
What the ceasefire means beyond the TTP trying to buy itself a short reprieve is difficult to know at the moment. For one, the ceasefire may or may not lead to a quick resumption of negotiations. Indeed, from the point of view of a strong state, the militant group should first be made to prove its willingness to abide by what it says and to restrain its sub-groups and franchises. If militant attacks continue and the Taliban leadership simply claims, as it has done in the past, that it is not responsible for a particular attack without either denouncing the attack or pledging to restrain the sub-group that may be responsible for it, then the ceasefire would be meaningless. Immediately resuming talks without verifying that the TTP is willing and able to ensure that a ceasefire holds would waste the advantage the state has gained through the tougher, more determined stance that it has taken in recent weeks.
For another, the negotiations process should not be open-ended. Thus far, the government has insisted that any agreement will be localised and, most crucially, must be within the ambit of the Constitution. Finding common ground there, if indeed it can be found, cannot be a debate that goes on endlessly. If anything, the state has to be careful about a ceasefire being just a ploy for the militants to regroup or relocate their leadership before once again trying to wrest concessions from the state through violence. In the days ahead, there will no doubt be fresh surprises and new twists in the unfolding saga of how best to deal with the militant group. Whatever those are, so long as the Pakistani state stands firm and refuses to countenance the impossible or unreasonable, there may be light at the end of the tunnel after all.