Have we really learned anything from over a decade of war?

Things have changed ever since we entered the war on terror; in particular, our policy towards Afghanistan has changed. Since 1947, we had genuine security concerns with our western neighbour — Pakhtunistan being the major bone of contention. There were incidents such as the Chaman border post attack and the Bajaur attack, which sounded alarm bells in Pakistan.

Back then, the tribal areas were only 30 per cent ‘open’. This means that government buildings and the military controlled only 30 percent of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata). The rest of the area was dark, it was closed to outsiders. This was true for the entire border region with Afghanistan, except for the border post at Torkham.

After 1973, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto made industrial units everywhere. This helped open up maybe 60 percent of the tribal areas. The Afghans, on their end, worked vigorously towards their goal; they set up two educational centres in Kabul to preach their doctrine of Pakhtunistan, they recruited people from this side of the border to go to these centres and be indoctrinated. They sought to divide the Pakhtuns in Pakistan.

Now though, Pakistan’s Pakhtun population has become very integrated. So much so that Karachi, not Peshawar or Kandahar, is the largest Pakhtun city in the world. Hence, the fervour for Pakhtunistan has died down too.

What about the doctrine of ‘strategic depth’? Have we moved on from our traditional myopic view of Afghanistan?

The realisation that the US is leaving but we will be left to pick up the pieces has begun to set in. But the doctrine of strategic depth has been exaggerated. It was never as in vogue as it is thought. It was primarily Aslam Beg and before him, a brigadier in the 1960s, who used to espouse this doctrine. But on the ground, this doctrine didn’t hold much sway.

All the military wanted was a government that accepted the Durand Line. They saw that even when the Taliban, who were their ‘own people’, were asked to recognise the Durand Line as an international border, they simply turned around and said, “Islam has no concept of borders or boundaries”. So they are wary now. Moreover, the Taliban threat has domestically awakened the realisation that a Taliban government in Kabul will be harmful for Pakistan as well.

The contention that the British leased the Frontier province from the Afghans and now it must go back to them is not true. Under the UN convention, the agreement between the British and the Afghans has now been transferred to Pakistan, and this is governed by international law. I cannot comment on what seem to be political statements by Abdullah Abdullah, but overall, this issue has died down now. What is most significant is that the US has given statements to the effect that the Durand Line is the recognised international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This has laid the border question to rest.

What about our internal security doctrine? In terms of victimisation and silencing of dissent, particularly when questioning state institutions such as the military. Are they still as unquestionable as they were in the past?

The internal security doctrine has changed as well. Gone are the days when you could brand someone a traitor simply because they didn’t agree with your policies. Among political leaders, victimisation has all but faded away. But this has more to do with the mindset of the people than anything else. Geo TV, for example, were declared traitors for speaking against the army, so there are still red lines. We’ve come a long way, but there is still more to be done. I believe the situation can improve further if democratic governments continue.

The National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) still looks to be an unrealised dream. Do you think having a centralised intelligence infrastructure will help us with this war?

In any country where there are several agencies charged with collecting intelligence, you can never have perfect inter-agency cooperation. Look at the US: they have the CIA, FBI, NSA, and they are all quite competitive. This is the bottom line; if the government tries to rein in the agencies through NACTA or any other centralised body, which is answerable to the Interior Ministry, they will face resistance.

In my opinion, sectarian organisations such as the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi must also be tackled in the wake of the action on North Waziristan. One could have a small cell supported by highly-trained operatives, who can swoop in and conduct surgical operations against militant hideouts in Bahawalpur, for example. Timing is key in all such operations, so it must be a small cell with a highly-trained and well-equipped force at their disposal. Now if you ask the Intelligence Bureau, Military Intelligence, and the Special Branch to share intelligence on sectarian organisations, they will be far more willing than if you were to simply ask them to share information with each other.

Following the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) split and Maulana Fazlullah’s flight to Afghanistan, how do you see things shaping up?

The Afghan government does not control the area where Fazlullah is in hiding. But you can be sure that when a player such as Fazlullah is out in the open, all major intelligence agencies in the region will get involved. Be it the Afghan NDS, Russian intelligence, the Iranian, Indians or even our own Inter-Services Intelligence.

The TTP is primarily a Mehsud-led group. Baitullah Mehsud wanted Waliur Rehman to succeed him, but after his death, Hakeemullah took charge. Then both Wali and Hakeemullah were killed in drone attacks, leading to a deadlock. Fazlullah was the consensus candidate; a temporary solution. Now, with the split in the TTP, I see that the Mehsud-led faction will hold sway in Waziristan, Kurram, Orakzai and the Frontier Regions (FRs), Darra Adam Khel and Lakki Marwat. The Fazlullah camp will be strong in Mohmand, Bajaur and Malakand, areas where the Tehreek-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Muhammadi (TNSM) is present, and will include hardliners like Umar Khalid Khorasani.

With regards to the operation specifically, what does it really mean when the army says that such and such area has been ‘cleared’?

When an agency is ‘cleared’, it means that the military has ‘dominated that space’ and disrupted the status quo, i.e. taken away the power base from militants and sent them packing. But even after an agency or any area is cleared, continued army presence is necessary to maintain stability.

As in the case of Swat, even today, military presence there is necessary because there is a chance that if Swat is left to its own devices, militancy might resurge in the area. The Swat valley and even the Mohmand Agency aren’t 100 per cent clear, but the writ of the state does prevail there now. Things are definitely better than before, at least Fazlullah is not in charge anymore.

So how do we deal with the remnants of these militants, those who blend back into society once their masters are killed or imprisoned?

Those who used to sympathise with militants must be rehabilitated. Those who surrender should be allowed safe passage and must be screened. Former combatants who reform must also be vetted to analyse why they were swayed by the extremist message in the first place. Above all, the children who have been either brainwashed by the terrorists or are simply traumatised by their experiences, must be rehabilitated. There should be aam maafi (general amnesty), like we’ve seen before in Balochistan in the 1970s. Ataullah Mengal, Bizenjo, they were all part of the Hyderabad tribunal, but now they are in the political mainstream.

Does the action stop with the operation in North Waziristan or do you think that there is more to this fight?

The momentum from this operation must be carried forward. After North Waziristan, if the military wants to proceed against terrorist hideouts in, for instance, Bhara Kahu or Jhang or Balochistan, they should go in and act swiftly.

Why has the operation taken so long? If the military wanted to move into NWA since 2011, what was stopping them?

It is always the concerns of the political leadership that hold up or delay any action on the ground. Even now, the biggest impediment to a final decision on the matter was the narrative built up in Punjab, that this action is being taken at the behest of the US. The Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) mantra about talks was hurting the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) in Punjab and they had to counter that perception, which is why things took this long to materialise.

Not that they didn’t give peace a chance. But the committee formed to negotiate with the Taliban was a non-starter in the first place. It was obvious that apart from Rahimullah Yousafzai, no one else knew what they were talking about. The Talibs themselves were the architects of the breakdown of talks.

The army needs the sanction of the civilian government before entering any area for an operation. The governor of the province must explicitly request army action and they can only proceed with his orders. But in Fata, interestingly, the orders issued by the governor of the area in 1909, before partition, remains in force. Action was ordered in both Pata and Fata and technically, that order was never rescinded.

What do you think the fallout will be like in the rest of the country?

Look, it’s not possible to stop the terrorists from all their activities. There will be a backlash and it must be tolerated through a national consensus. Only that will ensure the operation’s success. The terrorists will try their best to fragment society’s opinions, but we must remain committed to this action.

There are currently two narratives on the drone issue; that they are a violation of our sovereignty, or that they are the best and most efficient way of taking out high-value targets. Where do you stand on this?

I believe the number of civilian casualties in drone attacks is exaggerated. The Taliban are masters of propaganda. I put it to you that if civilians were dying in drone attacks in as great numbers, as people are claiming, the Taliban would be all over the story. They have massive communications and public relations machinery at their disposal and in the immediate aftermath of a drone strike, they cordon off the area and clear it. So if we had instances of widespread civilian deaths, the Taliban’s media offensive would have been unstoppable. But they are reduced to sharing forged images, taken usually from the Middle East.

They don’t have anything, so they resort to faking ‘proof’.

Discuss the complexities of war on Twitter with Asad Munir @asadmunir38 and with Hassan Belal Zaidi @mightyobvious_

Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, June 22nd, 2014