All fall down
There have so far been four major political movements in Pakistan that attempted to unseat the government of the day. Three of these movements were against military rule and one targeted an elected civilian set-up. Though three of the movements (two against military rule and one against a civilian government) were actually successful in initiating a sequence of events that brought the government down, the eventual successes of these movements were soon soiled by the consequential emergence of greater social and political crises compared to the ones that the movements had pointed their remonstrations against. Of course, the movements that ousted Ayub, Bhutto and Musharraf can’t be entirely blamed for such devastating quandaries because the roots of the ultimate damage that followed their ouster also lie in the shortcomings of their respective governments.But it is also true that the economic, political and social consequences triggered by the movements did hasten the final impact and intensified the magnitude of the rot that had been brewing within the country’s state and society before the movements began. Below we try to figure all this out by looking at the country’s four major anti-government movements.
Exit stage left: the movement against Ayub Khan
Many people who, as young men and women, took part in the widespread protest movement against the military rule of Ayub Khan in the late 1960s suggest that Ayub relinquished power after he was told what some of the protesters had started to call him. In 1968 at the height of the movement against him, young protesters in Karachi and Lahore began describing him as a dog (Ayub Khan Kutta!).
This was a time when politicians and rulers in Pakistan hardly ever used any derogatory language against their opponents, so Ayub was supposedly shocked when he heard that some of his ‘children’ (the term he used to describe his subjects), had called him a dog.
Ayub had come to power in 1958 on the back of a popular military coup (Pakistan’s first), and had enjoyed a significant run of admiration from a majority of Pakistanis in the first four years of his dictatorship.
Vowing to make Pakistan a powerful and influential military-industrial state, Ayub encouraged and facilitated an unprecedented growth in the process of industrialisation in the country. He also initiated the introduction of technical innovations in agriculture and brought Pakistan closer to the United States, thus benefitting from the military and financial aid that came with the enhanced relationship.
By 1961 the Ayub regime had largely restored the country’s economy that had begun to weaken from the mid-1950s onwards, mainly due to the political chaos that prevailed in the country, as various factions of Pakistan’s first ruling party, the Muslim League, indulged in constant infighting and intrigues, and were unable to address the growing disenchantment and cynicism exhibited towards politicians by those who were kept out from the political process dominated by the country’s political-bureaucratic elite.
He became the president and handpicked an assembly through a complex electoral system that he called ‘Basic Democracy’. After discarding the 1956 Constitution, his assembly passed a brand new constitution that enshrined Ayub’s idea of ‘Jinnah’s Pakistan’.
It revolved around the construction of a strong military-industrial state, propped-up by state-backed capitalism, free enterprise, agricultural reforms and a ‘progressive interpretation of Islam that was compatible with science, technology and modernity.’
Ayub detested politicians, from both the left as well as the right. His regime came down hard on left-wing parties and then went on to also ban parties such as the Jamat-i-Islami (JI) — though the ban was overturned by the courts.
Leftists accused him of encouraging crony capitalism, the exploitation of workers and the suppression of the rights and ethnic-nationalism of the Bengalis (in East Pakistan), Sindhis, the Baloch and the Pakhtun, and of dislodging the Urdu-speaking (the Mohajirs) from important state and government institutions that they had helped build after Pakistan’s creation in 1947.
The religious right denounced him of being overtly secular and undermining ‘Pakistan’s Islamic culture and traditions’.
Ayub easily glided through the many periodical protests that took place against him after 1962 and then won a second term as president in a controversial presidential race in 1965.
Buoyed by his victory and his status as a ‘benevolent dictator’, Ayub then made an uncharacteristic mistake by allowing himself to be convinced by the hawks in his cabinet (led by his young foreign minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto), to crown his economic and political achievements with a military triumph against India.
India had suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Chinese army in 1964 and Bhutto and his supporters in the cabinet were convinced that the Pakistan army would be able to crush the weakened Indian armed forces.
Though the Pakistani armed forces made rapid gains in the initial period of the 1965 war, the conflict soon turned into a stalemate. Ayub settled for a ceasefire, apparently sending Bhutto into a rage.
Ayub eased out Bhutto from the government but the damage was done. The war had drained the country’s resources and the economy began to slide.
Ayub’s opponents accused him of ‘losing the war on the negotiation table’. Bhutto went on to form the PPP, and along with the already established left-wing groups, such as the National Awami Party (NAP) and the National Students Federation (NSF), he became the most prominent face of left-wing opposition in West Pakistan.
In East Pakistan, Shiekh Mujeebur Rehman’s Awami League (AL), upped the ante against the regime and accused it of leaving East Pakistan open to an Indian attack during the 1965 war.
As the Bengali nationalist movement led by AL and by various militant/Maoist Bengali nationalist groups in East Pakistan gathered pace, in West Pakistan, Ayub was suddenly faced by a spontaneous students’ movement when in October 1968, a large contingent from the NSF gate-crashed a ceremony being held by the government at Lahore’s Fortress Stadium (to celebrate the government’s ‘Decade of Progress’).
The students began to chant anti-Ayub slogans and clashed with the police. They accused the regime of enriching a handful of cronies and letting everyone else suffer unemployment and economic hardship. Then in November 1968, police opened fire on a left-wing student rally in Rawalpindi, killing three protesters. In response, students formed a Students Action Committee and announced that students across Pakistan would begin a concentrated protest movement against the regime.
As the students began their campaign (with most of the student groups demanding a socialist system and parliamentary democracy), Bhutto’s PPP joined the fray along with NAP and their entry brought with it the participation in the movement of the radical trade and labour unions that were associated with these parties.
By late 1968 the movement had spread beyond Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi and Peshawar and reached the smaller cities and towns of Punjab and Sindh. Meanwhile in East Pakistan, AL and other Bengali nationalist groups began to demand complete provincial autonomy for East Pakistan.
Schools, colleges and universities stopped functioning; workers went on strike and closed down a number of factories, and white-collar professionals refused to attend office, further crippling an already deteriorating political and economic order.
After failing to quell the protests (through police action and wide-scale arrests), Ayub invited opposition parties to hold a dialogue with the government. But the PPP and NAP boycotted the negotiations that were largely attended by religious parties and some moderate right-wing parties. However, Mujeeb’s AL did participate, but the talks ultimately broke down.
By early 1969 the movement had also been joined by peasant committees and organisations in the country’s rural areas. In March 1969 a group of senior military men advised Ayub to step down, fearing the eruption of a full-scale civil war in East Pakistan and political and social anarchy in the country’s west wing.
A weakened and tired Ayub finally decided to throw-in the towel and resigned, handing over power to General Yahya Khan who immediately imposed the country’s second martial law.
He promised to hold the country’s first general election based on adult franchise and to relinquish power after introducing parliamentary democracy in Pakistan. With this announcement, the movement came to a halt.
Elections were held in 1970. In East Pakistan the AL won 98 per cent of the allotted national and provincial assembly seats, whereas in West Pakistan, the PPP swept the polls in the region’s two largest provinces, Punjab and Sindh. NAP performed well in the former NWFP and Balochistan. Most of the ‘status quo parties’ (such as the many Muslim League factions) and most religious outfits (except Jamiat Ulema Islam) were decimated.
However, a three-way deadlock between AL, PPP and the Yahya regime (over a power-sharing formula) regime triggered a crisis that finally saw the feared eruption of a civil war in East Pakistan and then India’s entry into the conflict.
After that disastrous conflict, a group of military officers (most of them Bhutto sympathisers), forced Yahya to resign and then invited Bhutto and his party to form the country’s first parliamentary government.
Ayub, who had gone into seclusion, died in 1974.
What goes around: The movement against Bhutto
Between March and June 1977, Z.A. Bhutto had to face a protest movement against his government — the kind he had himself triggered and then led 10 years earlier against the Ayub Khan regime.
But even though the movement against Bhutto in 1977 was as strong, impactful and effective as the one that ousted Ayub, this movement’s class and ideological make-up was squarely different from that of the 1968 movement.
In 1968, a wide cross-section of the society had participated — left-wing middle-class youth, blue-collar workers, peasants, etc. The1977 movement on the other hand, largely revolved around right-wing student groups, middle-class/white-collar professionals, traders and urban and semi-urban petite-bourgeoisie.
The PPP had contested the 1970 election on a populist socialist manifesto and the first three years of his regime were spent in repairing the morale of the armed forces and the civilians that was deeply damaged by the separation of East Pakistan and the defeat of Pakistani forces at the hands of the Indian army.
It was also during these years that his regime implemented large-scale populist policies that included the nationalisation of a number of industries. Also during this period, the Bhutto regime drafted a brand new constitution (1973) and managed to get it passed in the national assembly by gaining the approval of all political parties.
However, it is also true that the economic restoration could not withstand the stress generated by the 1973 international oil crises that raised the inflation rate in the country and Bhutto had to devalue the rupee. This got a negative response from traders and businessmen who then began to ship out their capital, creating a new economic crisis.
The incompetency and inexperience exhibited by the new managers in the nationalised industries further deepened the crisis and the Bhutto regime now decided to look towards the oil-rich Arab countries that had begun to make large profits due to the unprecedented hike in oil prices after 1973.
By 1974 Bhutto had overtly become the pragmatist that he actually was and began to ease out the hard line leftists from his cabinet. Conscious of the early moves made by oil-rich Arab states to begin funding a mainstream revival of ‘Political Islam’ in Muslim countries, Bhutto began manoeuvring a delicate balance between his socialist/populist policies and the emerging interest in Political Islam to attract ‘Petro-Dollars’ from Arab countries.
He cracked down on radical labour and student outfits (calling them ‘impractical’ and detrimental to Pakistan’s recovery), and tried to appease right-wing opposition by agreeing to address some of their demands to ‘Islamise the Constitution’.
Bhutto was sitting easy in 1976 as the petro dollars began to come in and he had quietened opposition from the left as well as the right (one through arrests and the other through pragmatic appeasement). He also seemed to have the military’s support and backing after he initiated a military operation in Balochistan against supposed Baloch separatists.
Feeling confident, he announced elections almost a year before they were due only to be left feeling surprised when he saw a fractured and battered opposition unite on single electoral platform to compete against the PPP in the 1977 election.
The Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) was made-up of nine anti-PPP parties. It included three of the country’s main religious parties, some moderate conservative parties and a few small left-wing outfits.
PNA largely represented the frustrations and aspirations of those groups that had been affected the most by Bhutto’s policies. These included industrialists, businessmen, traders, shopkeepers, the anti-Bhutto landed gentry and urban middle-classes.
The PNA denounced the government for being detrimental to the cause of Islam in Pakistan and for turning Pakistan into a ‘land of sin’. They also accused Bhutto of being a ‘civilian dictator’, an ‘oppressor’ and ‘a drunkard’ who had let loose a reign of hooligans on the streets of the country.
Bhutto’s party which, by now, had toned down its socialist rhetoric and tried to prove that its Islam was more enlightened than that ‘of the capitalist and feudal mullahs of the PNA’, won the election, which were marred by allegations of rigging.
The PNA cried foul, boycotted the provincial election and decided to start a protest movement. Today, according to various analysts and historians, rigging took place on not more than a dozen seats (in the Punjab) but resentment against the regime in certain sections of the society had been brewing so strongly that the movement that Bhutto thought would fizzle out, erupted in the most devastating fashion.
According to a detailed study of the movement done (in 1980) by historian and author Ahmad B. Syeed, the main participants/protesters of the movement included disgruntled urban middle and lower-middle class youth (mostly belonging to Karachi and Lahore); traders, shopkeepers and white-collar office workers. According to Syeed’s study, the working classes and the peasants largely remained away from the movement. The agitation against the regime and the police crackdowns mostly took place in Karachi, Lahore and Rawalpindi. Government buildings, police stations, homes of the members of the PPP, nightclubs, bars, cinemas and hotels were attacked by mobs demanding Nizam-i-Mustafa.
Bhutto called in the army and imposed long curfews but even this failed to stem the protests. Cops frequently opened fire on the rampaging mobs but some military personnel refused to follow the orders of their superiors to fire and this became a major concern within the military.
Wealthy industrialists who had been stripped of their perks and power by Bhutto were accused of funding the movement and the regime also alleged that the United States was bankrolling the protests. Many PPP leaders also pointed the finger towards the large amounts of Saudi Riyals that (according to them) had reached the coffers of the religious parties.
After a month of violence, Bhutto invited the PNA for talks. The PNA demanded fresh elections and the implementation of Shariah Laws. To stall the first demand, Bhutto agreed to conditionally implement the second request and in April 1977 he ordered the closure of all nightclubs and bars. He also banned the sale of alcohol (to Muslims) and replaced Sunday with the Muslim holy day (Friday) as the weekly holiday. PNA decided to stay in the talks.
More than a decade later, veteran JI leader, late Prof Ghafoor Ahmed, who played a leading role in the movement, told journalists that the talks went well and just when Bhutto had agreed to hold fresh elections, Gen Zia decided to impose the country’s third Martial Law (July 1977).
He said that most PNA leaders were happy at how the talks had gone but some leaders, such as Asghar Khan (of the moderate conservative, Tehreek-i-Istaqlal) and Begum Wali (wife of the left-wing Pukhtun nationalist, Wali Khan), desired military intervention.
When asked why then did JI join Zia’s first cabinet whereas most PNA parties opposed the Martial Law, Prof Ghafoor claimed that joining Zia was the decision of the party’s Punjab leadership.
Zia, who adopted PNA’s ‘Islamic’ rhetoric and agenda, went on to rule Pakistan for the next 11 years. Bhutto was arrested and in 1979, through a highly controversial trial, he was sentenced to death for a political murder he was alleged to have ordered, and hanged.
Shaken but not stirred: the movement against Zia
Though protests against Gen Zia’s dictatorship began almost immediately after his military coup in July 1977, his regime’s harsh measures (such as public floggings, executions, sentencing by military courts and torture) against any and all opposition did not allow opposition groups to organise themselves in a more coherent and systematic manner.
But even though the beginning of the anti-Soviet ‘Afghan Jihad’ in Afghanistan in late 1979 meant that the Zia regime was poised to attract recognition from the United States and its European allies, and (thus) become the vessel to carry the large military and financial aid that the US and Saudi Arabia pledged as a way to back the Mujahideen guerrillas in Afghanistan, it would take another few years for Zia to use this material and moral patronage to strengthen his position by reviving the country’s shattered economy.
With the regime’s undoing of the economic policies implemented by Bhutto and with the US and Saudi aid now beginning to come in, the economy did begin to slowly revive itself, but Zia’s position was still vulnerable in 1981 when a strong political alliance decided to launch an all-out protest movement against him.The alliance — Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) — was formed by the PPP that was being led by Z.A. Bhutto’s widow, Begum Nusrat and his 28-year-old daughter, Benazir Bhutto, both of whom had been in and out of jail and house arrest ever since Bhutto was toppled in 1977.
The MRD was headed by the PPP and also included various smaller left-wing parties, Sindhi, Baloch and Pukhtun nationalist outfits, one Muslim League faction (PML-Qasim) and the only mainstream religious party that opposed Zia, the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI).
The movement kicked off in early 1981 from Karachi’s Saddar area where a PPP worker arrived on a camel and court-arrested to the cheers of a large crowd that had gathered there. Soon the movement, whose first phase involved courting arrest, spread into Lahore and was about to take off when it suddenly collapsed due to the adventurism of Bhutto’s sons, Murtaza and Shahnawaz.
Both had escaped to Afghanistan where under the patronage of the Soviet-backed Afghan government they had formed a left-wing urban guerrilla organisation, the Al-Zulfikar (AZO), to plan strikes against Zia’s regime in Pakistan.
The AZO was made up of Punjabi, Sindhi, Pukhtun and Urdu-speaking militants belonging to the PPP’s student wing, and after conducting a couple of assassinations and two failed attempts to strike Zia’s official plane with a SAM missile in 1980, the AZO hijacked a PIA plane from the Karachi Airport (March 1981).
The mission was led by former president of the PPP’s student-wing, Salamullah Tipu, who got over 50 political prisoners released from Zia’s jails when he took the plane full of passengers to Kabul and then to Damascus.
Benazir condemned the hijacking and became even more critical of his brothers’ actions when Tipu shot dead a passenger in Kabul. The MRD movement collapsed when Zia accused the PPP of being behind the hijacking and used the episode to unleash an unprecedented and severe crackdown against MRD leaders and workers.
It took another two years for MRD to reorganise itself and plan another movement, but by 1983 Zia had consolidated his position and revived the economy — even though the revival brought with it a new kind of institutional corruption and the initial emergence of delinquencies such as heroin/gun smuggling and the coming into the mainstream of radical sectarian figures who had been loitering on the fringes of politics. Now, they began being patronised by the state to prop up support among young Pakistanis and Afghans for the US/Saudi-backed ‘jihad’ against the Soviet forces stationed in Kabul.
Also, since the Punjab had been the bastion of the PPP ever since the late 1960s, Zia (an immigrant Punjabi), began to overtly patronise various prominent business groups of Punjab and his economic policies were designed to attract the support of the province’s urban middle and lower-middle-class traders, businessmen and shopkeepers.
He then began to give these groups political roles and aligned them with the more radical religious outfits that he was fostering. So in a way the economic revival witnessed during the Zia regime was accompanied by a burst of religiosity within Pakistan’s bourgeoisie.
MRD deducted that the fruits of economic revival (at least in 1983) were mostly falling into the hands of central/urban Punjab’s middle and trader classes, industrialists and businessmen, whereas the rest of the country was being ravaged by economic hardship, rising crime and corruption and the growing incidents of sectarian violence.
On Aug 14, 1983 (one year after Zia had gotten himself elected as ‘President’ through a dubious referendum), the MRD launched a brand new movement against him.
The groundwork for the movement was mostly done by second-tier members and common workers of the parties of the MRD because by now most of the main leaders of the opposition outfits were either in jail or under house arrest.
Though the movement kicked-off simultaneously in Sindh and Punjab, it failed to gather much support in the latter province. Soon, it became restricted to Sindh where at one point it began to threaten turning into a full-blown Sindhi nationalist movement akin to the one that erupted in East Pakistan in 1971.
MRD activists and youth belonging to the student-wings of MRD parties and various left wing Sindhi nationalist groups plunged into the fray and for weeks disrupted everyday life in Sindh — though the province’s capital, Karachi, remained relatively calm.
The situation became too much for the police to handle and Zia called in the army. Anti-Zia activists used shrines of Sufi saints and the thick forests of Moro and Dadu to plan their agitation from. Dozens of MRD supporters were killed when troops used sophisticated weapons to mow down protests.
In Karachi, the left wing and progressive student groups went to war with right wing pro-Zia student outfits at universities and colleges and women organisations gathered on the streets to burn their dupattas as a protest against what they believed were Zia’s anti-women laws.
Radical trade, labour and journalist unions too played a role in the movement, but by late 1983, it had squarely become a militant Sindhi nationalist movement when Punjab failed to rise.
Though it left Zia and his regime feeling nervous and fearing that they now were facing another East Pakistan-like situation, troops finally managed to crush the movement. A number of people were killed and hundreds were thrown in jails and severely tortured. The PPP’s main leadership went into exile. Zia had managed to avert a major scare to his dictatorship.
But why Sindh? We have already discussed how Zia managed to change the political and social complexion of Punjab and begin the long process of drying out its support for the PPP. But whereas he managed to also keep Balochistan quiet (after releasing Baloch nationalists who had been thrown into jails by the Bhutto regime), and with the NWFP (present-day Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) caught-up in receiving Afghan mujahideen and Afghan refugees and the regime integrating the Pakhtuns into the changing ways of the ruling and business elites, Sindh was left to its own devices.
Apart from the fact that there was already anger among the Sindhis against the hanging of a Sindhi prime minister (Z.A. Bhutto), what actually triggered violence in the province in 1983 was the fact that Sindhis as well as the Urdu-speaking people in Karachi felt that they were being invaded by elements that were posing a threat to their economic and political interests.
Firstly, Karachi began receiving waves of Afghan refugees, many of whom came for the sole purpose of setting up shady drug and weapons businesses in the city. This trend would trigger the vicious circle of ethnic violence in Karachi from 1985 onwards.
Secondly, Zia began to allot land and business in Sindh to Punjabis who began to migrate from Punjab into Sindh.
Zia did this to create a constituency for himself in Sindh. But what he got was resistance and resentment from the Sindhis and Urdu-speaking traders. In Karachi non-Punjabi traders and businessmen formed an anti-Punjabi organisation called the Maha Sindh (this would at least partly evolve into becoming the MQM in 1984). But the reaction was more violent in the interior of the Sindh province where protests against the regime soon became militant and troops had to be called in to quell the turmoil.
The MRD would begin yet another movement in 1986 that was directly led by Benazir Bhutto. Though this time it did manage to draw support from Punjab, it would take another two years and a controversial plane crash for Zia to fall. His death in August 1988 allowed the return of democracy in Pakistan.
A sudden slip : Movement against Musharraf
General Parvez Musharraf pulled-off a popular military coup against the second government of Nawaz Sharif (PML-N) in 1999. Just like Ayub, Musharraf too came into power and received a hearty round of applause from a populace exhausted by the economic downturns, corruption and chaos of the 1990s in which the country’s two main political parties, the PPP and PML-N, constantly pulled the carpet under each other’s feet and at the same time wore themselves out by combating political intrigues whipped up by intelligence agencies and remnants of the Zia era in the ‘establishment.’
The Musharraf coup was not appreciated by Pakistan’s leading donor, the United States, and the General struggled to restore the country’s battered economy during the first two years of his regime. Posing himself as a religious moderate and a social liberal, Musharraf’s luck turned when he agreed to become a frontline ally of the US in its ‘war against terror’ in the aftermath 9/11.
Pakistan suddenly became the recipient of millions of dollars’ worth of military and financial aid from the US which Musharraf used to rebuild the country’s economy.
The economic boom masterminded by Musharraf’s second prime minister, Shaukat Aziz (a banker), and almost entirely based on various aspects of the post-Cold War ‘neo-con economics’, helped Musharraf avoid any serious resistance and the country remained largely peaceful till 2005.
However, joining the war on terror also meant Pakistan making some sudden U-turns regarding its policies related to religious militant groups who had been patronised by the state of Pakistan across the 1980s and 1990s to fight Pakistan’s proxy wars in Afghanistan and Indian-held Kashmir.
In 2002 Musharraf began to crack down on a number of extremist organisations but at the same time his regime maintained links with certain other militant outfits. The crackdown, his decision to join the US war on terror, and him positioning his regime as liberal and inspired by ‘enlightened moderation’, triggered a backlash by extremist outfits that had been outlawed.
Thus began the trend of suicide bombings against government targets and foreign embassies that then escalated from 2007 onwards against civilians in markets, mosques, Sufi shrines and churches.
Apart from facing the occasional terrorist attacks, the Musharraf regime managed to construct a feel-good environment in which the economy of the country’s urban areas thrived and no overt protest movement succeeded in taking hold. This also included Karachi’s return to peace and development after two decades of ethnic turmoil.
The euphoria lasted till about end-2005. Both the PPP and PML-N remained sidelined and Musharraf seemed to have been enjoying a continuous stretch of popularity.
Lawyers poured out on the streets of Lahore and Islamabad and demanded that Chaudhry be restored. As the protests of the lawyers grew louder, they now also demanded that Musharraf resign and fresh elections held.
Seeing the protests as an opening and seeing the way agitation was covered by the electronic media, the PPP and PML-N too jumped in, as did smaller parties such as the JI and Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI).
Musharraf was clearly taken aback by the commotion which was then followed by another crisis when radical clerics and their supporters from Islamabad’s Red Mosque began to abduct cops and women working at beauty parlours and attacking music shops.
After negotiations between the government and the clerics failed, Musharraf ordered the army to storm the mosque where the armed clerics were holed in. The event was freely covered by the new TV channels which, in an exhibition of some of the most anarchic coverage of a sensitive issue, further compounded the tense situation.
Exaggerated figures of the civilians killed (especially women and children) were often quoted and the clerics were given more airtime to sound out their views than the government officials.
The confusion created by the media and the regime’s own weakness to counter the narrative that was being built eventually saw the emergence of an alliance of extremist militants who began to target public places supposedly to avenge ‘Musharraf’s Red Mosque massacre.’
It was at this point that the Lawyers’ Movement that had been initially started by progressive groups of lawyers began its shift to the right as parties like PML-N, PTI and JI began to dominate it. It was also believed that PML-N had begun to bankroll the movement.
The movement’s greatest presence was felt in urban Punjab and the NWFP. It was almost nowhere in Sindh and barely present in the province’s capital, Karachi. This was the first major protest movement ever since 1968 and 1977 in which Punjab participated whole-heartedly. The province had largely remained quiet during the movements against Zia and many of Musharraf’s supporters in Sindh and Karachi suggested that Punjab only rises against non-Punjabi rulers.
Though some events may actually substantiate this, the recent rise of Imran Khan in the Punjab against Nawaz Sharif (a Punjabi) might be used to counter such a perception.
Unlike the movement against Ayub (which included the participation of the working classes and the peasants as well), the movement against Musharraf was more like the one against Bhutto in 1977 in which the majority of participants belonged to the urban middle and lower middle-classes.
This time however, these classes had actually prospered under Musharraf but after reaching certain limits of economic prosperity, these classes became the ‘blocked elite’ — and/or that portion of the robust urban classes who may have gained economic influence (through business-friendly economic policies) and social influence (through media outlets), find themselves blocked to also gain political influence by the traditional ruling elites.
The movement began to settle down when Musharraf grudgingly allowed the return of the country’s two main politicians, Benazir Bhutto (PPP) and Nawaz Sharif (PML-N).
Benazir unfortunately was assassinated in a bomb attack in December 2007 and her party’s charge was assumed by her husband Asif Ali Zardari.Zardari and Nawaz led their parties to victory in the 2008 elections and both then squeezed Musharraf to resign as President and Army chief.
Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, August 31, 2014