FOR 13 years, the US and Pakistan have stuck together as partners against terrorism even though they have been anything but satisfied with each other. Both have felt the other was insincere and overly demanding. Many continued to question throughout this period whether all the angst that marked their interactions was worth it.

Thankfully, the answer from those who mattered most: yes it was. Principal reason: Afghanistan.

Naturally then, the question is being asked afresh. With the international troops drawing down from Afghanistan and the West’s attention being diverted to other challenges, will the US see the need to keep Pakistan engaged? Many in Pakistan believe not — they say, ‘the US dumped us in 1989 and it is getting ready to do it again’.

In Washington too, those who have dealt with Pakistan professionally over the past decade are fed up. The feeling is that despite trying hard to nudge Pakistan to alter its strategic paradigm, they managed little more than hollow promises. Billions of US taxpayer dollars have been wasted on Islamabad they feel.

Our own sales pitch has contributed negatively to our image.

Indeed, a noisy, influential grouping of experts in Washington believes it is time to ‘contain’ Pakistan. Even the more balanced perspective argues that the US should (and will) tighten the screws and raise the stakes for Pakistan’s lack of cooperation in Afghanistan and against terrorism in general once the importance of US supply routes to Afghanistan through Pakistan dwindles.

So are we headed for another divorce? Or at least for more antagonism? Most likely not. Principally, because Pakistani leaders have succeeded in scaring the world sufficiently about the consequences of the country’s failure.

Not to take away from the fact that Pak­istan’s negativities have often been exaggerated by the international media, Pakis­tan’s own sales pitch contributed immensely to this.

Sum up the Pakistani message to Washington over the past 13 years and you’ll find an emphasis on lack of capacity to deal with the terrorist threat in a wholesome manner, on how monumental the task was and on how necessary it was for Washington to keep supporting the government of the time, more specifically, the military. The latter, it was stressed, was the only institution that can keep terrorism from overwhelming the state and keeping nuclear assets safe.

Interlocutors were constantly reminded that the already acutely negative perception of the US in Pakistan would suffer irreversibly if Washington was seen as ditching Islamabad again.

Washington buys aspects of this narrative that are necessary to keep the relationship going. It believes that its support is consequential for Pakistan; that state collapse in Pakistan is not unrealistic and that its chances will increase if Pakistan is cut off; and that as bad a partner as it believes Pakistan has been from the US perspective, all alternatives are worse.

No one believes that Pakistan acted sincerely in its partnership with the US, no one will be willing to champion its cause, but when you cut through all the noise in Washington, you realise that no one really wants to risk the consequences of pulling the plug on Pakistan either.

As things stand today then, one can be fairly confident that US civilian assistance will continue — likely at lower levels given the overall trend of budget cuts in Washington — as will support to the military. The latter will remain stronger than one would expect in light of all the tensions between GHQ and Pentagon over the years.

Ditto perhaps for the intelligence agencies. Indeed, for all their problems, the military-intelligence combine seem convinced that breaking ties with their counterparts in the 1990s was a massive error. I see no indication that they are about to repeat it.

Time to breathe a sigh of relief? Perhaps, since a divorce can’t be good for either side. Pakistan is indeed too important a country to alienate. And Pakistan itself can’t survive in the current economic and security context while being on the wrong side of the world’s only superpower. Pakistan’s officialdom gets this.

But let me also say this: if I were a decision-maker in Islamabad or Pindi, my sense of relief ought to be overtaken by shame and concern. For all I have done is succeeded in cashing in on my country’s problems by convincing the world that I am too weak and dangerous.

Meanwhile, the world’s success stories are busy attracting partners through markets, investment opportunities and business potential.

Our civilian and military leaders will do well to ask themselves: do they really want to continue feeling good about being in the market for loose change? How about working to earn some genuine respect and admiration from the world by interesting partners in what we have to offer rather than worrying them with what we may leave behind.

The writer is a foreign policy expert based in Washington, DC.

Published in Dawn, October 21st, 2014