THE times — and with them, Pakistan’s borders — are tense. It has long been predicted that the drawdown of international troops and political transition in Afghanistan would lead to shifts in, and likely a worsening of, regional dynamics. Still, recent border clashes with Iran should be a cause for alarm, particularly as they follow cross-border exchanges with both India and Afghanistan.

While clashes with India provoked expected histrionics on both sides, exchanges with Iran have produced little more than the routine hum of diplomatic statements. This distracts from the fact that Pakistan-Iran relations are increasingly strained, and could continue deteriorating in the coming months.

Last week’s clashes are not an anomaly: this year has seen several setbacks in the bilateral relationship, including the suspension of the much-needed Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline; a suicide attack outside the Iranian consulate in Peshawar; and the kidnapping in February of five Iranian soldiers who were allegedly held hostage by militants in Pakistan.

This year has seen many setbacks in Pak-Iran relations.

These developments have taken place under Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s leadership. Sharif’s close ties to Riyadh — which have been on full display this year in the form of a perceived tilt on Syria against the Assad regime as well as the $1.5bn ‘grant’ from Saudi Arabia in March — are anathema to Tehran. Earlier this year, it seemed as if Pakistan and Iran were at risk of backing opposing sides in Syria, though for now the rise of IS, viewed as a common threat by Iran and Saudi Arabia, has begun to disrupt traditional regional dynamics.

But the prime minister’s personal preferences should not cloud foreign policy thinking vis-à-vis Iran — particularly as this is not the time for a diplomatic fallout with Tehran.

Iran is currently resurgent, aiming to reclaim its role as a regional heavyweight. It has established itself as a force to be reckoned with through its effective and consistent support for the regime of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria, and that too at a time when it has been weakened by economic sanctions and relative diplomatic isolation.

Ongoing nuclear talks with the P5+1 are likely to lead to a gradual reduction in these sanctions and enhanced diplomatic engagement by Western powers with Tehran. Iran’s tacit alliance with the West against the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq is likely to empower it further, enhancing its regional role.

This resurgence is taking place at a time when Islamabad and Tehran are closely monitoring developments in Afghanistan, and seem increasingly at risk of a proxy confrontation in that country, along with other regional powers. Over the past decade, Iran has expanded its influence beyond Afghanistan’s western province of Herat and has significant trade and investment interests in Afghanistan. It also has influence over several Afghan media outlets, and links to the highest levels of power in Afghanistan’s new national unity government.

As Afghanistan’s politics increasingly stratify along ethnic lines and the contours of the country’s civil war re-emerge in the form of rival political camps, Pakistan and Iran could well find themselves on opposing sides, with Tehran courting Afghan Hazaras and Islamabad continuing to support the Taliban in southern and eastern provinces. In this context, deteriorating Pakistan-Iran relations (along with other traditional rivalries and evolving regional dynamics) could contribute to instability in Afghanistan.

There is also no ignoring the fact that Pakistan’s recent troubles with Iran are a harsh indictment of internal challenges. Iran alleges that cross-border attacks have been carried out by militants based in Balochistan. This claim does not seem far-fetched given the horrifying security situation in that province.

Sectarian militant groups such as Lashkar-i-Jhangvi are able to operate in Balochistan with impunity, killing Hazaras and other Shias by the dozens, and in the most brutal manner. It does not take a stretch of the imagination to consider that Iran-focused militants are also seeking sanctuary in Balochistan, no doubt taking advantage of the ideological affinity with Pakistan’s sectarian militant groups and the lack of local policing and effective law enforcement.

The current surge in sectarian violence is arguably Pakistan’s greatest challenge. At a time when the Middle East is roiled in conflict and polarising along sectarian lines, Pakistan has to make every effort to stay out of the fray. Our demographics demand it: Pakistan is the second-most populous Muslim country and it has the second-largest Shia population after Iran. Sustained sectarian violence in Pakistan could pose an existential threat to the country. And while tackling sectarianism is primarily a domestic endeavour, strong bilateral ties with Iran are a key element of the solution.

The writer is a freelance journalist.

huma.yusuf@gmail.com

Twitter: @humayusuf

Published in Dawn, October 27th, 2014