THE political, social and economic situation is fragile. The agenda for reform is large and daunting. Despite the urgency for change there is frustration on the seemingly aimless drift of a nation awaiting disaster. The population is gripped by a heightened sense of insecurity and uncertainty about the future, and a deeply divided, morally bankrupt, callous society is struggling to overcome apparently insoluble political and social crises. It is difficult to put in words one’s helplessness and despair.

So, what should one write about? The barbaric carnage in Peshawar, our leadership consisting of men of straw of limited capabilities petrified of taking on religious extremists, kidnappings for ransom, daylight robberies, property qabzas, corruption, misappropriation of public funds, use of discretionary powers violating laws, rules and regulations, the widening gulf between the rich and the poor, etc? These factors have paralysed state organs. No wonder many feel that the country’s survival has been unduly compromised.

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This state, fast becoming dysfunctional, is still hoping that the political and military-bureaucratic elites can mediate between different elite groups. It is trying to operate as a loose, uneasy coalition bringing together the traditional landed elite, business classes, the military-bureaucratic elite and the new breed of politicians — courtesy money made as construction contractors on government schemes following the upsurge in public-sector activity from the late 1970s to the 1990s. This involved, in several cases, bribes and connections with those in power.

Some went from rags to riches overnight thanks to commissions earned as deal fixers in transactions involving public-sector corporations and departments. Some seemingly appeared from nowhere. Their affluence can only be explained by money acquired from illegal/criminal activities (trade in drugs, arms and ammunition and the black market for foreign currency), etc. or by the nexus they developed with the civil and military bureaucracy to get government contracts, acquiring land for developing housing schemes, etc.

The income derived from bribes is now an expected part of wages for the bureaucracy.

Still others made money seizing opportunities in construction, trading, urban land speculation, smuggling of consumer goods, etc, created by the expansion in economic activity because of:

i) the role played by the state, following the more liberal availability of aid during the Afghan war and post 9/11;

ii) large inflows of foreign remittances through official channels and the hundi market or from narco trade.

Under such an arrangement each group has to be accommodated.

The expenditure on the military and civil bureaucracy’s extravagant privileges; the rulers’ lavish lifestyle and ‘gifts’ of plots and ‘licences’ for friends and supporters; corruption; protection of criminals by politicians; monopolistic profiteering by commercial groups sheltered from competition and their resistance to the widening of the tax net; transferring funds abroad through under-invoicing exports and overpricing imports, etc — these are outcomes which have to be tolerated even when it is recognised these privileges obstruct economic growth.

The state is hostage to these interests and their perceptions of how Pakistan’s political, bureaucratic and economic formations should be organised.

Society has also assimilated the political, social and cultural values of a structure rooted in paternalistic and personal relations (in contrast to impersonal and market relationships in most other countries), nepotism and patronage, violation of laws and non-acceptance of norms for contract adherence and rewarding merit, etc.

Resultantly, abuse of power and corruption became institutionalised, morphing into an integral component of the administrative, social and political culture. With the institutionalisation of corruption, the income derived from bribes is now an expected part of wages for the bureaucracy and expected earnings for public representatives, adversely influencing social values and work ethics.

Despite the complaints of the citizenry, the misuse of powers by politicians and bureaucrats’ expectations of favours to gain unfair advantage and get around the system go a long way in explaining why the disadvantaged vote for those they love to hate instead of someone who promises reforms.

They have little hope that the system will ever function in accordance with the norms of civilised societies or that the elite will work the system to their advantage, as the elite is too well entrenched to be dislodged by the electoral process. Therefore, instead of demanding the establishment of a fair and transparent system, they make the most they can from the opportunity provided by the electoral system. If you cannot beat them then, at least, attempt to join them and hope that some crumbs will fall into your lap. Not surprisingly, then, the same ‘families’ continue to ‘grace’ the assemblies.

However, society’s cultural, social and political values, the economy’s resource mobilisation capacities and the institutions of governance can no longer contain or resolve these crises. The military bureaucratic elite is now finding it exceedingly difficult to perform its historical role of mediation, especially with the regional question having acquired great importance. The unstable political structure is also being battered by the rising tide of ethnic and social conflicts.

The widening differential between the misery of the poor and the contentment of the rich is increasing polarisation in society, breeding social unrest.

The soft options of the past (concessional aid, remittances of overseas Pakistanis, the bounties from fortuitous events like the Cold War, Afghan war, 9/11 etc) that enabled the elite to postpone a fundamental restructuring of this crumbling state and associated political economic relationships, will most likely not be available so easily and in such abundance in future.

At least in theory, the time is up for a self-serving elite operating on a short time horizon to further enrich itself, an elite that is simply unwilling to foster a system that gives the less privileged some stake through the creation of a fairer and more caring social order. To put a derailed society and economy back on track will require these dominant elites to bear much of the pains of adjustment.

The writer is a former governor of the State Bank of Pakistan.

Published in Dawn December 23th , 2014