A VAN full of FC personnel slows down at a police checkpoint next to a sensitive site; the police constable waves a greeting and nods amicably while letting the vehicle pass without asking any questions. A few moments later, explosions and gunshots are heard. Soon there’s breaking news on the electronic media about a terrorist attack; channels are reporting that the ‘terrorists were wearing law-enforcement uniforms’.

Such scenarios arise because there is absolutely no check on the sale of law-enforcement uniforms and badges which can be purchased from the open market. Even smuggled uniforms/equipment of foreign militaries are available along roadsides in some cities. In most countries, the police department, relevant ministries and regulatory bodies are the mainstay for the implementation of regulations. But that, unfortunately, is not the case in this country even though we have so far lost more than 50,000 people to terrorist-related violence.

Some of the incidents that involved use of law-enforcement uniforms include the GHQ attack, the Peshawar school massacre, bus killings in Balochistan, attack on the Manawan Police Academy in Lahore, the Kamra air base attack and the recent Peshawar imambargah attack. In most law-enforcement agencies, there is no culture of checking identification cards. Our law-enforcement personnel have yet to realise that the uniform itself is not proof of identification, or else these organisations wouldn’t have spent millions on making ID cards.

To curtail such incidents, shops selling law-enforcement uniforms should be licensed and compelled to keep a record of all sales. They should be situated inside police/FC lines (the army has already limited the sale of its uniforms to CSDs only and made identification mandatory for purchase) and spot checks carried out to create deterrence against illegal sales. ID cards of law-enforcement personnel should be checked before selling them uniforms/equipment. Private security guards must check ID cards of law-enforcement personnel when they enter private premises and law enforcement should ensure its personnel carry IDs.

The sale of dangerous chemicals must be regulated.

The most deadly weapons in the hands of terrorists are improvised explosive devices and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) which they have used very successfully to inflict mass casualties and damage. Hundreds of pounds of explosives can be used in VBIEDs. Such quantities are usually not available in the market in ready-to-use condition. Hence, terrorists resort to making homemade explosives, fashioned from easily accessible chemical precursors sold commercially. Bomb-making recipes are available on the internet and taught extensively to terrorists (evidence has repeatedly been found in raids on their hideouts).

The most effective response to this threat is to regulate the sale of dangerous chemicals in the market. The US, EU, UK, Australia and other countries have formulated stringent regulations with severe punishments for defaulters. In Pakistan, we have the Explosives Act 1884 for dealing with dangerous chemicals. Astonishingly, the penalty under the law for manufacturing/ keeping/ selling explosives is a fine of only Rs5000.

Although there are thousands of NGOs and dozens of media groups working in Pakistan, they have never raised serious concerns about this and failed to push the government to take concrete steps to clamp down on the sale of explosive chemicals.

In some of the most destructive blasts carried out through VBIEDs, ammonium nitrate is mixed with different chemicals to create highly explosive mixtures.

Chemicals such as ammonium perchlorate, hydrogen peroxide, nitric acid, nitro methane, potassium chlorate, potassium nitrate, potassium perchlorate, sodium chlorate, so­­dium nitrate, sodium perchlorate, nitro methane and nitric acid are ingredients that can be used in any large-scale destruction plans and hence too dangerous to be sold on the open market without checks.

In November 2009, a ban on the sale of ammonium sulphate, ammonium nitrate and calcium ammonium nitrate fertilisers was imposed in KP’s Malakand Division after several large-scale bombings (including destruction of Ayub Bridge in Mingora) using these ingredients. Another measure that was taken was to change the colour of the fertiliser so that it can be tracked but this hasn’t been very fruitful.

Explosives factories in far-flung areas of Pakistan are dependent on large-scale supplies of these chemicals that are available in open markets. Surprisingly enough, such supplies are known to pass through law-enforcement checkpoints to reach the factories and are then brought back into major cities for detonation.

While successive governments and police have failed in implementing existing regulations, our nation has most of all failed in behaving responsibly. We disregard the risks involved in selling dangerous material/equipment to terrorists and their facilitators without the requisite controls on such sale. Such a cavalier attitude imperils not only us but society at large.

The writer is a retired military officer who has dealt with physical security and intelligence gathering.

Published in Dawn February 22nd , 2015

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