SINCE its engagement in the proxy war in Afghanistan, Pakistan has virtually been in a state of siege. In the process, the national discourse has been riveted by multifaceted external and internal security issues while numerous other insidious threats have been overlooked. State institutions, while tending to tangible security concerns on a priority basis, have been floundering in their response to nascent socio-economic challenges.

Perhaps the worst oversight has been the neglect of the subtle onslaught of demographic transition, defined as the differential between low mortality and high fertility rates of the population, and its possible ramifications for the country. This process has been reconfiguring our polity, its norms and relationship with the state since its onset in the late 1970s. Its most worrisome outcome has been the emergence of the youth bulge in Pakistan’s population, resulting from the ongoing ‘age-structural transition’ ie movement of different population segments from one age group to another. There has thus been a progressive increase in the working age (15-64 years) segment of population compared to the young (0-15 years) and the aging (64 years or older).

Within the working age group, there is a strong concentration of the youth (15-30 years), creating what is popularly referred to as the youth bulge. Around 102 million Pakistanis are estimated to be below the age of 24, nearly 58pc of the country’s official population estimates of 175m in 2010. The median age in the country is around 21 years and projected to rise to 33 years by 2050. Pakistanis are thus not just among the youngest people in the world but are going to stay this way for decades.

If one thinks about the young and their potential for society, there could not be a better thing happening to Pakistan. However, a bulging youth segment is an alarming development in a country saddled with a fractured polity and a struggling economy.

The discontent of young people does not augur well for social cohesion.

Unlike our domestic response, the youth bulge has received a great deal of attention from international policy and academic circles. In the last few years, various books/reports have been published on the subject. This literature is indicative of the West’s concern over emerging social patterns in Pakistan and their implications for local, regional and international stability.

The challenges posed by the youth bulge are multiple. Most significant is youth radicalisation ie the engagement of youth in religiously motivated violence, as distinct from religious orthodoxy, which has become entrenched in Pakistan with a ‘critical mass’ of followers and perpetrators. In Reaping the Dividend published by the Woodrow Wilson Centre, Moeed Yusuf writes that at the heart of youth radicalisation are various ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors. The push factors are rooted in the interplay of a stratified system of education, students’ socio-economic background and discrimination in the job market. On the ‘pull’ side, religious conservatism has been deployed as an instrument of state policy, creating a demand for madressah students and youth radicalisation.

The rising number of young people is also exposing huge gaps in the provision of social and economic services required to meet their needs. For example, the growth of the school-age population has been as high as 106pc between 1980 and 2010. The state failed to make the huge investment required in the education sector to meet this demand. No wonder we have overstretched schools and a tattered education system. Fortunately, the private sector has met some of the sector’s needs, sensing the economic opportunity opened by the demographic transition.

As the young cohorts move into the working age group seeking emp­loyment, pressure is transferred to the job market where the gap between demand and supply is widening for different reasons. Jobs are usually sought in urban areas, where almost one-third of the young population resides and the rural youth also aspires to find work. If not contained by spurring economic growth, rising unemployment levels will pose the gravest threat to social stability.

Other potent factors adversely influencing the mindset of young Pakistanis are social inequities, plutocracy, injustice, denial of economic opportunity and non-responsive governance. These ills are reflective of a ‘general malaise’ afflicting our society. Their impact, however, is more damaging now as the majority of sufferers are young people who have greater expectations from the state/society. Their growing discontent, manifest in violent law and order situations, political rallies and public protests, does not augur well for social cohesion. If this general malaise is not redressed, its repercussions can be more devastating than youth radicalisation.

The fast changing demography of Pakistan has already reoriented its social, economic and political landscape and unleashed forces which can mount a new siege against the state. If handled appropriately, they can transform Pakistan’s destiny.

The writer, a civil servant, has worked as secretary, planning and development department, Punjab.

Published in Dawn, August 19th, 2015

On a mobile phone? Get the Dawn Mobile App: Apple Store | Google Play