How do you reach a deadlock before even entering into the room for talks? Why scuttle the talks through bickering over an agreed text? Why has there been sudden flare-up in the violence and hardening of positions by both sides? Which side fared better in addressing its domestic constituency in the latest bizarre fiasco around Indo-Pak talks?

Ufa and domestic backlash

The meeting of PM Narendra Modi and PM Nawaz Sharif, in the Russian city of Ufa, had come after a year of intense acrimony. The joint statement laid down that their National Security Advisers (NSAs) will meet to discuss “all issues connected with terrorism” in New Delhi. However, to the surprise of many in Pakistan, Kashmir found no explicit mention in the Ufa joint statement. On return to Pakistan, PML-N government came under intense pressure for Ufa statement being too “one-sided”.

For the domestic audience in Pakistan, the terrorism-centric NSA talks were a “give” to New Delhi by PM Nawaz. Successive Indian governments had long sought exclusive talks on terrorism, but Pakistan had always refused to engage on these terms. Thus, for PM Nawaz to agree to “terrorism only” talks, without any significant “take”, in the form of resumption of Composite Dialogue, from PM Modi, was seen as conceding too much.

The domestic backlash revealed the thin political capital of PM Sharif. The PTI-led political turmoil of last year, structural constraints of civil-military relations and security-centric India policy of Pakistan compounded the challenge for PM Sharif. These factors did not allow PM Sharif much room to maneuver.

In India, supporters of Bhartiya Janta Party projected the Ufa statement as a major triumph of PM Modi. No reference to Kashmir, and managing a terrorism-centric future interaction were projected as a victory. For PM Modi, this domestic spin was necessary because he had to protect himself from the charge of having taken a U-turn after scuttling bilateral parleys last year on the pretext of Pakistan’s intention to consult the All Party Hurriyat Committee (APHC) leadership.

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Why the Pakistan-India NSA talks came to naught

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From Ufa to nowhere

In the days and weeks following Ufa, ceasefire violations and a heavy exchange of mortar, rocket and machine gun fire escalated. During the months of July-August Pakistan accused India of 70 ceasefire violations across LoC. In turn, India accused Pakistan of 91 ceasefire violations in the same time period. Each summoned the others’ diplomats to lodge protests. However, despite border provocations the NSAs agreed to meet, which seemed an attempt at managing the violence and controlling the prospects of an escalation spiral.

To placate domestic constituencies and seeking to emphasise the centrality of Kashmir, Islamabad took two additional measures: first, the Pakistani envoy in New Delhi invited the leadership of the APHC for a meeting with the Pakistani NSA, Sartaj Aziz, after the planned NSAs meeting. Second, the agenda put forward by Pakistan in addition to talks on terrorism, also called for exploring ‘modalities’ for future discussion on all issues, including Kashmir. It was a euphemism for resuming Composite Dialogue.

New Delhi took these actions as provocations challenging its new ‘redlines’ set last year by the abrupt cancellation of Foreign Secretary talks, and also termed it as violating the Ufa joint statement. To thwart the APHC-Aziz meeting, the Modi government first put the leadership of the APHC under house arrest. However, after persuasion by the PDP government in Indian controlled Jammu & Kashmir, Modi government released the APHC leaders, except Syed Ali Shah Gilani.

Pushing Islamabad back, Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) also advised Pakistan, publicly, to not meet the APHC leadership, as it was against the spirit of the Ufa understanding. The MEA urged Pakistan to focus on single point agenda to ‘jointly combat terrorism’. Unsurprisingly, the Pakistani Foreign Office (FO) refused to accept the ‘advice’, and announced that it was ready to partake in talks, but without any ‘preconditions’.

Next came the press conferences of Mr Sartaj Aziz and Ms Sushma Swaraj, Indian Minister of External Affairs. Mr Aziz reiterated the Pakistani stand, and also waved a dossier he intended to give the Indian NSA on the activities of RAW in Pakistan. He termed the Pakistani push for expanding the agenda in line with preamble of Ufa statement, and expressed willingness to meet his Indian counter-part but “without any preconditions”. In response Ms Swaraj told Pakistan in clear terms that if Mr Aziz only intends to talk ‘terrorism’ issues and not meet the APHC, then he is welcome in New Delhi. She categorically de-linked NSA talks from composite dialogue. Thus, the option of participating in “terror” only talks was left to Pakistan, and predictably, Islamabad refused.

Posturing for domestic audiences

The latest round of recriminations was exchanged through the media. Both sides were, in fact, addressing their own constituencies by engaging in this public exchange. In the Pakistani and Indian media Kashmir-centric developments, i.e., detention and then release of APHC leadership, Pakistani invite to APHC leadership and attempts to expand the agenda dominated the discussions. Terrorism, which was supposed to be the focus of talks, became the sub-text.

This put New Delhi in a bind: If it cancels the NSA level talks, then it will be blamed for irresponsible behaviour by Pakistan and the international community. Moreover, cancellation also meant that in future Islamabad will not agree to such high-level talks focusing only on issues “connected with terrorism”. Conversely, it appeared even if ‘terror only’ talks proceeded, Kashmir and the APHC-Aziz meeting would have been the major story on prime time in both countries.

Thus, India hardened its position. It made new ‘redlines’ non-negotiable. In doing so, Modi government sent a message to its domestic constituency that it was re-writing the terms of engagement with Pakistan, and will not allow Islamabad to expand the agenda without first addressing terrorism. Scuttling of talks means New Delhi is back to where it was before Ufa, insistent on the APHC redline.

Islamabad’s message to its constituencies, after the Ufa backlash, was an exercise in damage control. The Sharif government signaled that it will not be pressured into talks with a restrictive agenda, that engagement with New Delhi would be on an even keel and that the APHC and Kashmir remain central to Pakistan’s India policy. Meanwhile, India’s knee-jerk reaction revived the political support of the APHC and once again made, Kashmir a central topic in India-Pakistan discussion. Islamabad has achieved its objectives, for now.

What next?

Acrimony marks the scuttling of NSA talks. Another period of free-fall in the relationship will follow; ceasefire violations will increase and tensions will escalate. Both sides will adopt a policy of punitive retaliation. This will continue until, encouraged by the international community, the two sides could resume engagement. And the next round of talks is not a question of ‘if’, but ‘when’. But, before that stage is reached, both sides need to introspect.

In Pakistan, PM Sharif needs to initiate and lead a national conversation on Pakistan’s India problem and its future. For his part, PM Sharif is keen for continuous engagement with India, but his challenge is to balance a security-driven India policy of Pakistan that seeks meaningful dialogue on longstanding issues before normalisation.

PM Modi should also re-think his Pakistan strategy. His ‘act tough with Pakistan’ policy and periodic reaching for talks to show that he can set the agenda is not working. Modi, by ratcheting up rhetoric against Pakistan and setting non-negotiable “new redlines” is looking at Pakistan through a security perspective. This in turn, mirrors the security-centric India policy of Pakistan.

Thus, India and Pakistan are at a diplomatic gridlock. Having addressed domestic audiences, will Islamabad and New Delhi move forward? Will PM Sharif and PM Modi show statesmanship?

The writer is Research Fellow at Center for International Strategic Studies, Islamabad.

Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, August 30th, 2015

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