As any prime minister worth his salt would do, Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo too began efforts to evolve a programme aimed at improving the country’s economy and social order — increasing the literacy ratio, enacting judicial reforms to dispense speedy justice, and bringing about an end to corruption, among other reforms.

To achieve this ambitious task, Junejo needed an honest bureaucracy and an apolitical administration on his side. But he was shocked to find both inimical to him; in an irony of sorts, this situation was created partly by him.

From the moment Junejo was sworn in as the premier, General Ziaul Haq had decided to keep him subservient. Even when making some amendments to the constitution, the general merely informed his colleagues of the changes that he deemed necessary to run the new democratic government smoothly. Then, in a meeting of martial law administrators on March 4, 1985, he revealed the names of ministers to be included in the federal cabinet, many of them his nominees. They included Dr Mahboobul Haq, Hamid Nasir Chathha, Aslam Khatak, Haji Hanif Tayyab, Prince Mohiyuddin Baloch, Khaqan Abbasi, Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, Balakh Sher Mazari, Mir Ahmad Nawaz Bugti, General (rtd) Majid Malik, Qazi Abdul Majid Abid and Sardar Ghulam Mohammad Mahar.

Gen Zia unmoved by Parliamentary resolution to lift martial law

Junejo was a soft-spoken and cooperative person, and he decided to adopt peaceful means to run his administration. He believed that members of the parliament and federal ministers had a natural propensity of getting permits, plots and other personal gains. He, therefore, thought that keeping an eye over them would help him achieve his goals.

He was wrong.

Junejo had asked officers of the administration to keep a watchful eye on MNAs and ministers, and report their activities to him. But what transpired was that the bureaucracy exploited the prime minister at will. Along with actual follies members and ministers did commit, they also fed the prime minister fabricated stories, thereby creating a wedge between the MNAs and the prime minister.

The bureaucracy, of course, used this practice for personal gain; these machinations grew stronger by the day until the bureaucracy finally succeeded in its objective to prevail over Junejo. He began losing friendly ties with the parliamentarians, a folly no prime minister would commit in the backdrop of events he had been facing.

Meanwhile, with the restoration of the National Assembly, many MNAs wanted martial law to be lifted. Various attempts were made to convince Gen Zia to do so, but he was not prepared to relent. His only reply was that it would be lifted at its appropriate time.

Later, when Junejo informed the general about the apprehensions of the House, he assured the prime minister that he believed in the supremacy of the parliament. Gen Zia then addressed a joint press conference with the prime minister and reaffirmed his belief in the supremacy of the parliament.

On many occasions, Junejo spoke to Gen Zia about a timeframe for complete restoration of democracy, but the latter would only reply that he had already announced that martial law would be lifted when necessary. In a public meeting in Lahore, Junejo announced that martial law would be lifted before the new year set in, but he had not spoken to Gen Zia beforehand.

Later, when Junejo informed the general about the apprehensions of the House, he assured the prime minister that he believed in the supremacy of the parliament. Gen Zia then addressed a joint press conference with the prime minister and reaffirmed his belief in the supremacy of the parliament.

With the passage of time, there grew more than one group of MNAS who began meeting among themselves to discuss how to evolve a mechanism by which Gen Zia could be forced to lift the martial law. Maulana Gohar Rahman (Mansehra) was among them. He convinced other MNAs in forming two other groups to move the NA and pass a resolution demanding the military authorities to bring an end to the martial law.

After many long meetings and discussions, on May 26, 1985, three identical resolutions were placed before the National Assembly. The movers made long speeches in support of their resolutions and asserted that when the civilian rule had been restored there was no need of continuing martial law. After reading them, the house unanimously passed a resolution demanding an end to martial law.

It was generally believed that after the passage of the resolution, Gen Zia would be obliged to follow the house’s consensus. But it was later learnt that he had chalked out a schedule way back in 1983, when he announced on Aug 12 that after the elections he would lift the martial law before the end of the year. Four days later, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (then NWFP) and the Punjab assemblies also passed similar resolutions calling upon the army to bring an end to martial law and return to the barracks.

Despite the resolutions, the general did not budge. In fact, he had long ago decided to assert himself as a powerful president while Mohammad Khan Junejo was also trying to settle down as an elected prime minister and make sure that he gets all privileges and powers that he deserved as prime minister. By temperament, Junejo was not a man to raise quarrels. He knew it was a hard task and could only be achieved by a slow process. Gen Zia too played the matter diplomatically, and waited till an appropriate moment to keep his upper hand and go unchallenged.

By promulgation of Revival of the Constitution (RCO), Gen Zia had already exercised his domination over the prime minister and the federal cabinet. He wanted to act in the style of a ruler with all imperial powers, which he had enjoyed for the past eight years. He was never bothered about the parliament’s will, either through a resolution or any other act.

shaikhaziz38@gmail.com

Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, September 6th, 2015

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