THE year gone by was a landmark in the history of Pakistan: militant violence took a steep downward turn. However, the last two weeks of December exposed a new terror fault line — the growing footprint of the militant Islamic State group, or IS, in Pakistan. Apparently, the group has been silently making inroads into the religious segments of Pakistani society.

The unearthing of the reported IS-inspired or affiliated cells in Karachi, Daska and Lahore, many of whose members had apparently travelled to Syria to join the group, and the arrest of two Pakistanis in Turkey suspected of being members of IS brought to the fore some symptoms of the deep-rooted problem of religious extremism in society.

Nonetheless, after encroaching on cyberspace, IS’s Khorasan chapter in Afghanistan is now expanding its outreach through radio transmissions to Fata and the settled areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The militant groups in Pakistan have also felt the growing influence of IS, because a faction of Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan has rejected Baghdadi’s claim of being caliph. Such groups are taking IS as an existential threat to their survival.

IS does not need to do much to become relevant in Pakistan and Afghanistan, as the two countries offer fertile grounds in terms of their pervasive religious-ideological and militant orientations. The group’s inspiration is enough to catalyse existing extremist tendencies in the direction of ultra-extremism, and provide an advanced model to other terrorist groups.

The unearthing of IS-inspired cells in Karachi, Daska and Lahore points to a troubling reality.

A comparative study of the recently busted IS cells in Pakistan reveals that these were operating for similar causes and had many commonalities in their campaigns, notwithstanding variations in their structures and the profiles of their members. A more detailed study can help us better understand the challenge.

A factor common to the Karachi, Daska and Lahore cells was that these were personal initiatives of their respective members, who consciously decided to join IS.

Another common factor was shared religious-ideological and militant viewpoints and also the backgrounds of the members of these cells, who were found to be against democracy and the Constitution. They considered the Pakistan Army as the custodian of a colonial system and police as the guards of the power elite. There is nothing new in their religious and political views, as all militant and radical forces use the same argument to justify their cause, but they were greatly inspired by the IS approach to achieving the ultimate objective.

Militant strategies play an important role in transforming the landscape, as their operational success attracts the human resource of other organisations working for similar objectives.

The territorial aspect of the IS approach, which focuses on territorial control and the physical presence of a caliphate, holds great attraction for those who believe in the concept. Apparently, the same idea inspired the families of Lahore to travel to a land, where they could practise a complete code of religion.

The educational profiles of the members of all these cells were also similar and their social backgrounds had little variation. They belonged to varying income groups of the middle class but shared the same religious and social values. Like the normal middle class, they had dreams of a better life but their dreams had a religious orientation.

The members of the Daska cell originally belonged to Jamaatud Dawa, but they revolted and joined IS. At least two families of the Lahore cells had been associated with the same group, suggesting that the JuD is losing its members to IS. This may be due to two reasons: first, the Salafi credentials of both groups; and second, the ideological and political dilemma that the JuD is facing. Originally, the JuD was a militant group that contributed to the construction of jihadi culture and narratives in the country. But now it is struggling to put its concept of jihad in a regional domain and at the same time is developing a profile as a charity organisation. This dichotomy is alienating its members.

Even before the emergence of IS, the prime destination of JuD’s alienated members was Al Qaeda. One critical aspect of the JuD is its urban organisational structure in Punjab. This mainly focuses on engaging families, compared to other religious and militant groups that operate primarily in the ‘male’ domain. However the women belonging to the Lahore cells did not get involved in any operational activities inside Pakistan as they sought to travel to Syria. The Karachi and Daska cells had operational tasks as well. The Karachi cell had a connection with the Safoora Goth terrorist incident, and the Daska cell was operating a training camp in a nearby village.

Little is known about the families’ involvement in the Daska cell, but the Karachi cell was advanced, had a complete family syndicate, and its members were not in search of pure lands but eager to perform the obligation of ‘jihad’ inside Pakistan. Their techniques for raising funds and recruitment were quite advanced. The female members were active and, according to media reports, sent requests to well-off women seeking donations for IS through sophisticated messaging. They were also tasked with arranging the marriages of their operatives.

The Daska investigation revealed that a Pakistani national Abu Muavia Salfi was in charge of Pakistani militants in Syria, indicating that there could be more Pakistanis who have interacted with or are members of IS.

These cells, which had no links to each other, contacted IS through social media. However, no one was in touch with the Khorasan chapter in Afghanistan and instead members were directly communicating with their handlers in Syria. The members of these IS cells cannot be called self-radicalised or lone operators as they have been in the past affiliated with radical and militant organisations. The level of engagement of these cells with IS has varied: the Karachi cell was a family syndicate; the women belonging to Lahore cells took the initiative themselves; while the Daska members had not involved their families in the terror business. A giant task awaits us this year.

The writer is a security analyst.

Published in Dawn, January 3rd, 2016