Jason describes IS as “a hybrid of insurgency, separatism, terrorism and criminality with deep roots in its immediate local environment”, but at the same time, it is linked with broader regional conflicts and geopolitical battles. He goes deeper and traces the roots of insurgency in post-WWI Iraq as three provinces of the defeated and defunct Ottoman Empire eventually became independent in 1932. He sees the historical grievances, the political turmoil and rise of Ba’athists, Saddam Hussain’s brutality, and his expansionist ambitions as part of the socio-political discourse of the country which shaped the narratives of extremism.
However, a major portion of the book discusses the dynamics of Islamist militant groups, their strategies, and tactics. Burke elaborates Al Qaeda’s transformation after Osama bin Laden which he notes was not easy because it was not only about the organisational changes but also entailed changes in the strategy of the group.
However, the transformation within Al Qaeda did not prove productive as the group continues to be weakened because of the challenges posed by IS and local affiliates. Yet, Al Qaeda is committed to pursuing the same strategy formulated by Bin Laden during the 1990s. Despite being weakened, the group still poses a major threat to global security mainly due to its secretive nature. Obviously, IS is the emerging threat, which follows a carefully calibrated strategy of calling individuals to mount terrorist violence and mainly focuses on territorial control. In simple terms, Al Qaeda largely focuses on attacking the ‘far enemy’ — mainly the US and the West — and IS is attacking local regimes around the Islamic world — the ‘near enemy’ — which are allies of the West.
The author has also narrated the networks of affiliates that both Al Qaeda and IS have established as well as other independent groups and/or violent Islamist movements that may or may not pose a threat to the West. According to him, each group or movement poses different threats in different ways, but their alliances and nature of operational coordination make them more dangerous.
As far as Al Qaeda is concerned, after Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri took the lead and he tried to make the organisation more structured; he was enthusiastic about a formal association with each Al Qaeda chapter. Interestingly, this was the time when Al Qaeda chapters were struggling for legitimacy within their local political and ideological contexts.
The formal association with Al Qaeda central provided a temporary relief to many of these chapters that have had different motives to join the club. For example, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) appeared to have been motivated primarily by a desire for rebranding after a series of setbacks.
Al-Zawahiri was keen on developing a “solid base” around the world, where central leadership would have complete control over affairs of its affiliates. Burke also sees the formation of Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) in September 2014 in the same perspective and he argues that comparing with affiliates in other parts of the world there was no significant existing group on the ground ready to be incorporated into the Al Qaeda network. According to him, the other affiliates had been established over the best part of the decade — in Iraq in 2004, in the Maghreb in 2006, in the Arabian Peninsula in 2009. Each was the result of months of negotiations, as the terms of the relationship were worked out in a series of back-and-forth clandestine communications.
It seems that the ground situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan did not get proper attention in his analysis about the inception of AQIS. The situation in this region was quite fluid both on ideological and operational fronts. The local militant groups were getting inspiration from the newly emerging IS, and were arguing about Al Qaeda strategies, which they believed had failed to satisfy them and fulfil their dreams of territorial control and the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. The launch of military operations in Fata, including Zarb-i-Azb in North Waziristan, and growing internal differences among the militant groups there weakened the moral authority of Al Qaeda, which was the real strength of the group in this region. Seen in this perspective, the establishment of AQIS was a compulsion and not a decision of choice by al-Zawahiri. One should not ignore the fact that Al Qaeda and IS were not only involved in infighting, but on the propaganda front IS successfully painted the image that Al Qaeda has lost its relevance in the emerging context.
One interesting chapter in the book titled ‘The Caliphate’s Cavalcade’ is about the phenomena of growing extremism and the rise of lone wolves in Muslim societies. The author quotes the examples of Maldives and Bangladesh where liberal bloggers were targeted by IS-inspired individuals and small groups. He observes that India and Pakistan have manifested similar trends but the case of Pakistan is more complex because of its widespread extremist tendencies, and its potential to evolve into something much more threatening.
The key question the book raises is linked to the export of IS’s success in other parts of the world where Burke focuses on exploring the probabilities of expansion of the militant movement and examines the character of its affiliates. He sees a potential threat to the West from Syria. One dimension of that threat is linked to “returning veterans who do not get involved in any terrorist violence themselves but who help propagate extremist ideas among others.”
He considers the growing popularity of apocalyptic prophecy in the Middle East as an important tool for the inspiration and recruitment of the youth. Islamic State is continuously exploiting the idea in its publications that the apocalypse will be imminent when Islamist fighters will fight against infidels in Dabiq, a town in Syria that IS now controls.
IS’s sectarian tendencies help the group attract militants affiliated with sectarian organisations and also the Sunni youth. The author argues that “throughout the 1990s, violence towards the Shias had risen in parallel with the growing animosity towards the West, and growing intolerance towards other Sunnis who did not follow the more conservative, rigorous schools.” The propaganda strategies of IS are well known. The author also notes that sexual opportunities offered by the group also attract foreign volunteers. The organisation encourages marriages between volunteers from overseas and provides captive ‘wives’ to be systematically raped.
A chapter is devoted to the phenomenon of lone wolves in the West and tries to understand this through the case history of the French lone wolf Muhammad Merah who had conducted the March 2012 terrorist attacks targeting French soldiers and Jewish civilians in the cities of Montauban and Toulouse in the Midi-Pyrénées region of France. He had a criminal background and was arrested several times for petty crimes and jailed. He was fond of violent video games and behaved like a game character when he turned radical. He kept a low profile even when he travelled to Pakistan and Afghanistan for training. While quoting French security officials, Burke says, “Merah incarnated the new operational techniques of Al Qaeda. But Merah insisted that he had done the killing all alone. This was the puzzle but his travel record and other forensic evidence showed that he was connected with semi-autonomous groups.”
This case might appear familiar to many who are aware of the story of Saud Aziz, allegedly the mastermind of the Safoora Goth terrorist attack in Karachi in May 2014. Aziz and his journey are not much different from Merah’s with the exception that the former had formal relations with militant groups in Karachi. It is interesting that the radicals among diaspora communities and educated youth in Pakistan’s upper classes share lot of commonalities. That indicates how certain radical tendencies are getting globalised.
Overall the book provides an informed analysis of the potential and the threat of Islamist militancy and will be considered a valuable addition to the existing literature on the subject.
The reviewer is a security analyst. He is the Director of Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad.
The New Threat from Islamic Militancy
(TERRORISM)
By Jason Burke
Bodley Head, London
ISBN 978-1847923479
304pp.